The standard of care in the United States favors stabilizing any adult who arrives in an emergency department after a failed suicide attempt, even if he appears decisionally capacitated and refuses life-sustaining treatment. I challenge this ubiquitous practice. Emergency clinicians generally have a moral obligation to err on the side of stabilizing even suicide attempters who refuse such interventions. This obligation reflects the fact that it is typically infeasible to determine these patients’ level of decisional capacitation—among other relevant information—in this (...) unique setting. Nevertheless, I argue, stabilizing suicide attempters over their objection sometimes violates a basic yet insufficiently appreciated right of theirs—the right against bodily invasion. In such cases, it is at least prima facie wrong to stabilize a patient who wants to die even if they lack a contrary advance directive or medical order and suffer from no terminal physical illness. (shrink)

Patients with borderline personality disorder (BPD) sometimes request to be admitted to hospital under compulsory care, often under the argument that they cannot trust their suicidal impulses if treated voluntarily. Thus, compulsory care is practised as a form of Ulysses contract in such situations. In this normative study we scrutinize the arguments commonly used in favour of such Ulysses contracts: (1) the patient lacking free will, (2) Ulysses contracts as self-paternalism, (3) the patient lacking decision competence, (4) Ulysses contracts as (...) a defence of the authentic self, and (5) Ulysses contracts as a practical solution in emergency situations. In our study, we have accepted consequentialist considerations as well as considerations of autonomy. We conclude that compulsory care is not justified when there is a significant uncertainty of beneficial effects or uncertainty regarding the patient’s decision-making capacity. We have argued that such uncertainty is present regarding BPD patients. Hence, Ulysses contracts including compulsory care should not be used for this group of patients. (shrink)

IntroductionBorderline personality disorder patients are often subjected to inpatient compulsory care due to suicidal behaviour. However, inpatient care is usually advised against as it can have detrimental effects, including increased suicidality.AimTo investigate what motives psychiatrists have for treating borderline personality disorder patients under compulsory care.Materials and MethodsA questionnaire survey was distributed to all psychiatrists and registrars in psychiatry working at mental health emergency units or inpatient wards in Sweden. The questionnaire contained questions with fixed response alternatives, with room for comments, (...) about the respondents’ motives for practising compulsory care of borderline personality disorder patients. The responses were analysed quantitatively with descriptive statistics, and comments were analysed with qualitative descriptive content analysis.ResultsThe psychiatrists’ views were divided on when it was justified to treat borderline personality disorder patients under compulsory care, as were their views on borderline personality disorder patients’ decision competence. When there was an assessed risk of harm, 53% were positive to compulsory care of decision-competent borderline personality disorder patients and another 31% because they considered the patients to be decision incompetent in such situations. Adding the risk of harm caused many respondents to alter their assessment of the patient from decision competent to decision incompetent.ConclusionThe large variations in doctors’ opinions indicate that the care of borderline personality disorder patients is arbitrary. Further, the assessed risk of harm increases the use of compulsory care, even though such care is advised against in clinical guidelines, has questionable legal support, and could lead to an increased suicide risk over time. (shrink)

The notion that patients’ medical decision-making capacity depends on risk considerations has some acceptance in the bioethical literature. However, it arouses some criticism since it seems to give rise to paternalistic attitudes. In addition, the idea of capacity assessment as a collaborative space in which aid is given to the patient is emphasized so that they can decide about their life. It does not seem ethically acceptable to pose the evaluation as a simple observer report. Capacity assessment can sometimes be (...) impossible or inconsequential. In short, capacity assessment is a procedure that, used wisely, can allow the patient to take charge of their life. Misused, it can be the gateway to unjustified paternalistic actions. (shrink)

The standard of care in the United States favors stabilizing any adult who arrives in an emergency department after a failed suicide attempt, even if he appears decisionally capacitated and refuses life‐sustaining treatment. I challenge this ubiquitous practice. Emergency clinicians generally have a moral obligation to err on the side of stabilizing even suicide attempters who refuse such interventions. This obligation reflects the fact that it is typically infeasible to determine these patients’ level of decisional capacitation—among other relevant information—in this (...) unique setting. Nevertheless, I argue, stabilizing suicide attempters over their objection sometimes violates a basic yet insufficiently appreciated right of theirs—the right against bodily invasion. In such cases, it is at least prima facie wrong to stabilize a patient who wants to die even if they lack a contrary advance directive or medical order and suffer from no terminal physical illness. (shrink)