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  1. Real Feeling and Fictional Time in Human-AI Interactions.Krueger Joel & Tom Roberts - 2024 - Topoi 43 (3).
    As technology improves, artificial systems are increasingly able to behave in human-like ways: holding a conversation; providing information, advice, and support; or taking on the role of therapist, teacher, or counsellor. This enhanced behavioural complexity, we argue, encourages deeper forms of affective engagement on the part of the human user, with the artificial agent helping to stabilise, subdue, prolong, or intensify a person’s emotional condition. Here, we defend a fictionalist account of human/AI interaction, according to which these encounters involve an (...)
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  • Secret charades: reply to Hutto.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (5):1183-1187.
    In reply to Daniel Hutto’s “Getting Real About Pretense,“ I defend my theory of pretense against his claim that it is subject to counterexamples by clarifying wherein the value of the analysis lies. Then I argue that the central challenge still facing Hutto’s “primacy of practice” approach, as well as other 4E approaches to pretense, is to explain the link between pretense and deception.
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  • Public Charades, or How the Enactivist Can Tell Apart Pretense from Non-pretense.Marco Facchin & Zuzanna Rucińska - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-23.
    Enactive approaches to cognition argue that cognition, including pretense, comes about through the dynamical interaction of agent and environment. Applied to cognition, these approaches cast cognition as an activity an agent _performs_ interacting in specific ways with her environment. This view is now under significant pressure: in a series of recent publications, Peter Langland-Hassan has proposed a number of arguments which purportedly should lead us to conclude that enactive approaches are unable to account for pretense without paying a way too (...)
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  • Praxeological Enactivism vs. Radical Enactivism: Reply to Hutto.Martin Weichold & Zuzanna Rucińska - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (5):1177-1182.
    In his recent paper “Getting Real About Pretense: A Radical Enactivist Proposal”, Daniel Hutto raises several objections against our so-called praxeological enactivist account of pretense (Weichold & Rucińska 2022). He argues that one should, instead, adopt his radical enactivist explanation of pretend play. In this short reply, we defend our praxeological enactivist account against his objections, and argue that it has crucial advantages over his radical enactivist alternative.
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  • Implications of pretend play for Theory of Mind research.Julia Wolf - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1–21.
    Research on the development of Theory of Mind has often focused predominantly on belief attribution, but recently moves have been made to include also other mental states. This includes especially factive mental states like knowledge, where factive Theory of Mind may turn out to be more basic than non-factive Theory of Mind. I argue that children’s early pretend play also carries important implications for Theory of Mind research. Although pretend play does not directly provide evidence of Theory of Mind in (...)
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