This dissertation examines the idea of _ethical revaluation_ — taking things we normally see as good for our flourishing and seeing them as neutral or bad, and vice versa — in the Mahāyāna Buddhist thinker Śāntideva. It shows how Śāntideva’s thought on the matter is more coherent than it might otherwise appear, first by examining the consistency of Śāntideva’s own claims and then by applying them to contemporary ethical thought. In so doing, it makes four significant contributions. Śāntideva claims that (...) property and relationships are bad for us because they promote attachment, and that others’ wrongdoing is good for us because it allows us to generate patient endurance. Yet he also urges his readers to give property to others, and to prevent their wrongdoing. Is he caught in contradiction? The dissertation argues that he is not, because giving to others is not intended to benefit them materially, but rather to produce beneficial mental states in them, and preventing wrongdoing is intended to benefit the wrongdoer and not the victim. In both cases, Śāntideva emphasizes individual action in a way that makes social or political action more difficult to justify. The dissertation’s first contribution is to show how this interpretation of Śāntideva contrasts notably with standard presentations of Mahāyāna ethics. Its second contribution is to refute claims that Buddhists have no normative ethics. Śāntideva’s resolutions of these apparent contradictions also have relevance for contemporary ethical thought. Martha Nussbaum argues against an ethical revaluation similar to Śāntideva’s, on the grounds that such a revaluation makes it contradictory to argue for providing goods to others, preventing others’ wrongdoing or engaging in political action. Śāntideva’s views show that ethical revaluation is a more sustainable position than these criticisms of Nussbaum’s would imply; if it is to be rejected, it must be rejected on other grounds. To show this point is the dissertation’s third contribution. The fourth contribution is methodological; by finding similarities of concern and differences of opinion between Śāntideva and a contemporary thinker, it helps bridge the gap between normative and comparative religious ethics. (shrink)

In this article we argue that ideas about management are led by cognitive frameworks rooted in cultural, including intellectual, traditions. African management is part of ambiguous mental concepts. African management results from a quest for an essentialist authenticity in the framework of decolonisation. Through analysing the life and work of the Ugandan African nationalist, poet and anthropologist Okot p’Bitek (1931–1982), we argue that the concept of double consciousness as defined by W. E. B. Du Bois (1868–1963) can be used as (...) a strategy to analyse the ambiguous nature of management in Africa. Generally speaking, double or, even better, multiple consciousness could serve as an instrument of any manager (and scholar), both in Africa and outside Africa, avoiding the danger of essentialism. (shrink)

John Locke is known within anthropology primarily for his empiricism, his views of natural laws, and his discussion of the state of nature and the social contract. Marilyn Strathern and Marshall Sahlins, however, have offered distinctive, novel, and broad reflections on the nature of anthropological knowledge that appeal explicitly to a lesser-known aspect of Locke’s work: his metaphysical views of relations. This paper examines their distinctive conclusions – Sahlins’ about cultural relativism, Strathern’s about relatives and kinship – both of which (...) concern the objectivity of anthropological knowledge. Although Locke’s own views of relations have been neglected by historians of philosophy in the past, recent and ongoing philosophical discussions of Locke on relations create a productive trading zone between philosophy and anthropology on the objectivity of anthropological knowledge that goes beyond engagement with the particular claims made by Sahlins and Strathern. (shrink)

History and the modern sciences are characterized by what is sometimes called a methodological naturalism that disregards talk of divine agency. Some religious thinkers argue that this reflects a dogmatic materialism: a non-negotiable and a priori commitment to a materialist metaphysics. In response to this charge, I make a sharp distinction between procedural requirements and metaphysical commitments. The procedural requirement of history and the sciences—that proposed explanations appeal to publicly-accessible bodies of evidence—is non-negotiable, but has no metaphysical implications. The metaphysical (...) commitment is naturalistic, but is both a posteriori and provisional, arising from the fact that for more than 400 years no proposed theistic explanation has been shown capable of meeting the procedural requirement. I argue that there is nothing to prevent religious thinkers from seeking to overturn this metaphysically naturalistic stance. But in order to do so they would need to show that their proposed theistic explanations are the best available explanations of a range of phenomena. Until this has been done, the metaphysical naturalism of history and the sciences remains defensible. (shrink)

Farming God’s Way (FGW) is a type of conservation agriculture (CA) that re-interprets the CA principles of no tillage, mulching and crop rotation using biblical metaphors such as God doesn’t plow, God’s blanket, and the Garden of Eden. Through faith-based networks, FGW has spread throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, and beyond, as a development intervention for improving food security, adapting to climate change, and restoring soil productivity for resource-poor farming households. This research identifies and compares the production, sustainability and faith claims of (...) FGW to ascertain which claims are contested. A qualitative study of Canadian program managers with responsibilities for CA or FGW projects in Africa and smallholding FGW farmers in Kenya is employed using semi-structured interviews and focus groups. Production-related claims of improved soil moisture and climate change adaptation are generally consistent among program managers, farmers and the literature, but social claims of increased labour demand on women and religious claims of faith enhancing CA are contested. Findings show that female farmers unanimously contest the claim that their labour for weeding is increased under FGW. Similarly, FGW farmers contest the claim that faith inhibits adoption or innovation on the farm, reporting instead that FGW connects faith to their vocation, transforms why and how they farm, and changes mindsets for adopting faith-based CA. (shrink)

Fleck's Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact foregrounds claims traditionally excluded from reception, often regarded as opposed to fact, scientific claims that are increasingly seldom discussed in connection with philosophy of science save as examples of pseudoscience. I am especially concerned with scientists who question the epidemiological link between HIV and AIDS and who are thereby discounted—no matter their credentials, no matter the cogency of their arguments, no matter the sobriety of their statistics—but also with other classic examples of (...) so-called pseudoscience including homeopathy and other sciences, such as cold fusion. The pseudoscience version of the demarcation problem turns out to include some of the details that Latour articulates multifariously under a variety of species or kinds in his essay/interactive research project/monograph, ‘Biography of an Investigation’. Given the economic constraints of the current day, especially in the academy, the growing trend in almost all disc.. (shrink)

El artículo propone una alternativa contextualista, o contextualismo meta-epistemológico, al problema del criterio. Dicha alternativa consiste en que se puede optar por el particularismo o por el metodismo según el contexto de reflexión en el que se encuentre el sujeto. Dado que los criterios de conocimiento cambian dependiendo de las circunstancias, podría argumentarse que el contextualismo meta-epistemológico se acerca al relativismo epistémico. Sin embargo, la diferencia entre ambos reside en que el relativismo epistémico considera que no hay una jerarquía de (...) criterios: todos los criterios de conocimiento son igualmente válidos. En cambio, el contextualismo meta-epistemológico sostiene que el conocimiento es una generalización a partir de criterios que pueden ser fijos en un contexto determinado, ya que con gran frecuencia han resultado más efectivos que otros criterios competidores. Por último, se discuten las implicaciones de aplicar el contextualismo meta-epistemológico en la obtención de conocimiento básico, entendido como conocimiento fácil, en el contexto de la vida diaria. (shrink)

This paper argues for thinking about religious commitments as different in kind from everyday ordinary understandings of the world. It argues against the straightforward assertion from the cognitive science of religion that belief in the supernatural is easy. That is, there is a way in which intuitions of invisible presence come very easily to people. Yet to sustain that belief commitment is hard, especially when the invisible other is omnipotent and benevolent. Here I suggest that it makes more sense to (...) understand faith commitments as a kind of frame that coexists with everyday commitments. The approach shares much with Neil van Leeuwen’s understanding of religious commitments and factual commitments as being held with different kinds of cognitive attitudes. Here I suggest that people engage the faith frame the way engage play and fiction—except that in the case of faith, the commitment is a serious claim about the world. (shrink)

Consensus has been highlighted by African philosophers as an element essential to African societies, past and present, that has not been assigned the importance it deserves. The philosophers involved have done this in part by drawing upon firsthand experience of their own indigenous cultures. Consensual governance presents a rather different view of the constitution of indigenous African societies and what should be their most appropriate form of political order today. A legitimate concern, therefore, is why this element supposedly foundational to (...) sub-Saharan African societies came to be underrated. (shrink)

In this paper, I attempt a critical assessment of Hallen’s case for reconsidering consensual democracy in Africa and argue that it is unconvincing. In furthering the discourse, I argue against a case for consensual democracy by exposing some other salient problematic aspects of Wiredu’s model of consensual governance. Contra Wiredu and Hallen on non-party consensual governance, I make a case for enriching majoritarian democracy through a fusion of some moral-ontological aspects of indigenous political practices for good governance. This eclectic model, (...) I argue, is more appropriate for post-colonial African polity and should rather be taken more seriously in the ongoing conversations on how best to organise the African polis. (shrink)