Skepticism about the external world may very well be correct, so the question is in order: what theory of knowledge flows from skepticism itself? The skeptic can give a relatively simple and intuitive account of knowledge by identifying it with indubitable certainty. Our everyday ‘I know that p’ claims, which typically are part of practical projects, deploy the ideal of knowledge to make assertions closely related to, but weaker than, knowledge claims. The truth of such claims is consistent with skepticism; (...) various other vexing problems don’t arise. In addition, even if no claim about the world outside my mind can be more probable than its negation, the project of pure scientific research remains well motivated. (shrink)

This article reviews John Wood’s Truth in Fiction: Rethinking its Logic.

InMetaphysicsΘ.6, 1048b14-17, Aristotle treats the problem of what it is for the infinite to exist potentially, i.e. to be potentially actual. According to my interpretation, Aristotle argues that to exist potentially is for the infinite to have a potentiality which cannot be actualized in reality but only in thought, because it is a potentiality the process of whose actualization cannot be brought to an end.

Contemporary platonism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is the belief in a fundamental cleavage between intelligible but invisible Platonic forms that are real and eternal, and perceptible objects whose confinement to spacetime constitutes an inferior existence and about which knowledge is impossible. The other dogma involves a kind of reductionism: the belief that Plato’s unhypothetical first principle of the all is identical to the form of the good. Both dogmas, I argue, are ill-founded.

In several recent issues of this journal, I argued for an account of property possession as strict, numerical identity. While this account has stuck some as being highly idiosyncratic in nature, it is not entirely something new under the sun, since as I will argue in this paper, it turns out to have a historic precedent in Plato⠀™ s theory of forms. Indeed, the purpose of this paper is twofold. The first is to show that my account of property (...) possession can be utilized to provide a novel interpretation of Plato⠀™ s theory of forms. And the second is to show that once it has been divorced from a variety of implausible doctrines with which it has historically been wedded, Plato⠀™ s central insight that all properties possess themselves, far from being of mere historical interest, is independently plausible, ironically enough, even from an empirical point of view. (shrink)

By way of an analysis of Arendt's defense of the public/private distinction in The Human Condition, this essay offers a re-interpretation of the status of the family as a realm where the categories of action and speech play a vital role. The traditional criterion for the establishment of the public/private distinction is grounded in an idealization of the family as a sphere where a unity of interests destroys the conditions for the categories of action and speech. This essay takes issue (...) with this assumption and argues that the traditional conception has had a pernicious effect not only on women, but on men as well. This argument is supported by locating a fissure in Arendt's analysis of this distinction that suggests a profound structural affinity between the public realm and the family. Key Words: Arendt • family • feminism • public/private. (shrink)

This paper discusses some paradoxical propositions in Chinese tradition, especially the School of Names. It not only explains what Chinese philosophers mean by these propositions and why there are such paradoxes in Chinese philosophy, but also makes an attempt to formulate these paradoxical propositions in the language of symbolic logic. Meanwhile, the paper makes a comparison between Chinese views about contradiction and Aristotle?s law ot non?contradiction and explores the relation between them. It comes to the conclusion that once the difference (...) between Chinese concept of contraries and Aristotle?s is made clear, inconsistency between Chinese paradoxial propositions and Aristotle?s. law of non-contradiction disappears. (shrink)

I discuss Aristotle’s opening argument against Platonic Forms in _Metaphysics_ A.9, ‘the Razor’, which criticizes the introduction of Forms on the basis of an analogy with a hypothetical case of counting things. I argue for a new interpretation of this argument, and show that it involves two interesting objections against the introduction of Forms as formal causes: one concerns the completeness and the other the adequacy of such an explanatory project.

There is little agreement about Aristotle’s philosophy of geometry, partly due to the textual evidence and partly part to disagreement over what constitutes a plausible view. I keep separate the questions ‘What is Aristotle’s philosophy of geometry?’ and ‘Is Aristotle right?’, and consider the textual evidence in the context of Greek geometrical practice, and show that, for Aristotle, plane geometry is about properties of certain sensible objects—specifically, dimensional continuity—and certain properties possessed by actual and potential compass-and-straightedge drawings qua quantitative and (...) continuous. For their part, the objects of stereometry are potential sensible three-dimensional figures qua quantitative and continuous. (shrink)

At Aristotle,MetaphysicsE.1, 1026a14, Schwegler’s conjectural emendation of the manuscript reading ἀχώριστα to χωριστά has been widely adopted. The objects of physical science are therefore here ‘separate’, or ‘independently existent’. By contrast, the manuscripts make them ‘not separate’, construed by earlier commentators as dependent on matter. In this paper, I offer a new defense of the manuscript reading. I review past defenses based on the internal consistency of the chapter, explore where they have left supporters of the emendation unpersuaded, and attempt (...) to strengthen their appeal. I challenge Schwegler’s central case, developed by Ross and others, that the construction μὲν ἀλλ’ οὐκ demands an implausible ‘logical antithesis’ between inseparability and mobility. This is arguably the fundamental obstacle to the manuscript reading, and counterexamples have not to date convinced emenders. I offer a new, systematic review of Aristotle’s use of the phrase, including relevant cases from theRhetoric, to show how its usual meaning in Aristotle supports the transmitted text; I also reply to possible objections. Finally, I explore the implications of this defense for the classification of the sciences in E.1. (shrink)

Aristotle formulates in _Metaphysics_ M.9 an aporia about Forms, according to which, those who introduce Forms make them universal substances and, at the same time, separate entities and, hence, particulars. But, he claims, it is not possible that both attributes, being a universal and being a particular, inhere in the same thing. The interpretation that scholars have offered of this objection is external, in that they hold that it derives from Aristotle’s own conception of separation: only what is particular is (...) separate. Here I defend an internal interpretation which claims that the objection derives from an assumption about the explanatory role of Forms that Aristotle attributes to the Platonists. (shrink)

It is difficult for us to effectively diagnose our current character state such that we can follow Aristotle's advice to aim for the opposite extreme. The law can provide us a general standard, and the household strives to fill in the particular gaps inevitable to laws that must be universal. Neither, however, can ensure a proper diagnosis. Careful attention to Aristotle's discussion of how the medical doctor generates health gives us a model we can apply to Aristotle's discussions of character (...) virtues and vices in Book IV of Nicomachean Ethics. The medical doctor must identify the form of health and its various lacks, must have a sufficiently varied set of images by which to properly grasp these in the varied context of human beings, must attend carefully to the patient's impeded form of health, and must trace this impediment back to some cause on the basis of which she can act to correct the problem. By applying this model, we can more profitably employ Aristotle's discussions of individual virtues in our responsible attempts to diagnose and heal the characters of those who belong to us. (shrink)