The notion of ‘power of judgement’ in the title of Kant'sCritique of the Power of Judgementis commonly taken to refer to a cognitive power inclusive of both determining judgement and reflecting judgement. I argue, first, that this seemingly innocuous view is in conflict both with the textual fact that Kant attempts a Critical justification of the reflecting power of judgement – only – and with the systematic impossibility of a transcendentally grounded determining power of judgement. The conventional response to these (...) difficulties is to point out that, Kant's systematic ambitions in the thirdCritiquenotwithstanding, reflection, qua concept-forming synthesis, is too closely tied to determination to be a cognitive power in its own right. I argue, second, that this response is question-begging, since the notion of reflection it employs is not only not one central to the thirdCritiquebut one antecedently tied to the understanding. I argue, third, that Kant's discussion, in the pivotal § § 76–7, of our cognitive relation to sensible particularity addresses an epistemic problem present (but not raised) in theCritique of Pure Reason. This is the problem of the synthesizability, qua absolute unity, of unsynthesized intuitions. Solving this problem requires Critical justification of a principle of reflection. It follows that Kant's systematic ambitions in the thirdCritiqueare appropriate. Given the problem Kant seeks to address, he must offer what he takes himself to be offering: aCritique of the(Reflecting)Power of Judgement. (shrink)

In the controversial Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant claims to “complete the critical work of pure reason” [A670/b698] by providing a transcendental deduction of the ideas of pure reason. In order to analyse the role that this Appendix plays in the first Critique, this paper will read the Appendix alongside Kant’s comments in the B-Preface concerning the astronomy of Copernicus. Through an analysis of the nature of Kant and Copernicus’ respective use of presuppositions, and by looking at their respective (...) attempts to unify a science around a single systematic conception of the object of that science, this paper will offer a defence of the fundamental role that Kant’s transcendental deduction of the ideas of pure reason plays in the text. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to propose a novel reading of the critical legitimacy of the regulative use of reason in the Transcendental Dialectic of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. After introducing some key terminology of the Dialectic, I analyse the shortcomings of two influential accounts of the regulative use of reason and identify their common problem in their commitment to the descriptivity of the ideas of reason. I then offer my rule‐based account of the regulative use of reason (...) by clarifying how Kant transforms reason's metaphysical inclinations into prescriptive rules of bottom‐up empirical research. Finally, I explain why such interpretation of reason is metaphysically innocent and thereby a promising approach to understand its role in Kant's scientific project. (shrink)

This article attempts to read the Transcendental Dialectic through Meillassoux’s model of the absolute contingency of being in order to rethink some of its central difficulties. Specifically, this concerns better understanding the role played by the categories of relation and modality in the empirical use of the ideas of reason, which underlies their regulative use that is directed at an absolute unity of reason. It will be discussed which questions are implied in the central claim of Meillassoux’s ontology, i.e., that (...) it is possible to derive from the necessity of contingency the existence and noncontradictory being of the thing in itself. First, I will retrace basic points of Meillassoux’s critique of “correlationism”, by means of which he reconfigures the divisions between metaphysics, physics, and ontology. Second, against the background of the Kantian concept of hope, I will examine a relation between the Transcendental Dialectic and ethics, as, respectively, conceived of in Kant and in Meillassoux’s reinterpretation. Third, I will critically ask in how far absolute contingency can be understood as grounding a concept of experience and in which sense the idea of the antinomy chapter in the Transcendental Dialectic contains an argument more complex than Meillassoux’s model suggests. (shrink)

Kant entwickelt in der Kritik der Urteilskraft eine philosophische Ästhetik, eine Theorie der organischen Natur. Die beiden scheinbar heterogenen Gegenstandsbereiche sind durch das Prinzip der reflektierenden Urteilskraft, die Idee der Zweckmäßigkeit, verbunden, die der Mensch sowohl bei der Reflexion über die schönen Gegenstände der Natur und der Kunst als auch bei seiner Erforschung der organischen Natur zugrunde legt. Da sich alle Zwecke zuletzt auf den Endzweck des Menschen als moralisches Wesen beziehen, übersteigt die dritte „Kritik" schließlich die Bereiche von Kunst (...) und Natur und berührt Fragen der Moralphilosophie und der Moraltheologie. Zusätzlich entdeckt Kant im subjektiven Vermögen der Urteilskraft jenes Bindeglied unter den menschlichen Gemütskräften, das einen architektonischen Übergang zwischen den Naturbegriffen des Verstandes in der ersten und dem Freiheitsbegriff der Vernunft in der zweiten „Kritik" ermöglicht und die theoretische und die praktische Philosophie in einem einzigen philosophischen System vereinigt. Der vorliegende kooperative Kommentar bietet eine textnahe, fortlaufende Interpretation der „Kritik der Urteilskraft". Für die 3. Auflage anlässlich des 300. Jubiläums Immanuel Kants wurden alle Beiträge überarbeitet und auf den neuesten Forschungsstand gebracht. Mit Beiträgen von: K. Ameriks, J. Bojanowski, R. Brandt, G. Cunico, M. Foessel, E. Förster, C. Fricke, H. Ginsborg, P. Giordanetti, I. Goy, O. Höffe, A. Kablitz, G. Kohler, S. Mathisen, B. Recki, J. Rivera de Rosales, S. Roth und E. Watkins. (shrink)