A new form of skepticism is described, which holds that objectivity and understanding are incompossible ideals of modern science. This is attributed to Weyl, hence its name: Weylean skepticism. Two general defeat strategies are then proposed, one of which is rejected.

By inserting the dialogue between Einstein, Schlick and Reichenbach into a wider network of debates about the epistemology of geometry, this paper shows that not only did Einstein and Logical Empiricists come to disagree about the role, principled or provisional, played by rods and clocks in General Relativity, but also that in their lifelong interchange, they never clearly identified the problem they were discussing. Einstein’s reflections on geometry can be understood only in the context of his ”measuring rod objection” against (...) Weyl. On the contrary, Logical Empiricists, though carefully analyzing the Einstein–Weyl debate, tried to interpret Einstein’s epistemology of geometry as a continuation of the Helmholtz–Poincaré debate by other means. The origin of the misunderstanding, it is argued, should be found in the failed appreciation of the difference between a “Helmholtzian” and a “Riemannian” tradition. The epistemological problems raised by General Relativity are extraneous to the first tradition and can only be understood in the context of the latter, the philosophical significance of which, however, still needs to be fully explored. (shrink)

The paper offers a historical overview of Einstein's oscillating attitude towards a "phenomenological" and "dynamical" treatment of rods and clocks in relativity theory. Contrary to what it has been usually claimed in recent literature, it is argued that this distinction should not be understood in the framework of opposition between principle and constructive theories. In particular Einstein does not seem to have plead for a "dynamical" explanation for the phenomenon rods contraction and clock dilation which was initially described only "kinematically". (...) On the contrary textual evidence shows that, according to Einstein, a realistic microscopic model of rods and clocks was needed to account for the very existence of measuring devices of "identical construction" which always measure the same unit of time and the same unit of length. In fact, it will be shown that the empirical meaningfulness of both relativity theories depends on what, following Max Born, one might call the "principle of the physical identity of the units of measure". In the attempt to justify the validity of such principle, Einstein was forced by different interlocutors, in particular Hermann Weyl and Wolfgang Pauli, to deal with the genuine epistemological, rather then physical question whether a theory should be able or not to described the material devices that serve to its own verification. (shrink)

Hilbert’s program was an ambitious and wide-ranging project in the philosophy and foundations of mathematics. In order to “dispose of the foundational questions in mathematics once and for all,” Hilbert proposed a two-pronged approach in 1921: first, classical mathematics should be formalized in axiomatic systems; second, using only restricted, “finitary” means, one should give proofs of the consistency of these axiomatic systems. Although Gödel’s incompleteness theorems show that the program as originally conceived cannot be carried out, it had many partial (...) successes, and generated important advances in logical theory and metatheory, both at the time and since. The article discusses the historical background and development of Hilbert’s program, its philosophical underpinnings and consequences, and its subsequent development and influences since the 1930s. (shrink)

This article locates Weyl''s philosophy of mathematics and its relationship to his philosophy of science within the epistemological and ontological framework of Husserl''s phenomenology as expressed in the Logical Investigations and Ideas. This interpretation permits a unified reading of Weyl''s scattered philosophical comments in The Continuum and Space-Time-Matter. But the article also indicates that Weyl employed Poincaré''s predicativist concerns to modify Husserl''s semantics and trim Husserl''s ontology. Using Poincaré''s razor to shave Husserl''s beard leads to limitations on the least upper (...) bound theorem in the foundations of analysis and Dirichlet''s principle in the foundations of physics. Finally, the article opens the possibility of reading Weyl as a systematic thinker, that he follows Husserl''s so-called transcendental turn in the Ideas. This permits an even more unified reading of Weyl''s scattered philosophical comments. (shrink)

In one of his meetings with members of the Vienna Circle, Wittgenstein discusses Hermann Weyl’s brief conversion to intuitionism and criticizes his arguments against applying the law of the excluded middle to generalizations over the natural numbers. Like Weyl, however, Wittgenstein rejects the classical model theoretic conception of generality when it comes to infinite domains. Nonetheless, he disagrees with him about the reasons for doing so. This paper provides an account of Wittgenstein’s criticism of Weyl that is based on his (...) differing understanding of what a general statement over infinite domains consists in. This difference in their conception of generality is argued to be central to the middle Wittgenstein’s overall stance on intuitionism as well. While Weyl (and other intuitionists) reject the law of the excluded middle on grounds of constructivity, Wittgenstein argues that general statements over infinite domains do not express propositions in the first place. The origin of this position as well as its consequences for contemporary debates on generality are further assessed. (shrink)

This paper presents a systematic study of the prehistory of the traditional subsystems of second-order arithmetic that feature prominently in the reverse mathematics program of Friedman and Simpson. We look in particular at: (i) the long arc from Poincar\'e to Feferman as concerns arithmetic definability and provability, (ii) the interplay between finitism and the formalization of analysis in the lecture notes and publications of Hilbert and Bernays, (iii) the uncertainty as to the constructive status of principles equivalent to Weak K\"onig's (...) Lemma, and (iv) the large-scale intellectual backdrop to arithmetical transfinite recursion in descriptive set theory and its effectivization by Borel, Lusin, Addison, and others. (shrink)

A seminal theorem due to Weyl [14] states that if $(a_n)$ is any sequence of distinct integers, then, for almost every $x \in \mathbb{R}$, the sequence $(a_n x)$ is uniformly distributed modulo one. In particular, for almost every $x$ in the unit interval, the sequence $(a_n x)$ is uniformly distributed modulo one for every computable sequence $(a_n)$ of distinct integers. Call such an $x$ UD random. Here it is shown that every Schnorr random real is UD random, but there are (...) Kurtz random reals that are not UD random. On the other hand, Weyl's theorem still holds relative to a particular effectively closed null set, so there are UD random reals that are not Kurtz random. (shrink)

Henri Bergson and William James were great admirers of each other, and James seemed to think he got valuable ideas from Bergson. But early critics were right to see in Bergson the antithesis of pragmatism. Unfolding this antithesis is a convenient way to study important concepts and innovations in Bergson's philosophy. I concentrate on his ideas of duration and intuition, and show how they prove the necessity of going beyond pragmatism. The reason is because knowledge itself goes beyond the utilitarian (...) limitations in which pragmatism confines it. Knowledge is more than utility, more than adaptation, more than pragmatism, because our cognitive powers prove capable of more than any naturally selected service to survival. (shrink)

It is argued that Weyl’s theory of gravitation and electricity came out of ‘mathematical justice’: out of the equal rights direction and length. Such mathematical justice was manifestly at work in the context of discovery, and is enough to derive all of source-free electromagnetism. Weyl’s repeated references to coordinates and gauge are taken to express equal treatment of direction and length.

Even though Husserl and Brouwer have never discussed each other's work, ideas from Husserl have been used to justify Brouwer's intuitionistic logic. I claim that a Husserlian reading of Brouwer can also serve to justify the existence of choice sequences as objects of pure mathematics. An outline of such a reading is given, and some objections are discussed.

This article investigates an intertwined systematic and historical view on theories of matter. It follows an approach brought forward by Hermann Weyl around 1925, applies it to recent theories of matter in physics (including geometrodynamics and quantum gravity), and embeds it into a more general philosophical framework. First, I shall discuss the physical and philosophical problems of a unified field theory on the basis of Weyl's own abandonment of his 1918 ‘pure field theory’ in favour of an ‘agent theory’ of (...) matter. The difference between agent and field theories of matter is then used to establish a sort of dialectic meta-view. With reference to Weyl this view can be understood as being a particular Fichtean transcendental idealist approach which attempts to combine the strengths of the Husserlian phenomenology and Cassirer's neo-Kantianism. (shrink)

Dans un discours prononcé à Zurich vers la fin des années 1940, Hermann Weyl a examiné l'épistémologie dialectique de Ferdinand Gonseth et l'a considérée comme trop strictement limitée aux aspects de changement historique. Son expérience de la philosophie diaclectique post-kantienne, en particulier la dérivation du concept de l'espace et de la matière chez Johann Gottlieb Fichte, avait constitué une base dialectique solide pour ses propres études de 1918 en une géométrie purement infinitésimale et la théorie antérieure d'un champ de matière (...) géométriquement unifié (en prolongement du programme Mie-Hilbert). Bien que Weyl se fût alors éloigné des aspects spéculatifs de la philosophie de sa jeunesse et eût montré, en particulier, moins d'enthousiasme qu'auparavant pour Fichte, il nourrissait encore de nombreux doutes sur la base culturelle de la science mathématique moderne et sur son rôle dans la culture matérielle du modernisme de pointe. Pour Weyl, la « réflexion » philosophique était une nécessité culturelle ; il se tourna alors vers lexistentialisme de Karl Jaspers et de Martin Heidegger pour trouver des raisons plus profondes, dans un mouvement comparable à son orientation vers la philosophie de Fichte après la Première Guerre mondiale. Le débat de la fin des années 1940 peut être compris comme une sorte de supplément postérieur à la Seconde Guerre mondiale par rapport à ses commentaires plus connus sur les mathématiques et les sciences naturelles publiés au milieu des années 1920. (shrink)

En este artículo pretendo discutir la conclusión a la que llega Weyl en su libro _El continuo_ sobre la relación entre el continuo intuitivo y el matemático. Esto me sirve a su vez para analizar más profundamente estas ideas, y postular la propiedad de ausencia de espacios vacíos [_Lückenlosigkeit_] como fundamento del continuo intuitivo y, en consecuencia, del matemático. Proponiendo además una alternativa idealista para el tratamiento del problema del continuo.

Recently discovered correspondence from Oskar Becker to Hermann Weyl sheds new light on Weyl's engagement with Husserlian transcendental phenomenology in 1918-1927. Here the last two of these letters, dated July and August, 1926, dealing with issues in the philosophy of mathematics are presented, together with background and a detailed commentary. The letters provide an instructive context for re-assessing the connection between intuitionism and phenomenology in Weyl's foundational thought, and for understanding Weyl's term ‘symbolic construction’ as marking his own considered position (...) in the foundational controversy of the 1920s. In addition, they reveal Weyl's hitherto unknown objections to Becker's detailed attempt (Mathematische Existenz, 1927) to ground the transfinite phenomenologically. (shrink)

The paper explores Hermann Weyl’s turn to intuitionism through a philosophical prism of normative framework transitions. It focuses on three central themes that occupied Weyl’s thought: the notion of the continuum, logical existence, and the necessity of intuitionism, constructivism, and formalism to adequately address the foundational crisis of mathematics. The analysis of these themes reveals Weyl’s continuous endeavor to deal with such fundamental problems and suggests a view that provides a different perspective concerning Weyl’s wavering foundational positions. Building on a (...) philosophical model of scientific framework transitions and the special role that normative indecision or ambivalence plays in the process, the paper examines Weyl’s motives for considering such a radical shift in the first place. It concludes by showing that Weyl’s shifting stances should be regarded as symptoms of a deep, convoluted intrapersonal process of self-deliberation induced by exposure to external criticism. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the `Lorentzian Pedagogy' defended by J.S. Bell in his essay ``How to teach special relativity'', and to explore its consistency with Einstein's thinking from 1905 to 1952. Some remarks are also made in this context on Weyl's philosophy of relativity and his 1918 gauge theory. Finally, it is argued that the Lorentzian pedagogy---which stresses the important connection between kinematics and dynamics---clarifies the role of rods and clocks in general relativity.

This paper attempts to explain the emergence of the logical empiricist philosophy of space and time as a collision of mathematical traditions. The historical development of the ``Riemannian'' and ``Helmholtzian'' traditions in 19th century mathematics is investigated. Whereas Helmholtz's insistence on rigid bodies in geometry was developed group theoretically by Lie and philosophically by Poincaré, Riemann's Habilitationsvotrag triggered Christoffel's and Lipschitz's work on quadratic differential forms, paving the way to Ricci's absolute differential calculus. The transition from special to general relativity (...) is briefly sketched as a process of escaping from the Helmholtzian tradition and entering the Riemannian one. Early logical empiricist conventionalism, it is argued, emerges as the failed attempt to interpret Einstein's reflections on rods and clocks in general relativity through the conceptual resources of the Helmholtzian tradition. Einstein's epistemology of geometry should, in spite of his rhetorical appeal to Helmholtz and Poincaré, be understood in the wake the Riemannian tradition and of its aftermath in the work of Levi-Civita, Weyl, Eddington, and others. (shrink)

The logic of gauge theory is considered by tracing its development from general relativity to Yang-Mills theory, through Weyl's two gauge theories. A handful of elements---which for want of better terms can be called \emph{geometrical justice}, \emph{matter wave}, \emph{second clock effect}, \emph{twice too many energy levels}---are enough to produce Weyl's second theory; and from there, all that's needed to reach the Yang-Mills formalism is a \emph{non-Abelian structure group} (say $\mathbb{SU}\textrm{(}N\textrm{)}$).

A central issue in the philosophical debates over general relativity concerns the status of the metric field: should it be regarded as part of the background arena in which physical fields evolve, or as a physical field itself? In this paper, we approach this debate through its relationship to the so-called "Problem of Space": the problem of determining which abstract, mathematical geometries are candidate descriptions of physical space. In particular, we explore the way that Hermann Weyl tackled the Problem of (...) Space in the wake of general relativity, and argue that Weyl’s proposed solution reveals a “middle way” between bare-manifold and manifold-plus-metric accounts of spacetime. (shrink)

We give some lectures on the work on formal logic of Jacques Herbrand, and sketch his life and his influence on automated theorem proving. The intended audience ranges from students interested in logic over historians to logicians. Besides the well-known correction of Herbrand’s False Lemma by Goedel and Dreben, we also present the hardly known unpublished correction of Heijenoort and its consequences on Herbrand’s Modus Ponens Elimination. Besides Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem and its relation to the Loewenheim-Skolem-Theorem, we carefully investigate Herbrand’s (...) notion of intuitionism in connection with his notion of falsehood in an infinite domain. We sketch Herbrand’s two proofs of the consistency of arithmetic and his notion of a recursive function, and last but not least, present the correct original text of his unification algorithm with a new translation. (shrink)

Gauge symmetries provide one of the most puzzling examples of the applicability of mathematics in physics. The presented work focuses on the role of analogical reasoning in the gauge argument, motivated by Mark Steiner's claim that the application of the gauge principle relies on a Pythagorean analogy whose success undermines naturalist philosophy. In this paper, we present two different views concerning the analogy between gravity, electromagnetism, and nuclear interactions, each providing a different philosophical response to the problem of the applicability (...) of mathematics in the natural sciences. The first is based on an account of Weyl's original work, which first gave rise to the gauge principle. Drawing on his later philosophical writings, we develop an idelaist reading of the mathematical analogies in the gauge argument. On this view, mathematical analogies serve to ensure a conceptual harmony in our scientific account of nature. We further discuss the construction of Yang and Mills's gauge theory in light of this idealist reading. The second account presents a naturalist alternative, formulated in terms of John Norton's account of a material analogy, according to which the analogy succeeds in virtue of a physical similarity between the different interactions. This account is based on the methodological equivalence principle, a simple conceptual extension of the gauge principle that allows us to understand the relation between coordinate transformations and gravity as a manifestation of the same method. The physical similarity between the different cases is based on attributing the success of this method to the dependence of the coupling on relational physical quantities. We conclude by reflecting on the advantages and limits of the idealist, naturalist, and anthropocentric Pythagorean views, as three alternative ways to understand the puzzling relation between mathematics and physics. -/- . (shrink)