The anticipation of the typical under the assumption of the non-occurrence of the atypical is the experiential schema governing the individuation of ordinary enduring objects and their properties. Against this background, a primitive form of “if-and-only-if” consciousness is implicit in our everyday perceptual intentions. The thematization of the fact that perception operates under this proto-tentative structure occurs at the level of reflection and is expressed by defeasible judgments of the form “if p, then q, unless r,” or “if p, then (...) q provided that not-r”. Here I will argue that what is made thematic by judgments containing such restrictive clauses is the structure of unpredictability inherent in what Husserl calls the horizon of latency and, indirectly, the world as background of normality. (shrink)

In the first edition of Husserl’s 5th Logical Investigation we find a relatively unknown reductive method, which Husserl identifies retrospectively in the second edition as a ,Reduktion auf den reellen Bestand‘. In the 1913 version of the Logical Investigations the descriptions of this first reduction are nearly completely obscured by Husserl’s tendency to see them as tentative hints to his transcendental reduction. In this paper I will delineate the aims and the methodical context, but also the shortcomings, of Husserl’s first (...) attempt at a reduction, taking into account also the problems of the sense and the motivation of transcendental reduction. This first reduction seems strongly steeped in the methods and presuppositions of empiricism, a stance that was highly problematic already in the phenomenology of the first edition. Thus the present investigation opens up some new ways of understanding the formation of the method of reduction in phenomenology. (shrink)

One of the most prominent notions in Heidegger’s thinking about art is that of the earth. This paper probes the phenomenological potential of Heidegger’s concept by turning to the work of contemporary British artist Andy Goldsworthy. Drawing from Heidegger’s theoretical writings as well as his analysis of a poem by C.F. Meyer in “The Origin of the Work of Art” and his 1936–37 seminar on Schiller, I show that Goldsworthy’s sculptural art exemplifies different phenomenal traits of the “earth.” To supplement (...) Heidegger’s discussion, both Husserl’s claim that the earth defines the “spatiality of nature” and the role of the earth in Hegel’s philosophy of nature are taken into account. (shrink)

"Naiveté as Critique. The present paper addresses the similarities between the concept of “critique” used in phenomenology and the one put forth by critical theory in analyzing their corresponding understanding of “naiveté”. While Husserl develops a broad concept of naiveté in his reflections regarding the phenomenological reduction, where he characterizes the natural attitude as such as “transcendentally naive”, this concept becomes more nuanced when considering the unavoidable naivetés of phenomenology itself, on the one hand, and the complications brought to the (...) mutual relationship between naiveté and critique with his turn towards the life-world. This turn, the paper shows, can be seen as a metacritical reinvestment of naiveté that can also be traced in the works of Adorno. Keywords: Husserl, Adorno, life-world, metacritique, physiognomics. ". (shrink)

This article draws on Husserl’s manuscripts from the 1920s and 1930s (especially on the as-yet unpublished D-manuscripts), arguing that each concrete experience is governed by an irreducible tension between two intersecting normative dimensions: primordial and intersubjective. Husserl’s ideas of normality and normativity have gained a lot of attention in recent years, but the normative aspects of primordial constitution have not been properly taken into account. By arguing for the “normative tension” between the primordial and the intersubjective, this article contributes to (...) filling in this lack. By doing so, it sheds new light on the debate concerning the relationship between genetic and generative phenomenology, challenging interpretations that exclusively render either the genetic-primordial or the generative-intersubjective as the constitutive absolute. (shrink)

Based on Merleau-Ponty's description of nature as that on which we ultimately rely, this essay cultivates the thought that this description also fits an idea of God and therefore of Deus sive Natura. Guided by an outline for a phenomenology of climbing, it is argued that what Heidegger calls readiness to hand presupposes readiness-to-foot (Zufussenheit). The latter gives ground for gratitude not only because it gives ground for enjoyment as gratification, but because it also gives ground for joy understood as (...) a grace, grace understood as having its ground in Natura. (shrink)

This paper seeks to demonstrate the structural difference in communication of schizophrenia and autism. For a normal adult, spontaneous communication is nothing but the transmission of phantasía (thought) by means of perceptual objects or language. This transmission is first observed in a make-believe play of child. Husserl named this function “perceptual phantasía,” and this function presupposes as its basis the “internalized affection of contact” (which functions empirically in eye contact, body contact, or voice calling me). Regarding autism, because of the (...) innate lack of affection of contact, intersubjective perceptual phantasía does not occur spontaneously. Consequently, autistics do not engage in make-believe play but in stereotyped and solipsistic play. Without the formation of perceptual phantasía, there is no differentiation between phantasía and perception. For this reason, people with Asperger's syndrome consider conversation not an immediate communication of thought but a logical transmission of concepts. Schizophrenia is characterized by a distortion in the internalized affection of contact, resulting in a disturbance of perceptual phantasía, and this later is covered by various symptoms—for example, delusion as a pathological kind of communication of thought. This delusion is based on the pathological internalized affection of contact represented by a terrifying Other. (shrink)

In this paper we want to show how far the early, pre-critical Kant develops a theory of the constitution of space that not only anticipates insights usually attributed to the phenomenological theory of lived space with its emphasis on the constitutively central role of the human lived-body, but which also establishes the foundation for Kant’s Copernican turn according to which space is understood as ‘form of intuition’, implied in the activity of the transcendental subject. The key to understand this role (...) of the body lies in Kant’s understanding of the asymmetrical nature of a pair of hands, which despite being equal in size and structure, remain incongruent counterparts, and thus evade integration into a homogenous and purely self-referential form of space. (shrink)

The paper shows how to use the Husserlian phenomenological method in contemporary philosophical approaches to mathematical practice and mathematical ontology. First, the paper develops the phenomenological approach based on Husserl's writings to obtain a method for understanding mathematical practice. Then, to put forward a full-fledged ontology of mathematics, the phenomenological approach is complemented with social ontological considerations. The proposed ontological account sees mathematical objects as social constructions in the sense that they are products of culturally shared and historically developed practices. (...) At the same time the view endorses the sense that mathematical reality is given to mathematicians with a sense of independence. As mathematical social constructions are products of highly constrained, intersubjective practices and accord with the phenomenologically clarified experience of mathematicians, positing them is phenomenologically justified. The social ontological approach offers a way to build mathematical ontology out of the practice with no metaphysical magic. (shrink)

Em seu escrito "A origem da geometria", Husserl trata do horizonte, da história cuja estrutura deve ser investigada metodicamente. "A explicitação do horizonte, que percorremos, não deve permanecer apenas num discurso vago e superficial, mas deve alcançar um tipo de cientificidade". Para captara indole peculiar do horizonte histórico deve-se levar em conta primeiramente o conceito de "pré-darse". Uma dupla interpretação deste conceito permite que Husserl examine a história como possibilidade e a históriacomo efetividade. Isto significa que, através das múltiplas realidades (...) que a história nos oferece sejam condições de possibilidade para que possamos ter um horizonte histórico. Além disso, uma relação com a possibilidade tanto quantocom a efetividade, é possivel traçar duas distinções ulteriores. Assim, pode-se distinguir quatro níveis diferentes da interpretação da história: 1) o nível das condições de possibilidade, isto é, da implicação dos outros, o tempo e o mundo; 2) o nível das condições prévias para a efetivação, isto é, da "protogeratividade", a tradicionalização e a terra; 3) o nível da efetividade da história, isto é, de uma forma de geração, uma tradição e um território e 4) o nível da generatividade espiritual racional, de "uma" tradição e da representação de "um" mundo. O caminho da investigaçãohusserliana segue este escalonamento e clareiacada rúvel segundo três dimensões. De acordo com este esquema tentaremos, nas considerações a seguir, desenvolver a explicitação husserliana do horizonte histórico. (shrink)

Pre-theoretical experience and the lifeworld are traditionally seen as a key reference for phenomenology. In the present paper I intend to point out their relevance for critical theory as well. To this extent, I start off with a brief overview of phenomenological approaches to pre-theoretical experience and their relationship to empirical research. In sketching out some of the overlaps between phenomenology and early critical theory in this regard, I then specifically focus on Adorno’s reflections concerning the role of an extended (...) concept of experience in both his sociological and his philosophical work. Outlining Adorno’s methodological appropriation of “unregimented experience” in the guise of what he terms “physiognomic interpretation” – a procedure intended as a corrective to both rigorous empirical research and philosophical aprioric reasoning – I try to show wherein Adorno’s own approach to the pre-theoretical diverges from phenomenology. Finally, I conclude with some reflections concerning the different functions experience acquires in traditional phenomenology and critical theory. (shrink)

This thesis wrestles with the normativity of language, its usage and its practices while questioning the signifié-signifiant reality. A structural reading of language designs its translational practices within the source-target framework, thereby essentialising its relationship en passant: everything has meaning as long as we accept the hidden framework of a universal language. Therefore, language outlined as a system of signs is a product of transcendental considerations and consequently it renders practice into a hermeticrealm in which the distinction between eidos and (...) eidolon, right and wrong, familiar and unfamiliar, grammar and gibberish makes perfect sense and in which the translation from A to B is simply a matter of transferring identities. Linguistic power neutralises through its transcendental conditioning ephemera in life and world. We will discover that a phenomenological reading of language is open to layers which questions the dialectic setting of linguistic knowledge production. Phenomenology proposes to study life-world relationships by reducing the power of dialectical denomination to the power of gazing or to the lenses of ambiguity. Theorising language and translational practices within the phenomenological realm follows the concept of being oriented towards body-life-world while laying bare the phenomenon language. This revealing method supersedes empirical considerations since phenomenological methodology questions permanently our very own positioning. Hence, the transfer from A to B will be challenged by possibilities which are temporary: it is about a transfer zone featuring A as A’ to B or A’ in B / C. However, the phenomenological possibility reveals that the price for ephemera is tamed by the condition of its possibilities: indeed, the aporia of linguistic identity in polyvalence requires not only phenomenological brackets but also a transcendental backup. Chapter I and II study the translational practice of language and phenomenology by explaining its analysis via dynamised transcendental conditions. The disillusion of the phenomenological inquiry will be yield by radicalising phenomenological reading of language towards a phenomenographical practice of language. Chapter III goes to the extremes in exposing a language without content. The introduction of the trickster figure Narcissistgrotesque Face will be the anti-metaphor in which the grotesque line up forces us to learn bearing A with B and in which the non-content materiality of linguistic practices resemble le bas matérialisme. Not explanation, understanding and rendering things plausible is the movens for language but it is all about the spur of its enactment, its style and its story telling that renders translational practice visible. Chapter III is a performative practice in which we turn the text into texture. Translation happens then when your are perplex and the translational void enacts you and me. (shrink)

Focus of this article is the current situation characterized by students’ de-rootedness and possible measures to improve the situation within the frame of education for sustainable development. My main line of argument is that science teachers can practice teaching in such a way that students are brought in deeper contact to the environment. I discuss efforts to promote aesthetic experience in science class and in science teacher education. Within a wide range of definitions, my main understanding of aesthetic experience is (...) that of pre-conceptual experience, relational to the environment and incorporated in students’ embodied knowledge. I ground the idea of Earth at rest in Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy and Heidegger’s notion of science’ deprivation of the world. A critique of the ontological reversal leads to an ontological re-reversal that implies giving lifeworld experience back its value and rooting scientific concepts in students’ everyday lives. Six aspects of facilitating grounding in sustainability-oriented science teaching and teacher education are highlighted and discussed: students’ everyday knowledge and experience, aesthetic experience and grounding, fostering aesthetic sensibility, cross-curricular integration with art, ontological and epistemological aspects, and belongingness and connection to Earth. I conclude that both science students and student-teachers need to practice their sense of caring and belonging, as well as refining their sensibility towards the world. With an intension of educating for a sustainable development, there is an urgent need for a critical discussion in science education when it comes to engaging learners for a sustainable future. (shrink)