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Converging on values

Analysis 59 (4):355–361 (1999)

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  1. Neo‐Humean rationality and two types of principles.Caj Strandberg - 2024 - Analytic Philosophy 65 (2):256-273.
    According to the received view in metaethics, a Neo-Humean theory of rationality entails that there cannot be any objective moral reasons, i.e. moral reasons that are independent of actual desires. In this paper, I argue that there is a version of this theory that is compatible with the existence of objective moral reasons. The key is to distinguish between (i) the process of rational deliberation that starts off in an agent's actual desires, and (ii) the rational principle that an agent (...)
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