This paper explores the theory of freedom that Emilie du Châtelet advances in her essay “On Freedom.” Using contemporary terminology, we can characterize this theory as a version of agent-causal compatibilism. More specifically, the theory has the following elements: (a) freedom consists in the power to act in accordance with one’s choices, (b) freedom requires the ability to suspend desires and master passions, (c) freedom requires a power of self-motion in the agent, and (d) freedom is compatible with moral necessity (...) but not with physical necessity. While these elements may at first appear disparate, the paper shows that they fit together quite well. The resulting theory is a surprising combination of doctrines that appear to be based on Samuel Clarke’s libertarian account of free will and doctrines that are reminiscent of the compatibilist accounts of John Locke, Anthony Collins, Gottfried Leibniz, and Thomas Hobbes. (shrink)

Si Dios es la razón suficiente del mundo, entonces parece seguirse que todos los eventos son consecuencia necesaria de un ser necesario. Para evadir esta conclusión, Leibniz formula en la década de 1670 una concepción modal que funda la contingencia en un rasgo lógico e intrínseco de las ideas de las cosas: la posibilidad de concebir la idea contraria sin contradicción. Hacia 1686, Leibniz complementa esta primera concepción con lo que considera su solución definitiva al problema de la contingencia: la (...) teoría del análisis infinito. Sin embargo, en otros escritos de ese año, propone dos vías alternativas de fundamentación de la contingencia. Este trabajo sugiere que esa pluralidad de modelos explicativos converge en una concepción integral de las modalidades que subyace como trasfondo de la reflexión modal leibniziana. If God is the sufficient reason for this world, then it seems to follow that every event is a necessary consequence of a necessary being. in order to avoid this conclusion, Leibniz states, during the 1670's, a modal conception that grounds contingency on a logical feature which is intrinsic to the ideas of things: the possibility of conceiving the opposite idea without contradiction. Towards 1686, Leibniz complements this first conception with what he considered to be his definitive solution to the problem of contingency: the theory of infinite analysis. However, in other writings from the same year, he proposes two different ways to explain contingency. This paper suggests that this plurality of models converges in a global conception of modalities, which lies at the background of Leibniz's modal thought. (shrink)

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz endorses a version of the guise of the good thesis: he holds that whenever we do something intentionally, we do it because it seems good to us. This paper explores Leibniz...

En sus últimos años, Leibniz emplea el concepto de necesidad moral para cualificar la elección divina de lo óptimo. Sin embargo, Leibniz no explica este concepto con precisión. El presente trabajo intenta mostrar que la necesidad moral leibniziana no puede entenderse como una modalidad puramente deóntica, porque ello contraría los fundamentos metafísicos que hacen al carácter teleológico de su ética. El artículo propone también una interpretación del contenido alético de tal noción, basada en la conexión necesaria que Leibniz parece atribuir (...) a la relación entre la voluntad y la tendencia al bien. Dicha necesidad afirmaría que, aun cuando toda elección es contingente, en tanto entraña una infinidad de consideraciones, el Dios leibniziano está metafísicamente necesitado a seguir el criterio de lo mejor. In his last years, Leibniz employs the concept of moral necessity to qualify God's choice of the best. However, he doesn't explain this concept accurately. This paper intends to show that leibnizian moral necessity cannot be conceived as a purely deontic modality, because it would be contrary to the metaphysical grounds which make Leibniz's ethics strictly teleological. This paper also proposes an interpretation of the alethic content of this concept, based on the necessary connection that Leibniz seems to assign to the relationship between free will and the tendency towards good. What this necessity entails is that, for Leibniz, even though the infinity of reasons involved makes every choice contingent, God is metaphysically necessitated to follow the rule of the best. (shrink)

Moral rationalists and sentimentalists traditionally disagree on at least two counts, namely regarding the source of moral knowledge or moral judgements and regarding the source of moral motivation. I will argue that even though Leibniz's moral epistemology is very much in line with that of mainstream moral rationalists, his account of moral motivation is better characterized as sentimentalist. Just like Hume, Leibniz denies that there is a necessary connection between knowing that something is right and the motivation to act accordingly. (...) Instead, he believes that certain affections are necessary for moral motivation. On my interpretation, then, Leibniz is an externalist about judgements and motivation: he is committed to a gap between the judgement that something is morally right and the motivation to act accordingly. As a matter of fact, I will argue that there are two gaps. The first and less controversial one has to do with the fact that Leibniz reconciles his psychological egoism with ethical altruis.. (shrink)