The problem of history in Nietzsche’s second Unfashionable Observation is best approached through that which it is supposed to serve: life, more specifically human life. I argue that Nietzsche presents an oblique but nevertheless complete articulation of the nature of the human soul as consisting of two basic parts, of desiring (the unhistorical) and memory (the historical): of a multiplicity of desires that struggle for domination over the others, and which express themselves in more complex ways through memory-based structures such (...) as conscience. I then discuss some implications of this conception. First, I interpret the significance of the useful kinds of history: rather than being different modes of historical science, they are much more basic modes of practical relating to the matters of our world (especially to other humans and their ways of life) that are external to us both temporally and spatially. Second, I discuss the particular kinds of desires which underpin the three useful kinds of history. Third, I interpret the problem of scientific history as arising from a turning of the normal human structures of meaningfulness against themselves, and as resulting in two specific kinds of psychic damage: to our capacity for growth and self-cultivation, and to our will to do so at all. Finally, I show the importance of the erotic-historic soul for the questions of right and wrong methods of self-knowledge and for the meaning of the imperative “sei du selbst!” that we find in Schopenhauer as Educator. (shrink)