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Physics, biology, and common-sense psychology

Jennifer Hornsby

In K. Lennon & D. Charles (eds.), Reduction, Explanation, and Realism. New York: Oxford University Press (1992)

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Personal and sub‐personal; A defence of Dennett's early distinction.Jennifer Hornsby - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):6-24.details Since 1969, when Dennett introduced a distinction between personal and sub- personal levels of explanation, many philosophers have used 'sub- personal ' very loosely, and Dennett himself has abandoned a view of the personal level as genuinely autonomous. I recommend a position in which Dennett's original distinction is crucial, by arguing that the phenomenon called mental causation is on view only at the properly personal level. If one retains the commit-' ments incurred by Dennett's early distinction, then one has a (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 48 citations
Objetividad como ausencia de toda perspectiva.Daniel Kalpokas - 2009 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 34 (2):29-47.details order to defend Putnam’s conceptual pluralism. Finally, the paper defends the compatibility between conceptual pluralism and the idea of convergence in a final opinion. Consequently, I conclude that objectivity depends on the particular vocabularies employed. This paper examines the concept of objectivity as a point of view without perspective. This sense of objectivity is present (among others) in Williams’ works (particularly in its notion of absolute conception of reality). The structure of the paper is the following: first, Williams’ physicalist program (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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