In this paper, I shall show that for Husserl, (a) evidence determines epistemic justification and (b) evidence is linked to originary givenness in the sense that one's ultimate evidence consists of one's originary presentive intuitions. This means that in contemporary analytic terminology, Husserl is a proponent of evidentialism and mentalism. Evidentialism and mentalism have been introduced into current debates by Earl Conee and Richard Feldman. Finally, I shall highlight that there is one significant difference between Husserl and Earl Conee and (...) Richard Feldman. Although Conee and Feldman argue that the fundamental principles of epistemology are principles of best explanation, Husserl opts for phenomenological principles as the most fundamental epistemic principles. The main difference is that for Husserl, experiences gain their justificatory force by virtue of their phenomenal character, namely, their originary givenness. (shrink)

ABSTRACTFor Husserl, noetics is the most fundamental science and the centrepiece of a phenomenological epistemology. Since in his major works Husserl does not develop noetics systematically but uses its main ideas and achievements often in apparent isolation without clarifying their systematic unity, the significance of noetics is often overlooked. Although Husserl has repeatedly stressed the importance of a phenomenological epistemology, what the concrete theses of such an undertaking are supposed to be often remains obscure. We shall see that the best (...) way to clarify this is by providing a detailed account of Husserl’s noetics as it is developed in Husserl’s lecture courses “Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge” and “Logic and General Theory of Science”. This is the main aim of the present paper. We will shed light on the significance, systematic unity, and concrete theses of noetics. Furthermore, I shall show in what way the main theses of noetics are present in Husserl’s ot... (shrink)

In his later writings, Husserl posits the original life of transcendental consciousness as the ultimate subject of phenomenological inquiry. Through self‐criticism in his work, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Husserl realises that the transcendence of representation remains unnoticed after the transcendental reduction. Consequently, he develops the method of apodictic reduction to reveal what is apodictic in consciousness. This method specifically reveals the living presence, as well as the constitution of immanent consciousness, to which the (...) transcendence of representation belongs. Husserl refers to this transcendence as the first transcendence, in contrast to the second transcendence of the constitution of the world. The constitution of the first transcendence is not separate from the living streaming presence but rather belongs to the life of consciousness itself. And it is only through this transcendence of representation that the identifiable (and re‐identifiable) I with its life is constituted. (shrink)