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Promises Schmomises

Law and Philosophy 36 (3):279-343 (2017)

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  1. What You're Rejecting When You're Expecting.Blake Hereth - 2023 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry (3):1-12.
    I defend two collapsing or reductionist arguments against Weak Pro-Natalism (WPN), the view that procreation is generally merely permissible. In particular, I argue that WPN collapses into Strong Pro-Natalism (SPN), the view that procreation is generally obligatory. Because SPN conflicts with the dominant view that procreation is never obligatory, demonstrating that WPN collapses into or entails SPN establishes epistemic parity (at least as concerns reproductive liberty) between WPN and Anti-Natalism (AN), the view that procreation is always impermissible. First, I distinguish (...)
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  • The bluff: The power of insincere actions.Kimberly Kessler Ferzan - 2017 - Legal Theory 23 (3):168-202.
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  • Probing the Depths of the Responsible Corporate Officer’s Duty.Kimberly Kessler Ferzan - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (3):455-469.
    Many criminal law scholars have criticized the responsible corporate officer doctrine as a form of strict and vicarious liability. It is neither. It is merely a doctrine that supplies a duty in instances of omissions. Siding with Todd Aagaard in this debate, I argue that a proper reading of the cases yields that the responsible corporate officer doctrine is just duty supplying, and does not allow for strict liability when the underlying statute requires mens rea. After analyzing Dotterweich, Park, and (...)
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  • What You’re Rejecting When You’re Expecting.Blake Hereth - 2023 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 20 (3):397-408.
    I defend two collapsing or reductionist arguments against weak pro-natalism (WPN), the view that procreation is generally merely permissible. In particular, I argue that WPN collapses into strong pro-natalism (SPN), the view that procreation is generally obligatory. Because SPN conflicts with the dominant view that procreation is never obligatory, demonstrating that WPN collapses into or entails SPN establishes epistemic parity (at least as concerns reproductive liberty) between WPN and anti-natalism (AN), the view that procreation is always impermissible. First, I distinguish (...)
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