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  1. Moralinis tikrumas vietoje moralinio objektyvumo.Aistė Noreikaitė - 2024 - Problemos 106:95-109.
    Straipsnyje siekiama įrodyti, kad nors Dworkino pastanga rasti labiau praktinę patirtį atliepiantį moralinės tiesos supratimą yra pagrįsta, jo tikslas tokį supratimą plėtoti pasiliekant moralės objektyvumo sąvoką yra problemiškas. Straipsnio tikslas – įrodyti, kad reikėtų žengti vienu žingsniu toliau nei Dworkinas ir atsisakyti pačios moralės objektyvumo sąvokos. Kadangi moralės objektyvumas pačia savo samprata oponuoja bet kokiam subjektyvumui, jis yra vidujai nesuderinamas su tokia praktinės tikrovės patirtimi, kokią mes turime kaip asmenys iš pirmojo asmens, subjektiškos, pozicijos. Kitaip tariant, Dworkino siekis peraiškinti moralės (...)
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  • By Which We May Be Judged: Moral Epistemology, Mind-Independent Truth Conditions And Sources Of Normativity.Maarten Van Doorn - 2022 - Dissertation, Central European University
    Many hope that our values, purged of messy human contingency, could aspire to correspond with mind-independent, rationally obligatory, and eternal ethical facts. But if the arguments of this thesis are on the right track, we should reject the search for non-natural and mind-independent moral truths.
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  • Future value change: identifying realistic possibilities and risks.Jeroen Hopster - forthcoming - Prometheus.
    The co-shaping of technology and values is a topic of increasing interest among philosophers of technology. Part of this interest pertains to anticipating future value change, or what Danaher (2021) calls the investigation of “axiological futurism”. However, this investigation faces a challenge: “axiological possibility space” is vast, and we currently lack a clear account of how this space should be demarcated. It stands to reason that speculations about how values might change over time should exclude farfetched possibilities and be restricted (...)
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  • The meta-ethical significance of experiments about folk moral objectivism.Jeroen Hopster - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (6):831-852.
    The meta-ethical commitments of folk respondents – specifically their commitment to the objectivity of moral claims – have recently become subject to empirical scrutiny. Experimental findings suggest that people are meta-ethical pluralists: There is both inter- and intrapersonal variation with regard to people’s objectivist commitments. What meta-ethical implications, if any, do these findings have? I point out that current research does not directly address traditional meta-ethical questions: The methods used and distinctions drawn by experimenters do not perfectly match those of (...)
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  • Explaining historical moral convergence: the empirical case against realist intuitionism.Jeroen Hopster - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1255-1273.
    Over the course of human history there appears to have been a global shift in moral values towards a broadly ‘liberal’ orientation. Huemer argues that this shift better accords with a realist than an antirealist metaethics: it is best explained by the discovery of mind-independent truths through intuition. In this article I argue, contra Huemer, that the historical data are better explained assuming the truth of moral antirealism. Realism does not fit the data as well as Huemer suggests, whereas antirealists (...)
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  • Striking coincidences: How realists should reason about them.Jeroen Hopster - 2019 - Ratio 32 (4):260-274.
    Many metaethicists assume that our normative judgments are both by and large true, and the product of causal forces. In other words, many metaethicists assume that the set of normative judgments that causal forces have led us to make largely coincides with the set of true normative judgments. How should we explain this coincidence? This is what Sharon Street (2006) calls the practical/theoretical puzzle. Some metaethicists can easily solve this puzzle, but not all of them can, Street argues; she takes (...)
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  • Shall We Adapt? Evolutionary Ethics and Climate Change.Jeroen Hopster - 2020 - In Julia Hermann, Jeroen Hopster, Wouter Kalf & Michael Klenk (eds.), Philosophy in the Age of Science? Inquiries into Philosophical Progess, Method, and Societal Relevance. Fordham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
    In this chapter I zoom in on a topic in climate ethics that has not previously received academic scrutiny: the intersection between evolutionary ethics and climate change. I argue that in the context of climate discourse, an evolutionary perspective can be illuminating, but may also invite moral corruption and reasoning fallacies. Relating my discussion to the general theme of the book, I argue that academic philosophy is well-positioned to fulfil a specific societal role, which is particularly important in the age (...)
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  • Fondamentalisme ou constructivisme des raisons? Les limites du réalisme normatif de Thomas Scanlon.Félix Aubé Beaudoin & Patrick Turmel - 2018 - Dialogue 57 (3):549-570.
    We argue that Reasons Fundamentalism, as defended by T.M. Scanlon, faces two important difficulties—one ontological, the other epistemological—namely theontological proliferation problemand thereliability challenge.We suggest that formal constructivism can avoid these difficulties, and that Scanlon would do well to adopt it. We also show that Scanlon’s three main objections to this view depend either on a misunderstanding of what formal constructivism is or on a question-begging argument in favour of realism.
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  • Trusting our own minds.Dennis Kalde - 2019 - Dissertation, Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
    When it comes to the metaethical task of explaining and making sense of what it is that we are doing while doing ethics, the subject of moral objectivity occupies an important and special place within that task. Thus, it is often agreed that being able to explain and justify the objective features of common moral practice is one of if not the most important task for any metaethical theory to undertake. In this dissertation, I tackle the issue of ethical objectivity (...)
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