In “Abetting a Crime,” Husak puzzles over what, exactly, abettors are held liable for. Having dismissed the proposal that derivative liability can ground the imposition of punishment, he then turns to fair labeling concerns to further highlight problems surrounding current Anglo-American complicity laws. The best moral solution, according to Husak, is a drastic but ultimately unworkable revising of our laws. Loosely, he presents a two-horned dilemma: the laws are either insufficiently detailed to respect fair labeling practices or too detailed to (...) be workable. Though I agree with his assessment derivative liability, I advocate for a more optimistic outlook. Specifically, I advocate for having multiple new crimes of “abetting _____,” where the blank is filled in by reference to a particular existing crime for which we think it should be wrongful to help another. This framework offers significant advantages over current complicity laws while escaping the two pitfalls Husak highlights. (shrink)

Accomplice liability makes people guilty of crimes they knowingly helped or encouraged others to commit, even if they did not commit the crime themselves. But this method of criminalizing aiders and abettors is fraught with problems. In this chapter, I argue that accomplice liability in the criminal law should be replaced with a system in which agents are criminalized on the basis of their individual contributions to causings of harm—the larger the contribution, the more severe the crime—regardless of whether those (...) contributions were made “through” the actions of another person. Not only would this avoid the issues associated with making the guilt of accomplices parasitic on the guilt of the principal, it would also fill gaps in the law concerning other cases to which accomplice liability does not apply. (shrink)