ABSTRACT A growing body of research suggests that political polarization in the United States is at a forty-year high, and that it is rooted less in disagreements over policy than in hostile attitudes toward political opponents. Such attitudes explain the manifest increase of intolerant behavior in American culture and politics in recent years. But what explains the attitudes themselves? One significant contributor may have been the rise of scientism in the early twentieth century, which undermined the metaphysical, epistemic, and institutional (...) foundations of the type of morality required to transcend our instinctual tribalism. (shrink)

Almost all participants in the debate about the ethics of accidents with self-driving cars have so far assumed moral universalism. However, universalism may be philosophically more controversial than is commonly thought, and may lead to undesirable results in terms of non-moral consequences and feasibility. There thus seems to be a need to also start considering what I refer to as the “relativistic car” — a car that is programmed under the assumption that what is morally right, wrong, good, bad, etc. (...) is determined by the moral beliefs of one’s society or culture. My investigation of this idea involves six steps. First, I explain why and how the moral universalism/relativism debate is relevant to the issue of self-driving cars. Second, I argue that there are good reasons to consider accident algorithms that assume relativism. Third, I outline how a relativistic car would be programmed to behave. Fourth, I address what advantages such a car would have, both in terms of its non-moral consequences and feasibility. Fifth, I address the relativistic car’s disadvantages. Finally, I qualify and conclude my considerations. (shrink)

Moral relativism is an important topic in metaethics. It is also widely discussed outside philosophy (for example, by political and religious leaders), and it is controversial among philosophers and nonphilosophers alike. This is perhaps not surprising in view of recent evidence that people's intuitions about moral relativism vary widely. Though many philosophers are quite critical of moral relativism, there are several contemporary philosophers who defend forms of it. These include such prominent figures as Gilbert Harman, Jesse J. Prinz, J. David (...) Velleman and David B. Wong. The term ‘moral relativism’ is understood in a variety of ways. Most often it is associated with an empirical thesis that there are deep and widespread moral disagreements and a metaethical thesis that the truth or justification of moral judgments is not absolute, but relative to the moral standard of some person or group of persons. Sometimes ‘moral relativism’ is connected with a normative position about how we ought to think about or act towards those with whom we morally disagree, most commonly that we should tolerate them. (shrink)

This dissertation explores some objections to natural law theory- many of which are also leveled against contemporary naturalism. Despite the way the natural law tradition has fallen into disrepute in much of the American academy, this dissertation defends a classical Thomistic approach to natural law from some modern and contemporary criticisms. It begins with a brief explanation of the theory of natural law that will be defended from these contemporary objections. Chapter three examines G.E. Moore and David Hume's classical problems (...) posed to natural law, along with some contemporary defenders of Moore's position. These arguments are purported to undermine using human nature as a basis for ethics. Chapter four considers how moral relativism, especially the form given by Gilbert Harmon and David Wong, offers a unique challenge to natural law that must be answered and one that seems to undermine any ethical theory than any account relying on human nature. Chapter five explores the relation between neo-naturalism and natural law. Although neo-naturalism is a position often thought of as opposed to natural law, the two share many similarities in the positions they oppose. The last chapter examines how natural law reasoning is used in making medical decisions. The overarching thesis is that, insofar as natural law is coherent and answers many major criticisms, the proposal to reexamine this ethical theory stands as viable. (shrink)