In this chapter I provide resources for assessing the charge that post-secondary students are self-censoring. The argument is advanced in three broad steps. First, I argue that both a duality at the heart of the concept of self-censorship and the term’s negative lay connotation should incline us to limit the charge of self-censorship to a specific subset of its typical extension. I argue that in general we ought to use the neutral term “refrainment from speech,” reserving the more normatively charged (...) “self-censorship” for cases of bad refrainment. In the second step of the argument, I seek to narrow down what counts as bad refrainment by mapping broad categories of possible reasons for and consequences of refrainment from speech. I argue that in general refrainment from speech is only bad if it is for bad (or what I will later term vicious) reasons or has pernicious consequences. When considering pernicious consequences, I argue that we should be concerned in particular about systems that perpetuate the coercive silencing of marginalized voices. I draw on Kristie Dotson’s work to describe two means by which marginalized voices are systemically silenced: testimonial quieting and testimonial smothering. After considering these types of silencing, I circle back to the post-secondary context to assess whether there is cause for concern if, as some reports suggests, US college students are refraining from speech within the educational context. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest prześledzenie wpływu cenzury na powstawanie zachowanej w rękopisie _Bożycy lub teozofii_ oraz na decyzje wydawnicze Bronisława Trentowskiego, jednego z wiodących polskich filozofów romantyzmu. Ze swego traktatu z zakresu filozofii Boga autor opublikował za życia tylko dwa fragmenty. Stawiam w artykule tezę, że dzieło nie zostało w pełni opublikowane z powodu złej recepcji owych fragmentów pośród polskich odbiorców, których tożsamość narodowa w okresie zaborów zawisła na spójności polskiego Kościoła katolickiego, a nie bezpośrednio z powodu cenzury. Kolacjonowanie opublikowanych fragmentów (...) z rękopisem dzieła ujawnia różnice o charakterze ilościowym i jakościowym specyficzne dla każdej z publikacji: jednej wydanej w Paryżu bez cenzury oraz drugiej opublikowanej w Poznaniu pod cenzurą pruską. Analiza wyników kolacjonowania w zestawieniu z korespondencją Autora z przyjaciółmi i wydawcami pozwala wnioskować o wpływie cenzury na proces twórczy _Bożycy_ pod postacią autocenzury. Pozwala też uznać gotowość Autora do wydania dzieła za cenę kompromisu z cenzurą instytucjonalną, ale nie za cenę odstąpienia od poglądów na kwestię filozofii Boga w celu zdobycia uznania odbiorców. (shrink)

In this article, my aim is to consider under what circumstances, and for what reasons, individuals may freely choose not to speak hatefully about others. Even if not threatened with legal sanction, why might they decide not to say something which they think they have good reason to say? My suggestion will be that there are various pro tanto reasons for individuals to restrain themselves from saying what they wanted to say. To be specific, I shall argue that such reasons (...) fall into three analytically distinct categories, which I shall describe as normative codes of civility, ethics and morality. Thus each of these codes may provide different sorts of reasons for not engaging in hate speech. My hope is that the results of this investigation may usefully inform a strategy which aims to combat such speech without resource to the law. (shrink)

Revelations of personal matters often have negative consequences for social-media users. These consequences trigger frequent warnings, practical rather than moral in nature, that social-media users should consider carefully what they reveal about themselves since their revelations might cause them various difficulties in the future. I set aside such practical considerations and argue that social-media users have a moral obligation to maintain their own privacy that is rooted in the duty to self-censor. Although Anita L. Allen provides a paternalist justification of (...) the duty that supports my position that social-media users are obligated to self-censor what they reveal about themselves, I justify the obligation through considerations that are more palatable to liberals than is paternalism. I accomplish this by arguing that the failure to self-censor often creates for others undue burdens that individuals are obligated morally not to create. In particular, social-media revelations often create undue burdens for those, such as employers and university personnel, who are obligated morally to respect individuals’ privacy in their decision-making processes. I also demonstrate that this argument is not for a broad duty to self-censor, but, rather, for a narrow duty that applies to particular circumstances such as certain uses of social media. (shrink)

On the face of it, self-censorship is profoundly subversive of democracy, particularly in its talk-centric forms, and undermines the culture of openness and publicity on which it relies. This paper has two purposes. The first is to develop a conception of self-censorship that allows us to capture what is distinctive about the concept from a political perspective and which allows us to understand the democratic anxiety about self-censorship: if it is not obvious that biting our tongues is always wrong, we (...) need a fuller account of the moral sensibility that finds it so troubling and this is elaborated here. The second is to develop an argument to the effect that this sensibility should not have the last, or only, word, but instead that self-censorship should be viewed as an ‘ordinary vice’ of democratic societies. The grounds for tolerating it rest on the democratic values that critics believe it threatens. (shrink)

This research examines the knowledge constructed in political ironic discourses, which is associated with different models of practicing self-censorship, taking a case study of the 2017 Hong Kong Chief Executive Election via social media Weibo. Critical discourse analysis, the verbal irony principle and semi-structured interviews were employed to compare participants from mainland China and Hong Kong, including opinion leaders and casual users. This research suggests a three-stage analytical framework that clearly emphasizes the act of rhetorical discourse and the practice of (...) self-censorship. As such, it reveals citizens’ intrinsic motivation related to self-efficacy, resistance or empowerment. This research argues that dissidents’ shared knowledge and ideology are structurally represented in the ‘binary opposition’ mode of rhetorical discourse, concerning the discursive construction of Hong Kong identity. The proliferation of rhetorical discourse, evolving shoulder to shoulder with Internet self-censorship, results from the complexity of politics, history and digital technology development within China. (shrink)