Napredak umjetničkih praksi i stvaranje nove kategorije umjetničkih artefakata očekivano je doveo i do problema intuitivnog, ali i teorijskog određenja navedenih artefakata i praksi kao umjetničkih. Uvođenje do tada neumjetničkih ili uporabnih predmeta svakodnevnoga svijeta u svijet umjetnosti otvorio je rascjep u određivanju predikata biti umjetničkim djelom. Odgovor i teorijski izazov koji je uslijedio pojavio se u često osporavanoj potrebi pa i samoj mogućnosti da se umjetnost uopće definira. Čini se da, u kontekstu navedenog problema, potreba nije sporna, ali mogućnost (...) definiranja snažno je metodološki određena – željena definicija ne smije se urušiti novim napretkom umjetničkih praksi, posebno s obzirom da se izvodi iz umjetnosti kao dovršenog sustava. Nadalje, ona unatoč svojoj dovršenosti mora moći obuhvatiti nove umjetničke predmete i tako zadržati demokratičnost, inovativnost i imaginaciju kao obilježja koja tradicionalno konstituiraju područje umjetničkoga. Tako zahtjevan zadatak, koji bez dublje teorijske analize djeluje gotovo protuslovno, moguće je izvršiti spojem Dantoovih i Hegelovih teorija. Umjetnost valja pokušati definirati iz nje same, njenog historijskog napretka, a ujedno i opravdano napustiti estetiku kao filozofsku disciplinu koja se pokazuje nedovoljnom u korist samoproblematizacije umjetnosti kao filozofije umjetnosti. Time umjetnost sama sebi postaje objektom ispitivanja i vlastitom filozofijom koja omogućuje traženu dvostrukost u njenom definiranju. (shrink)

In “Violence and Metaphysics” Jacques Derrida suggests that “the only effective position to take in order not to be enveloped by Hegel would seem to be…to consider false-infinity…irreducible.” Inversely, refuting the charge of logocentrism associated with Hegelian true infinity ( wahrhafte Unendlichkeit ) would involve showing that Hegel’s speculative logic does not establish the infinity of being exempt from the negativity of the finite. This paper takes up Derrida’s challenge, and argues that true infinity is crucial to Hegel’s understanding of (...) ideality as a question of normative authority, which does not fall prey to logocentrism. Through an exposition of the dialectic of the finite and the infinite in Hegel’s Science of Logic , I argue that true infinity is not an ontological category that eliminates division, but rather refers to the metalogical standpoint involved in a philosophical account of determinacy. Although fully achieved at the end of the Logic , the metalogical standpoint that Hegel elaborates in the Seinslogik under the banner of the true infinite already clarifies that determinacy is a product of normative authority that is itself precarious. (shrink)

The article examines the role of Hegel's theory of finite cognition in Marx's critique of classical political economy. I argue that Hegel's distinction of finite cognition between analytic and synthetic in the Science of Logic constitutes the methodological framework through which Marx delineates the different stages of the development of political economy. Focusing on the Grundrisse, I reveal the Hegelian influence behind Marx's statements on previous political economists’ methods. Thus, Marx's immanent critique of the classical political economy is construed as (...) undertaken from the level of the systematic dialectical method of Capital, and is modelled on Hegel's immanent critique of analytic and synthetic cognition from the perspective of absolute cognition. In this context, and focusing on Marx's critique of Ricardo's method, I argue that the latter's limitations are associated with the deficiencies of synthetic cognition as presented by Hegel. Therefore, the article sheds light on an important yet underexplored topic of the Hegel-Marx relationship. By indicating the centrality of Hegel's theory of finite cognition in Marx's methodological underpinnings, the article provides a new perspective on Hegel-Marx scholarship. (shrink)