AI-enabled State surveillance capabilities are likely to exert chilling effects whereby individuals modify their behavior due to a fear of the potential consequences if that behavior is observed. The risk is that chilling effects drive individuals towards the mainstream, slowly reducing the space for personal and political development. This could prove devastating for individuals’ ability to freely develop their identity and, ultimately, for the evolution and vibrancy of democratic society. As it stands, human rights law cannot effectively conceptualize this cumulative, (...) longer-term, harm, and so cannot accurately evaluate the cost/benefit of AI tools, risking irreparable harm. As chilling effects impact individuals’ ability to live a good, self-determined life, the concept of human flourishing is relevant. This article engages with Aristotelian naturalism, the life-satisfaction approach, and the capabilities approach to determine which best resonates with the concept of identity as relevant to chilling effects and human rights law. It concludes that the capabilities approach may overcome some of the problems associated with the human rights law approach and may provide a framework capable of capturing both the intricate processes of free identity development and of conceptualizing the harm linked to AI surveillance. The challenge, however, is to ‘operationalize’ this approach. (shrink)

In this paper I assess the possibility of advancing a modern conception of social justice under neo-Aristotelian lights, focussing primarily on conceptions that assert a fundamental connection between social justice and eudaimonia. After some preliminary remarks on the extent to which a neo-Aristotelian account must stay close to Aristotle’s own, I focus on Martha Nussbaum’s sophisticated neo-Aristotelian approach, which I argue implausibly overworks the aspects of Aristotle’s thought it appeals to. I then outline the shape of a deeper and more (...) general, and as yet unanswered, problem facing neo-Aristotelian accounts: how to justify the claim that the point of a just society is to assist or enable its members to flourish. (shrink)

Comparing Aristotle's and Confucius' ethics, where each represents an ethics of virtue, I show that they are not susceptible to some of the frequent charges against them when compared to non-virtue ethical theories like utilitarianism and deontology. These charges are that virtue ethics: (1) lack universal laws; they cannot (a) provide content for actions, and (b) they do not consider actions in the evaluation of morality. (2) Virtue ethics cannot provide the resources for dealing with social justice and human rights (...) practices. Contrary to these charges, I show how these thinkers' ethics can account for the first generation civil and political rights, and the second generation economic, social and cultural rights. (shrink)