In this study, we wanted to show that plunging into the depths of modern consciousness allows us to discover a new fundamental measurement of consciousness associated with compaction of time. More precisely, we seek to identify the possibility of compaction of time in the consciousness under certain conditions, by analogy with how time is fundamentally transformed in space. We are trying to understand how, through modern existential and phenomenological as well as natural science methods, primarily on the way of interpreting (...) Heidegger’s destruction, one can rethink the essence of the fundamental dimension of consciousness related to institutionalization of time. In other words, the analysis results offer an opportunity to state that the new dimension reveals another fundamental property of consciousness. In this dimension, not only time is split, which had an objective effect on the classic understanding of the world view. The intention of time is also split, which manifests itself in transretention, transcendention and transprotention. (shrink)

We contest two claims: (1) that language, understood as the processing of abstract symbolic forms, is an instrument of cognition and rational thought, and (2) that conventional notions of turn-taking, exchange structure, and move analysis, are satisfactory as a basis for theorizing communication between living, feeling agents. We offer an enkinaesthetic theory describing the reciprocal affective neuro-muscular dynamical flows and tensions of co- agential dialogical sense-making relations. This “enkinaesthetic dialogue” is characterised by a preconceptual experientially recursive temporal dynamics forming the (...) deep extended melodies of relationships in time. An understanding of how those relationships work, when we understand and are ourselves understood, when communication falters and conflict arises, will depend on a grasp of our enkinaesthetic intersubjectivity. (shrink)

This article has already been published in The Polish Journal of Aesthetics, Numer 61. We warmly thank Ineta Kivle and The Polish Journal of Aesthetics for the permission to republish it here.: During the pandemic situation while the usual order changes and the search for new elements of security become more active, rhythm studies may provide a deeper understanding of human and ongoing processes. The current study views rhythm as a force of stability in the context of - Philosophie – (...) Nouvel article. (shrink)

The guiding question for this essay is: who is the learner? The aim is to examine and criticize one answer to this question, sometimes referred to as the theory of the learning brain, which suggests that the explanation of human learning can be reduced to the transmitting and storing of information in the brain’s formal and representational architecture, i.e., that the brain is the learner. This essay will argue that this answer is misleading, because it cannot account for the way (...) people strive to learn in an attempt to lead a good life as it misrepresents the intentional life of the mind, which results in its counting ourselves out of the picture when it attempts to provide a scientific theory of the learning process. To criticize the theory of the learning brain, this essay will investigate its philosophical foundation, a theory of mind called cognitivism, which is the basis for the cognitive sciences. Cognitivism is itself built on three main tenets: mentalism, the mind-brain identity theory and the computer analogy. Each of these tenets will be criticized in turn, before the essay turns to criticize the theory of the learning brain itself. The focus of this essay is, in other words, mainly negative. The hope is that this criticism will lay the groundwork for an alternative view of mind, one that is better equipped to give meaningful answers to the important questions we have about what it means to learn, i.e., what we learn, how we do it and why. This alternative will emphasize the holistic and intentional character of the human mind, and consider the learning process as an intentional activity performed, not by isolated brains, but by people with minds that are extended, embodied, enacted and embedded in a sociocultural and physical context. (shrink)

The first part of this thesis articulates and defends the Subjectivist View of the Mental. According to this view, my mental states are essentially different from the mental states of everyone else, but the fact that they are is a subjective fact, rather than an objective one. Chapter 1 explains what it takes for a fact to be subjective, what kind of difference holds between my mental states and everyone else's mental states and what kind of intuitions lead me to (...) believe that there is such a difference. Chapter 2 defends the Subjectivist View of the Mental from objections and discusses some of its most significant implications. In the second part of the thesis, I explore the advantages that the Subjectivist View of the Mental offers when it comes to accounting for three basic features of our knowledge of the mental. Chapter 3 deals with the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds. It is argued that, if the Subjectivist View of the Mental is true, we can explain why this asymmetry holds without assuming that self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds are involved with substantially different ways of knowing. Chapter 4 focuses on the immunity to error through misidentification of mental self-ascriptions. I show that, while there has been a temptation to explain this phenomenon by following Lichtenberg and Wittgenstein in taking the content of mental self-ascriptions to be general rather than particular, this proposal cannot be made to work unless something like the Subjectivist View of the Mental is true. Chapter 5 is concerned with experiential knowledge. I argue that, if experiential truths are taken to be objective truths, it is not easy to see why experiential knowledge should have the peculiar 'first-hand' character it has. The problem disappears if experiential truths are regarded as subjective rather than objective. (shrink)

Due to great importance in the construction of theories it is imperative to analyze the nature of time and space and their use by scholars, societies and subjects. This text is the product of such analysis. My claim is that the validity of an argument depends on the spatial and temporal conditions that it is produced in. Moreover, I posit that time and space have been used in order to impose regimes of oppression over different collectives. My intention, however, is (...) not only denounced these uses because the oppression of the societies, to present the lack of such arguments. In other words, arguments based on universality of time and space have been the cornerstone of modern knowledge. This knowledge justifies regimes of oppression in different parts of the world. However, the intention of this analysis is not to denounce the lack of humanism in this knowledge, but to present the falsehood or incompleteness of this knowledge. It is not only wrong because its lack of humanity which justifies the inhuman regimes of oppression. It is also wrong, since its premises are false. (shrink)

This article intends to compare the pure We-relationship in Schütz to what happens between us in Waldenfels. Schütz criticizes Weber’s basic methodological concepts: behavior and rationalism. For Schütz it is impossible through rational observance on relational behavior to guarantee the objectivism of sociology as a science. Schütz tries to prove that only a sociological theory that shows the different realms/worlds from which the interpretation of a product is built, with its obvious limitation of grasping the real meaning, while also clarifying (...) the deep relationship with others, can in fact illustrate its relative anonymity or concreteness. This task involves a sense of searching for concreteness instead of taking for granted its objectiveness. For Waldenfels, the pure We-relationship is too fixed in the subjectivity that is based on one-sided understanding, and decreases possibilities of the event occurring between us. For Schütz, one deals with an eternal paradox of interpretation that will not make us acquainted completely with the other’s mind. The lack of fissure in the We-relationship does not leave space for the possibilities of what happens between us, in other words, the meaning is arrested in subjectivity in an attempt to make meaning as concrete as possible. Waldenfels will not say that the meaning in its integrality can be found, but he will open ways, which lead to a threshold where/elsewhere one will find fissures, new possibilities that first penetrate the body and after can take place in attitudes towards the other. (shrink)

Based on results from evolutionary psychology, we discuss important functions that can be served by consciousness in autonomous robots. These include deliberately controlled action, conscious awareness, self-awareness, metacognition, and ego consciousness. We distinguish intrinsic intentionality from consciousness, but argue it is also important to understanding robot cognition. Finally, we explore the Hard Problem for robots from the perspective of the theory of protophenomena.

Die vorliegende Abhandlung versucht auf die Komplexität der Bezüge zwischen Friedrich Nietzsche und Martin Heidegger aufmerksam zu machen. Im Hintergrund dieser Bezüge steht das Phänomen der Stimmigkeit, das von beiden Denkern erörtert wird. Heidegger macht Nietzsche zwar dessen metaphysischen Nihilismus zum Vorwurf, der im Wille zur Macht im Sinne eines Willen zum Willen gegenwärtig sei. Dennoch verweist Heideggers Interpretation auf die Vielfältigkeit und Vielseitigkeit im ursprünglichen Denkansatz dieses hintergründigen Denkers, womit erstmals auf die Relevanz Nietzsches bezüglich der modernen Metaphysik verwiesen (...) wurde; diese Relevanz war zuvor, sämtlichen affirmativen oder negativen Äußerungen über den Urheber des Zarathustra zum Trotz, verworfen worden. Trotz alledem gibt es bei Nietzsche auch weiterhin Themen, die selbst Heidegger verkannt hatte, die jedoch auf vorzügliche und ertragreiche Weise zum Verständnis dessen, was man als Gemeinsamkeiten im Denken dieser beiden Philosophen betrachten darf, beitragen können. Das Tor, das sowohl in Nietzsches als auch in Heideggers Denkarena führt, ist das Thema ihrer thematisch neutralen, fundamentalen Stimmigkeit. Die Beurteilung dieses Sachverhalts erweist sich so als grundlegend für das Verständnis Nietzsches und Heideggers, aber auch für unsere heutige Situation. (shrink)