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Phänomenologische Psychologie: Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925

Edmund Husserl & Walter Biemel

Martinus Nijhoff (1962)

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(1 other version)‘Let's Look at It Objectively’: Why Phenomenology Cannot be Naturalized.Dermot Moran - 2013 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 72:89-115.details In recent years there have been attempts to integrate first-person phenomenology into naturalistic science. Traditionally, however, Husserlian phenomenology has been resolutely anti-naturalist. Husserl identified naturalism as the dominant tendency of twentieth-century science and philosophy and he regarded it as an essentially self-refuting doctrine. Naturalism is a point of view or attitude (a reification of the natural attitude into the naturalistic attitude) that does not know that it is an attitude. For phenomenology, naturalism is objectivism. But phenomenology maintains that objectivity is (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 26 citations
Is There a Metaphysics of Consciousness Without a Phenomenology of Consciousness? Some Thoughts Derived from Husserl's Philosophical Phenomenology.Eduard Marbach - 2010 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 67:141-154.details The paper first addresses Husserl's conception of philosophical phenomenology, metaphysics, and the relation between them, in order to explain why, on Husserl's view, there is no metaphysics of consciousness without a phenomenology of consciousness. In doing so, it recalls some of the methodological tenets of Husserl's phenomenology, pointing out that phenomenology is an eidetic or a priori science which has first of all to do with mere ideal possibilities of consciousness and its correlates; metaphysics of consciousness, on the other hand, (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
The fantasy of third-person science: Phenomenology, ontology and evidence.Shannon Vallor - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):1-15.details Dennett’s recent defense in this journal of the heterophenomenological method and its supposed advantages over Husserlian phenomenology is premised on his problematic account of the epistemological and ontological status of phenomenological states. By employing Husserl’s philosophy of science to clarify the relationship between phenomenology and evidence and the implications of this relationship for the empirical identification of ‘real’ conscious states, I argue that the naturalistic account of consciousness Dennett hopes for could be authoritative as a science only by virtue of (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Killing the straw man: Dennett and phenomenology.Dan Zahavi - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):21-43.details Can phenomenology contribute to the burgeoning science of consciousness? Dennett’s reply would probably be that it very much depends upon the type of phenomenology in question. In my paper I discuss the relation between Dennett’s heterophenomenology and the type of classical philosophical phenomenology that one can find in Husserl, Scheler and Merleau-Ponty. I will in particular be looking at Dennett’s criticism of classical phenomenology. How vulnerable is it to Dennett’s criticism, and how much of a challenge does his own alternative (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 28 citations
Husserl’s Foundation of the Formal Sciences in his “Logical Investigations”.Henning Peucker - 2012 - Axiomathes 22 (1):135-146.details This article is composed of three sections that investigate the epistemological foundations of Husserl’s idea of logic from the Logical Investigations . First, it shows the general structure of this logic. Husserl conceives of logic as a comprehensive, multi-layered theory of possible theories that has its most fundamental level in a doctrine of meaning. This doctrine aims to determine the elementary categories that constitute every possible meaning (meaning-categories). The second section presents the main idea of Husserl’s search for an epistemological (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Ordinary experience and the epoché: Husserl and Heidegger versus Rosen (and Cavell).Søren Overgaard - 2010 - Continental Philosophy Review 43 (3):307-330.details In various publications, Stanley Cavell and Stanley Rosen have emphasized the philosophical importance of what they both call the ordinary. They both contrast their recovery of the ordinary with traditional philosophy, including the phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl. In this paper, I address Rosen’s claims in particular. I argue that Rosen turns the real situation on its head. Contra Rosen, it is not the case that the employment of Husserl’s epoché distorts the authentic voice of the ordinary—a voice that is (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Husserl’s appropriation of the psychological concepts of apperception and attention.Daniel J. Dwyer - 2007 - Husserl Studies 23 (2):83-118.details In the sixth Logical Investigation, Husserl thematizes the surplus (Überschuß) of the perceptual intention whereby the intending goes beyond the partial givenness of a perceptual object to the object as a whole. This surplus is an apperceptive surplus that transcends the purely perceptual substance (Gehalt) or sensed content (empfundene Inhalt) available to a perceiver at any one time. This surplus can be described on the one hand as a synthetic link to future, possible, active experience; to intend an object is (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 8 citations

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