ABSTRACT: In this article I defend the view that all feminists should be contractarians. Indeed, I argue that feminists should be Hobbesian or rational-choice contractarians at that. The argument proceeds by critically examining some of the main reasons why feminists have been resistant or even hostile to contractarian moral theory, and showing that the criticisms are misguided against Hobbesian versions of the theory. I conclude with a brief positive argument to the effect that contractarianism provides a plausible explanation of what (...) is wrong with patriarchy and so can serve as the theoretical basis for feminist ethics.RÉSUMÉ: Cet article propose que les féministes de toutes tendances se doivent d'être contractualistes de type hobbesien ou de choix rationnel. L'argument débute par une critique de quelques-unes des raisons principales pour lesquelles les féministes ont résisté ou se sont opposées à une morale contractualiste et établit que leurs critiques n'atteignent pas leur cible lorsqu'elles sont dirigées contre les versions hobbesiennes de cette doctrine. Un argument positif vient brièvement conclure le tout, en montrant que le contractualisme rend compte, fort plausiblement, des défauts du patriarcat, et qu'il est donc à même de fournir une base théorique à une éthique féministe. (shrink)

Hobbes's central insight about ethics was that it should not be understood to require that we make ourselves a prey for others. It is this insight that both varieties of contractarianism [Hobbesian and Kantian] respect. Consider a relationship between two human beings that exists for reasons of either love or duty; let us also suppose that it is a relationship that can be instrumentally valuable to both parties. In order for that relationship to receive our full moral endorsement, we must (...) ask whether either party uses the duty or the love connecting them in a way that affects the other party's ability to realize the instrumental value from that relationship. To be sure, good marriages and good friendships ought not to be centrally concerned with the question of justice, but they must also be, at the very least, relationships in which love or duty are not manipulated by either party in order to use the other party to her detriment. (shrink)