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  1. Revisiting the Proof-Structure of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction.Hyoung Sung Kim - 2023 - Kantian Review 28 (1):81-103.
    There is no consensus concerning how to understand the ‘two-step proof structure’ (§§15–20, 21–7) of the Transcendental Deduction in the B-edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. This disagreement invites a closer examination of what Kant might have meant by a ‘transcendental deduction’. I argue that the transcendental deduction consists of three tasks that parallel Kant’s broader project of a ‘critique’ of pure reason; first, an origin task to justify reason’s authority to use them; second, an analytical task that determines (...)
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  • Kant's mature account of monads as objects in the idea.Pierpaolo Betti - 2024 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):501-517.
    In On a Discovery, Kant depicts monads as simple beings that are thought in the idea as the ground of appearances. He argues that his account of monads is partially in line with both Leibniz's monadology and his own critical philosophy. However, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant appears to depart from the monadologies of his predecessors. In this article, I make sense of Kant's late subscription to a version of Leibniz's monadology by arguing that Kant considers monads to (...)
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  • The Grounds of a Critique of Pure Reason.Joe Stratmann - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (2):354-371.
    For the realist metaphysician, certain notions in metaphysics are objectively theory-guiding. But what makes them so? Echoing others, Dasgupta (Citation2018) suggests that the realist metaphysician faces trenchant difficulties here—resulting in the problem of missing value. I first propose that Kant’s project of a critique of pure reason faces this problem: he supposes that the notion of ground is objectively theory-guiding in metaphysics. This investigation reconstructs his response. I argue that, for Kant, a notion is objectively theory-guiding in metaphysics if (and (...)
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