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  1. Pictures in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy.David Egan - 2010 - Philosophical Investigations 34 (1):55-76.
    The word “picture” occurs pervasively in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Not only does Wittgenstein often use literal pictures or the notion of mental pictures in his investigations, but he also frequently uses “picture” to speak about a way of conceiving of a matter (e.g. “A picture held us captive” at Philosophical Investigations§115). I argue that “picture” used in this conceptual sense is not a shorthand for an assumption or a set of propositions but is rather an expression of conceptual bedrock on (...)
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  • What's the point of elucidation?Anthony Philip A. Hutchinson - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 38 (5):691-713.
    A. P. A. Hutchinson. What's the Point of Elucidation? Metaphilosophy, 2007, vol. 38, no. 5, pages 691-713. Published by and copyright Wiley-Blackwell Publishing. The definitive version of this article is available from http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/.
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  • The philosopher's task: value‐based practice and bringing to consciousness underlying philosophical commitments.Phil Hutchinson - 2011 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 17 (5):999-1001.
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  • Wittgenstein on Understanding as a Mental State.Francis Y. Lin - 2019 - Philosophical Investigations 42 (4):367-395.
    In trying to make clear whether understanding is a mental state Wittgenstein asks a series of questions about the timing and duration of understanding. These questions are awkward, and they have posed a great challenge for commentators. In this paper I review the interpretations by Mole and by Baker and Hacker, and point out their problems. I then offer a new interpretation which shows (1) that a “mental state” in this context means a state of consciousness, (2) that Wittgenstein's questions (...)
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  • Philosophical Clarification, its Possibility and Point.Daniel D. Hutto - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (4):629–652.
    It is possible to pursue philosophy with a clarificatory end in mind. Doing philosophy in this mode neither reduces to simply engaging in therapy or theorizing. This paper defends the possibility of this distinctive kind of philosophical activity and gives an account of its product—non-theoretical insights—in an attempt to show that there exists a third, ‘live’ option for understanding what philosophy has to offer. It responds to criticisms leveled at elucidatory philosophy by defenders of extreme therapeutic readings and clearly demonstrates (...)
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  • ‘Grasping the Difficulty in its Depth’: Wittgenstein and Globally Engaged Philosophy.Thomas D. Carroll - 2019 - Sophia 60 (1):1-18.
    In recent years, philosophers have used expressions of Wittgenstein’s (e.g. “language-games,” “form of life,” and “family resemblance”) in attempts to conceive of the discipline of philosophy in a broad, open, and perhaps global way. These Wittgenstein-inspired approaches indicate an awareness of the importance of cultural and historical diversity for approaching philosophical questions. While some philosophers have taken inspiration from Wittgenstein in embracing contextualism in philosophical hermeneutics, Wittgenstein himself was more instrumental than contextual in his treatment of other philosophers; his focus (...)
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  • Framing Effects in Museum Narratives: Objectivity in Interpretation Revisited.Anna Bergqvist - 2016 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 79:295-318.
    Museums establish specific contexts, framings, which distinguish them from viewing the world face-to-face. One striking aspect of exhibition in so-calledparticipatorymuseums is that it echoes and transforms the limits of its own frame as a public space. I argue that it is a mistake to think of the meaning of an exhibit aseitherdetermined by the individual viewer's narrativeoras determined by the conception as presented in the museum's ‘authoritative’ narrative. Instead I deploy the concept of amodel of comparisonto illuminate the philosophical significance (...)
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