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  1. Using Values as Evidence When There’s Evidence for Your Values.Sharyn Clough - 2020 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 26 (1):5-37.
    I have argued that political values are beliefs informed, more or less well, by the evidence of experience and that, where relevant and well-supported by evidence, the inclusion of political values in scientific theorizing can increase the objectivity of research. The position I endorse has been called the “values-as-evidence” approach. In this essay I respond to three kinds of resistance to this approach, using examples of feminist political values. Solomon questions whether values are beliefs that can be tested, Alcoff argues (...)
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  • Solomon's empirical/non-empirical distinction and the proper place of values in science.Sharyn Clough - 2008 - Perspectives on Science 16 (3):pp. 265-279.
    In assessing the appropriateness of a scientific community's research effort, Solomon considers a number of "decision vectors," divided into the empirical and non-empirical. Value judgments get sorted as non-empirical vectors. By way of contrast, I introduce Anderson's discussion of the evidential role of value judgments. Like Anderson, I argue that value judgments are empirical in the relevant sense. I argue further that Solomon's decision matrix needs to be reconceptualized: the distinction should not be between the empirical vs. non-empirical, but between (...)
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  • Racist value judgments as objectively false beliefs: A philosophical and social-psychological analysis.Sharyn Clough & William E. Loges - 2008 - Journal of Social Philosophy 39 (1):77–95.
    Racist beliefs express value judgments. According to an influential view, value judgments are subjective, and not amenable to rational adjudication. In contrast, we argue that the value judgments expressed in, for example, racist beliefs, are false and objectively so. Our account combines a naturalized, philosophical account of meaning inspired by Donald Davidson, with a prominent social-psychological theory of values pioneered by the social-psychologist Milton Rokeach. We use this interdisciplinary approach to show that, just as with beliefs expressing descriptive judgments, beliefs (...)
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  • Wittgenstein on Aspect‐Recognition in Philosophy and Mathematics.Michael Hymers - 2021 - Philosophical Investigations 44 (1):71-98.
    Although Wittgenstein’s most extensive discussion of aspect‐recognition appears in Part II of the Philosophical Investigations, aspect‐recognition was of interest to Wittgenstein almost from the beginning of his engagement with philosophy at Cambridge in 1912. However, the nature of that interest changes upon his return to Cambridge in 1929, and that change in turn is connected with the inter‐related ideas that philosophical clarity rests on recognising aspects of our grammar and that mathematical proof leads us to recognise new aspects of mathematical (...)
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