Pierre Duhem’s philosophy of science has influenced many philosophers in the twentieth century, and even today. Many of the subjects he addressed are still highly discussed today, especially the distinction between science and metaphysics. My aim in this paper will be to motivate a naturalistic approach where the difference between physics and metaphysics is only a matter of degree. I focus on whether it would be possible to articulate this gradual distinction from a duhemian point of view. Although Duhem thought (...) that metaphysics is an entirely different and more excellent activity than physics, I believe that Duhem’s philosophy of science also supports a naturalistic distinction in terms of degrees. I offer three reasons to justify this conclusion: Duhem’s notion of common sense; Duhem’s holism and his views on the generality of our theories, and Duhem’s notion of natural classification. At the end of the paper I will argue that a naturalistic approach accomplishes must of what Duhem wanted to achieve with his distinction. (shrink)

Cet article a pour objectif de présenter un compte-rendu accessible de l’immense héritage philosophique de l’œuvre scientifique d’Einstein. Einstein n’était pas un philosophe de métier, mais son raisonnement en sciences physiques portait en soi des conséquences philosophiques qu’il était prêt à explorer. En explorant les conséquences philosophiques de ses travaux scientifiques Einstein s’inscrit dans la démarche de physiciens tels que Newton, Mach, Planck et Poincaré. Einstein déduisait les conséquences philosophiques de la problématique que son travail de physicien faisait surgir. Ces (...) conséquences philosophiques vont de la métaphysique à la philosophie de la physique. Dans une certaine mesure, ces conséquences philosophiques peuvent être considérées comme étant des réponses à des questions philosophiques. On peut noter en particulier, ses vues sur l’aspect représentationnel des théories scientifiques et son insistance, à leur sujet, sur la notion de contraintes. Les travaux sur Einstein ont souvent négligé l’étude des contraintes en philosophie des sciences. (shrink)

This paper attempts to explain the emergence of the logical empiricist philosophy of space and time as a collision of mathematical traditions. The historical development of the ``Riemannian'' and ``Helmholtzian'' traditions in 19th century mathematics is investigated. Whereas Helmholtz's insistence on rigid bodies in geometry was developed group theoretically by Lie and philosophically by Poincaré, Riemann's Habilitationsvotrag triggered Christoffel's and Lipschitz's work on quadratic differential forms, paving the way to Ricci's absolute differential calculus. The transition from special to general relativity (...) is briefly sketched as a process of escaping from the Helmholtzian tradition and entering the Riemannian one. Early logical empiricist conventionalism, it is argued, emerges as the failed attempt to interpret Einstein's reflections on rods and clocks in general relativity through the conceptual resources of the Helmholtzian tradition. Einstein's epistemology of geometry should, in spite of his rhetorical appeal to Helmholtz and Poincaré, be understood in the wake the Riemannian tradition and of its aftermath in the work of Levi-Civita, Weyl, Eddington, and others. (shrink)

It is widely believed that the development of the general theory of relativity coincided with a shift in Einstein’s philosophy of science from a kind of Machian positivism to a form of scientific realism. This article criticizes that view, arguing that a kind of realism was present from the start but that Einstein was skeptical all along about some of the bolder metaphysical and epistemological claims made on behalf of what we now would call scientific realism. If we read Einstein’s (...) philosophy of science in its proper late nineteenth-and early twentieth-century philosophical context, we find that a kind of Duhemian under determinationist holism and conventionalism was more important to Einstein than either positivism or realism. And, reading his philosophy of science in its proper scientific. (shrink)

By inserting the dialogue between Einstein, Schlick and Reichenbach into a wider network of debates about the epistemology of geometry, this paper shows that not only did Einstein and Logical Empiricists come to disagree about the role, principled or provisional, played by rods and clocks in General Relativity, but also that in their lifelong interchange, they never clearly identified the problem they were discussing. Einstein’s reflections on geometry can be understood only in the context of his ”measuring rod objection” against (...) Weyl. On the contrary, Logical Empiricists, though carefully analyzing the Einstein–Weyl debate, tried to interpret Einstein’s epistemology of geometry as a continuation of the Helmholtz–Poincaré debate by other means. The origin of the misunderstanding, it is argued, should be found in the failed appreciation of the difference between a “Helmholtzian” and a “Riemannian” tradition. The epistemological problems raised by General Relativity are extraneous to the first tradition and can only be understood in the context of the latter, the philosophical significance of which, however, still needs to be fully explored. (shrink)

The Linda paradox is a key topic in current debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. We present a novel analysis of this paradox, based on the notion of verisimilitude as studied in the philosophy of science. The comparison with an alternative analysis based on probabilistic confirmation suggests how to overcome some problems of our account by introducing an adequately defined notion of verisimilitudinarian confirmation.

Continental philosophy of science has developed alongside mainstream analytic philosophy of science. But where continental approaches are inclusive, analytic philosophies of science are not–excluding not merely Nietzsche’s philosophy of science but Gödel’s philosophy of physics. As a radicalization of Kant, Nietzsche’s critical philosophy of science puts science in question and Nietzsche’s critique of the methodological foundations of classical philology bears on science, particularly evolution as well as style (in art and science). In addition to the critical (in Mach, Nietzsche, Heidegger (...) but also Husserl just to the extent that continental philosophy of science tends to depart from a reflection on the crisis of foundations), other continental philosophies of science include phenomenology (Husserl, Bachelard, Merleau‐Ponty, etc.) and hermeneutics (Heidegger, Gadamer, Heelan, etc.), especially incorporating history of science (Nietzsche, Mach, Duhem, Butterfield, Feyerabend, etc.). Examples are drawn from the philosophy of sciences (chemistry, geology, and biology) other than physics. (shrink)

Continental philosophies of science tend to exemplify holistic themes connecting order and contingency, questions and answers, writers and readers, speakers and hearers. Such philosophies of science also tend to feature a fundamental emphasis on the historical and cultural situatedness of discourse as significant; relevance of mutual attunement of speaker and hearer; necessity of pre-linguistic cognition based in human engagement with a common socio-cultural historical world; role of narrative and metaphor as explanatory; sustained emphasis on understanding questioning; truth seen as horizonal, (...) aletheic, or perspectival; and a tolerance for paradoxical and complex forms of expression. Continental philosophy of science is thus more comprehensive than philosophy of science in the analytic tradition, including (and as analytic philosophy of science does not tend to include) perspectives on the history of science as well as the social and practical dimensions of scientific discovery. Where analytic philosophy is about reducing or, indeed, eliminating the perennial problems of philosophy, Continental philosophy is all about thinking and that will mean, as both Heidegger and Nietzsche emphasize, making such problems more not less problematic. (shrink)

On the basis of historical and textual evidence, this paper claims that after his Tractatus, Wittgenstein was actually influenced by Einstein's theory of relativity and, the similarity of Einstein's relativity theory helps to illuminate some aspects of Wittgenstein's work. These claims find support in remarkable quotations where Wittgenstein speaks approvingly of Einstein's relativity theory and in the way these quotations are embedded in Wittgenstein's texts. The profound connection between Wittgenstein and relativity theory concerns not only Wittgenstein's “verificationist” phase , but (...) also Wittgenstein's later philosophy centred on the theme of rule‐following. (shrink)

The line of argument pursued in this paper is to proceed from Einstein’s fundamental problem situation to a consideration of scientific representation with respect to the Special theory of relativity (STR). Einstein’s fundamental problem situation, which is Kantian in spirit, is how the conceptual freedom of the scientist is compatible with the need for an objective representation of an independently given material world. To solve this philosophical issue Einstein employs a number of constraints, which are central to the STR. The (...) issue of scientific representation leads to a consideration of the notion of reality and to the realistic commitments implied in the STR. From this point of view, the paper concludes that Einstein was committed to a kind of ‘structural’ realism. (shrink)

The conventional interpretation that Pierre Duhem condemned outright any type of thought experiment in Ernst Mach’s sense should be, at least in large part, rejected. Although Duhem placed particular emphasis on the perils of thought experiments that Mach had overlooked or at least underestimated, he retained the core idea of Mach’s theory, according to which thought experiments cannot break free from the ultimate authority of real-world experiments. This similarity between Duhem’s and Mach’s views about thought experiments is not the only (...) one. Just as there was in Duhem’s criticism of “expériences fictives” a tendency leading him to give voice to one of Mach’s basic empiricist claims, so also there was in Mach’s interpretation of thought experiments a tendency in the direction of Duhem’s conventionalism. If Mach’s and Duhem’s conceptions of thought experiments are compared, there results an importantly similar, although not identical, tension that should properly be taken into account in the more general comparison between Mach and Duhem. (shrink)

The ArgumentEinstein's concept of causality as analyzed in this paper is a thick concept comprised of: (a) regularity; (b) locality; (c) symmetry considerations leading to conservation laws; (d) mutuality of causal interaction. The main theses are: 1. Since (b)–(d) are not elements of Hume's concept of causality, Einstein's concept, the concept embedded in the theory of relativity, is manifestly non–Humean. 2. On a Humean conception, Newtonian mechanics is a paradigmatically causal theory. Einstein, however, regarded this theory as causally deficient, for (...) it fails to comply with both (b) and (d). Special relativity was (partly) motivated by the wish to correct the first of these failures; general relativity the second. 3. Ironically, general relativity, based on the thick concept of causality, opens the way for a conventionalist understanding of that concept. 4. With regard to human freedom, Einstein professed to be a Spinozist. However, he suggested a version of soft determinism, not found in Spinoza. (shrink)

Although quantum theory is applicable, in principle, to both the microscopic and macroscopic realms, the strategy of practically applying quantum theory by retaining a classical conception of the macroscopic world has had tremendous success. This has nevertheless rendered the task of interpretation daunting. We argue the need for recognizing and solving the ‘observation problem', namely constructing a ‘quantum-compatible’ view of the properties and states of macroscopic objects in everyday thinking to realistically interpret quantum theory consistently at both the microscopic and (...) macroscopic levels. Toward a solution to this problem, we point out a category of properties called ‘relational properties’ that we regularly associate with everyday objects. We see them as being potentially quantum-compatible. Some possible physical implications are discussed. We conclude by touching upon the nexus between the relational property view within quantum physics and some neurobiological issues underlying cognition. (shrink)

While Einstein considered that sub specie astern the correct philosophical position regarding geometry was that of the conventionality of geometry, he felt that provisionally it was necessary to adopt a non-conventional stance that he called practical geometry. here we will make the case that even when adopting Einstein’s views we must conclude that practical geometry is conventional after all. Einstein missed the fact that the conventionality of simultaneity leads to a conventional element in the chrono-geometry, since it corresponds to the (...) possibility of different space-time metrics. (shrink)

This paper attempts to show how the logical empiricists’ interpretation of the relation between geometry and reality emerges from a “collision” of mathematical traditions. Considering Riemann’s work as the initiator of a 19th century geometrical tradition, whose main protagonists were Helmholtz and Poincaré, the logical empiricists neglected the fact that Riemann’s revolutionary insight flourished instead in a non-geometrical tradition dominated by the works of Christoffel and Ricci-Curbastro roughly in the same years. I will argue that, in the attempt to interpret (...) general relativity as the last link of the chain Riemann–Helmholtz–Poincaré–Einstein, logical empiricists were led to argue that Einstein’s theory of gravitation mainly raised a problem of mathematical under-determination, i.e. the discovery that there are physical differences that cannot be expressed in the relevant mathematical structure of the theory. However, a historical reconstruction of the alternative Riemann–Christoffel–Ricci–Einstein line of evolution shows on the contrary that the main philosophical issue raised by Einstein’s theory was instead that of mathematical over-determination, i.e. the recognition of the presence of redundant mathematical differences that do not have any correspondence in physical reality. (shrink)

In the late 19th century great changes in theories of light and electricity were in direct conflict with certitude, the view that scientific knowledge is infallible. What is, then, the epistemic status of scientific theory? To resolve this issue Duhem and Poincaré proposed images of fallible knowledge, Instrumentalism and Conventionalism, respectively. Only in 1919–1922, after Einstein's relativity was published, he offered arguments to support Fallibilism, the view that certainty cannot be achieved in science. Though Einstein did not consider Duhem's Instrumentalism, (...) he argued against Poincaré's Conventionalism. Hitherto, Einstein's Fallibilism, as presented at first in a rarely known essay of 1919, was left in the dark. Recently, Howard obscured its meaning. Einstein's essay was never translated into English. In my paper I provide its translation and attempt to shed light on Einstein's view and its context; I also direct attention to Einstein's images of philosophical opportunism in scientific practice. (shrink)

Gerald Holton has famously described Einstein’s career as a philosophical “pilgrimage”. Starting on “the historic ground” of Machian positivism and phenomenalism, following the completion of general relativity in late 1915, Einstein’s philosophy endured (a) a speculative turn: physical theorizing appears as ultimately a “pure mathematical construction” guided by faith in the simplicity of nature and (b) a realistic turn: science is “nothing more than a refinement ”of the everyday belief in the existence of mind-independent physical reality. Nevertheless, Einstein’s mathematical constructivism (...) that supports his unified field theory program appears to be, at first sight, hardly compatible with the common sense realism with which he countered quantum theory. Thus, literature on Einstein’s philosophy of science has often struggled in finding the thread between ostensibly conflicting philosophical pronouncements. This paper supports the claim that Einstein’s dialog with Émile Meyerson from the mid 1920s till the early 1930s might be a neglected source to solve this riddle. According to Einstein, Meyerson shared (a) his belief in the independent existence of an external world and (b) his conviction that the latter can be grasped only by speculative means. Einstein could present his search for a unified field theory as a metaphysical-realistic program opposed to the positivistic-operationalist spirit of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

This study reconstructs the 1928–1929 correspondence between Reichenbach and Einstein about the latter’s latest distant parallelism-unified field theory, which attracted considerable public attention at the end of the 1920s. Reichenbach, who had recently become a Professor in Berlin, had the opportunity to discuss the theory with Einstein and therefore sent him a manuscript with some comments for feedback. The document has been preserved among Einstein’s papers. However, the subsequent correspondence took an unpleasant turn after Reichenbach published a popular article on (...) distant parallelism in a newspaper. Einstein directly wrote to the Editorial Board complaining about Reichenbach’s unfair use of off-the-record information. While Reichenbach’s reply demonstrates a sense of personal betrayal at Einstein’s behavior, his published writings of that period point to a sense of intellectual betrayal of their shared philosophical ideals. In his attempts to unify both electricity and gravitation, Einstein had abandoned the physical heuristic that guided him to the relativity theory, to embrace a more speculative, mathematical heuristic that he and Reichenbach had both previously condemned. A decade-long personal and intellectual friendship grew fainter and then never recovered. This study, relying on archival material, aims to revisit the Reichenbach–Einstein relationship in the late 1920s in light of Reichenbach’s neglected contributions to the epistemology of the unified field theory program. Thereby, it hopes to provide a richer account of Reichenbach’s philosophy of space and time. (shrink)

Dans cet article, j’entends décrire comment évolue la philosophie de la physique de Weyl au cours de la période 1918-1927. Je rappellerai en particulier qu’il développe différentes formes d’« apriorisme» entre 1918 et 1923: un apriorisme « spéculatif» avec sa théorie unifiée des champs (1918-1921), puis une conception des connaissances a priori largement inspirée de la Wesensanalyse de Husserl dans ses travaux sur le problème de l’espace (1921-1923). Je montrerai par ailleurs que le holisme de Weyl, i.e., la thèse selon (...) laquelle seule une théorie physique envisagée comme un tout peut faire l’objet de tests empiriques, occupe le devant de la scène dès 1924-1925 dans des textes qui portent sur les fondements des mathématiques. Ce holisme est étroitement lié à sa conception de la théorie physique comme construction symbolique de la réalité. Au bout du compte je caractériserai le point de vue holiste de Weyl en le comparant à certaines réflexions développées par Cassirer, Einstein et Hilbert à peu près au même moment. (shrink)

Dans cet article, j’entends décrire comment évolue la philosophie de la physique de Weyl au cours de la période 1918-1927. Je rappellerai en particulier qu’il développe différentes formes d’« apriorisme» entre 1918 et 1923: un apriorisme « spéculatif» avec sa théorie unifiée des champs, puis une conception des connaissances a priori largement inspirée de la Wesensanalyse de Husserl dans ses travaux sur le problème de l’espace. Je montrerai par ailleurs que le holisme de Weyl, i.e., la thèse selon laquelle seule (...) une théorie physique envisagée comme un tout peut faire l’objet de tests empiriques, occupe le devant de la scène dès 1924-1925 dans des textes qui portent sur les fondements des mathématiques. Ce holisme est étroitement lié à sa conception de la théorie physique comme construction symbolique de la réalité. Au bout du compte je caractériserai le point de vue holiste de Weyl en le comparant à certaines réflexions développées par Cassirer, Einstein et Hilbert à peu près au même moment. (shrink)

By inserting the dialogue between Einstein, Schlick and Reichenbach in a wider network of debates about the epistemology of geometry, the paper shows, that not only Einstein and Logical Empiricists came to disagree about the role, principled or provisional, played by rods and clocks in General Relativity, but they actually, in their life-long interchange, never clearly identified the problem they were discussing. Einstein’s reflections on geometry can be understood only in the context of his “measuring rod objection” against Weyl. Logical (...) Empiricists, though carefully analyzing the Einstein-Weyl debate, tried on the contrary to interpret Einstein’s epistemology of geometry as a continuation of the Helmholtz-Poincaré debate by other means. The origin of the misunderstanding, it is argued, should be found in the failed appreciation of the difference between a “Helmhotzian” and a “Riemannian” tradition. The epistemological problems raised by General Relativity are extraneous to the first tradition and can only be understood in the context of the latter, whose philosophical significance, however, still needs to be fully explored. (shrink)

Such are those thick & gloomie shadows dampe Oft seene in charnel vaults, & sepulchers, Lingering, & sitting by a new made grave, As loath to leave the bodie that it lov'd, & link’t it selfe by carnall sensualtie To a degenerate, & degraded state.

The paper offers a historical overview of Einstein's oscillating attitude towards a "phenomenological" and "dynamical" treatment of rods and clocks in relativity theory. Contrary to what it has been usually claimed in recent literature, it is argued that this distinction should not be understood in the framework of opposition between principle and constructive theories. In particular Einstein does not seem to have plead for a "dynamical" explanation for the phenomenon rods contraction and clock dilation which was initially described only "kinematically". (...) On the contrary textual evidence shows that, according to Einstein, a realistic microscopic model of rods and clocks was needed to account for the very existence of measuring devices of "identical construction" which always measure the same unit of time and the same unit of length. In fact, it will be shown that the empirical meaningfulness of both relativity theories depends on what, following Max Born, one might call the "principle of the physical identity of the units of measure". In the attempt to justify the validity of such principle, Einstein was forced by different interlocutors, in particular Hermann Weyl and Wolfgang Pauli, to deal with the genuine epistemological, rather then physical question whether a theory should be able or not to described the material devices that serve to its own verification. (shrink)