Purpose. The author believes that the main topic of philosophical studies of Heraclitus was not nature, not dialectics, and not political philosophy; he was engaged in the development of philosophical anthropology, and all other questions raised by him were subordinated to it to one degree or another. It is anthropology that is the most "dark" part of the teachings of this philosopher, therefore the purpose of this article is to identify the hidden anthropological message of Heraclitus. In case of success, (...) it will become clear what made him "darken". Theoretical basis. The methodological basis of the article is the anthropological understanding of fragments of Heraclitus’ texts presented in a historical and philosophical context. Originality. The philosophical concept of Heraclitus is still a mystery for researchers of his work. The author of the article proposed such a variant of interpretation, within the framework of which different elements of this concept fit into a consistent model. Conclusions. The article proves that although the anthropological turn in philosophy is traditionally associated with the activities of the sophists and Socrates, the previous philosophical thought was also not devoid of anthropological ideas. Moreover, pre-Socratic philosophers posed problems, the interpretation of which brought the doctrine of man to the level of high-order abstractions, while surprisingly preserving the concreteness of the life-meaning questions that confront him. And one of the brightest representatives of pre-Socratic anthropology was Heraclitus of Ephesus. Religion was the motivator that made him study the world, man, and society. The doctrine of the Logos developed by Heraclitus had a tremendous impact on Plato and Philo of Alexandria, and through them on the author of the Fourth Gospel, who begins his story with a "Greek" rethinking of the mystery of the Incarnation. If Heraclitus claimed that a person carries a particle of the Logos, then John proclaimed that the Logos itself incorporated a particle of man. Despite all the differences between these approaches, each of them postulated the cosmic significance of human existence, which means that it brought anthropology to the ontological level. (shrink)

On the long and well-worn road of many, but justifiable attempts of human to discover his origin, his trajectory as a species, and a suitable understanding consciousness, his system allowing the connection to the environment and to his own organism, the concepts and models of philosophy enunciated or experienced by millennia, meet today with modern science concepts of physics and of science of information. Based on recent discoveries of quantum physics and astrophysics, revealing a new understanding of our environment and (...) starting from some philosophical concepts on information of matter and of living structures, this work discusses the dynamics of information within the frame of the Informational Model of Consciousness as an informational system of the human body, connected both to the environment and to the body itself, to control the adaptation for survival. It is shown that consciousness is actually an informational projection in the mind of seven informational subsystems, three of which forming the operative system of consciousness for the short-term adaptation, and other three forming the programmed operating system, dedicated to the maintenance of body and to the long-term survival of species, showing various inputs and outputs of information. The seventh subsystem is the information pole, connecting the organism with the external information, especially related to the extra-sensorial properties of the mind, the human body appearing as a bipolar info-matter structure, managed by the brain. The received information is progressively integrated into the informational system of the organism, which absorbs and emanates information as a reactive system for adaptation, able to operate both with matter-related (codified) and non-matter related (virtual) information. As both connections with external and internal environment (body itself) can be described in terms of information, this model opens the gate to investigate consciousness by means of the tools of the information science, offering also answers to the philosophic “mind-body” problem and to the “hard” problem and showing correspondences with some ancient philosophies. (shrink)

Pre-publication certification through peer review stands in need of philosophical examination. In this paper, philosopher-psychologist Steven James Bartlett recalls the arguments marshalled four hundred years ago by English poet John Milton against restraint of publication by the "gatekeepers of publication," AKA today's peer reviewers.

This thesis examines Kant's and Nietzsche's treatments of the moral agent. It argues for three broad conclusions. Firstly, it argues that, although Nietzsche's explicit criticisms of Kant's conception of the moral agent can be understood only in the context of Nietzsche's broader moral philosophy, neither these criticisms nor their context are well understood by the prevailing literature. The thesis thus engages with existing scholarship on the nature of Nietzsche's moral philosophy and with the scanty literature on the relationship between Kant's (...) and Nietzsche's moral philosophies. Secondly, the thesis argues that Kant's conception of the moral agent is not undermined by the criticisms which Nietzsche explicitly levels at it, or, indeed, by others which are commonly made in Nietzsche's name. In doing so, the thesis combines original interpretations of Kant with elements of recent Kant scholarship. Finally, however, the thesis argues that neglected elements of Nietzsche's own moral philosophy provide for a more sophisticated, telling, and, indeed, original critical engagement with Kant's conception of the moral agent is not undermined by the criticisms which Nietzsche explicitly levels at it, or, indeed, by others which are commonly made in Nietzsche's name. In doing so, the thesis combines original interpretations of Kant with elements of recent Kant scholarship. Finally, however, the thesis argues that neglected elements of Nietzsche's own moral philosophy provide for a more sophisticated, telling, and, indeed, original critical engagement with Kant's conception of the moral agent. Thus the thesis defends an original interpretation of Nietzsche's moral philosophy and its critical relation to Kant's, and demonstrates the pertinence of a certain neglected critical approach to Kant's conception of the moral agent. On the basis of these conclusions, the thesis ultimately defends a conception of the moral agent which, although Kantian, owes something to both Kant and Nietzsche. (shrink)

In the Dedicatory Letter of the Meditations, René Descartes claims that he will offer a proof of the soul’s immortality, to be accomplished by reason alone. This proof is also promised by the title page of the first edition of the Meditations, which includes the words “in which the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are demonstrated.” But in the Synopsis, and later in his replies to objections, Descartes gives a more nuanced account of the possibility of (...) proving immortality and whether an attempt is even to be found in the Meditations. To confuse matters further, the title page of the second edition no longer mentions a demonstration of immortality but promises only to prove the distinction between body and soul. The question arises, therefore, whether the Meditations contains a purely philosophical demonstration of the immortality of the soul. (shrink)

Modality and Anti-Metaphysics critically examines the most prominent approaches to modality among analytic philosophers in the twentieth century, including essentialism. Defending both the project of metaphysics and the essentialist position that metaphysical modality is conceptually and ontologically primitive, Stephen McLeod argues that the logical positivists did not succeed in banishing metaphysical modality from their own theoretical apparatus and he offers an original defence of metaphysics against their advocacy of its elimination. -/- Seeking to assuage the sceptical worries which underlie modal (...) anti-realism, McLeod provides an original contribution to essentialist epistemology, engaging with current debates about modality and suggesting that standard essentialist approaches to some issues in the philosophies of logic and language require revision. -/- This book offers valuable insights to professional philosophers, postgraduates and advanced undergraduates interested in metaphysics, philosophy of logic or the history of twentieth-century analytic philosophy. (shrink)

In the industrial era, advanced science and technology make immortality-obsessed human beings constantly develop, modify, and reshape their bodies and consciousness, to overcome the fragility and transience of their bodies and approach the dream of immortality. The transformation of the body, in turn, drives society to confront the co-existence of cyborg, transhuman, information subject, nomadic posthuman and other life forms. Focusing on Chinese-American writer Ken Liu’s science fiction the Future Trilogy, Arc, and The Waves, this paper attempts to explore the (...) metamorphosis of the body and the ethical choices in the tension between death and immortality, embodiment and disembodiment. Immortality is not a Utopian paradise but causes many ethical problems and loss of continuity of time, space, history, and identity. Liu’s works suggest that the solution to the problem of posthuman disembodiment involves embracing embodiment and recognizing the importance of memory and social interaction in the formation of one’s identity, affirming that memory and the interaction with others are necessary conditions for the formation of the subject’s identity. Blending genesis myths and technological immortality, Liu explores the possibility of creating new life different from human beings. The posthumans depicted are always in the status of becoming, eager to discover the new world, and indicate the author’s expectations for the bright new future. (shrink)

Responding to a well-known essay by Bernard Williams, philosophers (and a few theologians) have engaged in what I call “the Makropulos debate,” a debate over whether immortality—“living forever”—would be desirable for beings like us. Lacking a firm conceptual grounding in the religious contexts from which terms such as “immortality” and “eternal life” gain much of their sense, the debate has consisted chiefly in a battle of speculative fantasies. Having presented my four main reasons for this assessment, I examine an alternative (...) and neglected conception, the idea of eternal life as a present possession, derived in large part from Johannine Christianity. Without claiming to argue for the truth of this conception, I present its investigation as exemplifying a conceptually fruitful direction of inquiry into immortality or eternal life, one which takes seriously the religious and ethical surroundings of these concepts. (shrink)

Survival is the theory that some significant part of man continues after the death of his physical body. This dissertation studies philosophical argumentation of Christians and Buddhists, and analyzes the latest available empirical data, to determine which if any forms of survival are most probable. ;Part I finds insuperable difficulties in the purely materialistic resurrection theory, and in survival of disembodied minds as pure process. To make sense, resurrection must postulate either invisible bodies as conscious carriers of personal identity, or (...) a next world of Berkeleyan or Leibnizian idealism entered at death. ;Part II studies Buddhist views of survival. Early Buddhism proposes the alternatives of perpetual rebirth and transcendent nirvana. Pure Land Buddhism propounds objective idealist heavens accessible both in meditation and at death. Tibetan Buddhism further defends the mind-dependent nature of the intermediate state between rebirths. Thus Buddhism also requires either invisible bodies or an idealist next world. ;Part III examines empirical evidence indicative of survival: claimed memories of former lives; apparitions and out-of-body experiences ; and visions of dead people or other worlds at death . Questionable materials are discarded and evidence is presented with sample cases and experimental results. Alternative hypotheses are adduced to interpret the data. The evidence that NDE's are independent of culture and personality, and that some subjects have experiences while "brain dead," shows the falsity of the mind-brain identity theory, and is strongly indicative of survival. ;Part IV considers survival research as a case history of resistance to counter-paradigmatic scientific theories. Change and conservatism in science prove more dependent on sociological and psychological variables than on objective or logical grounds. The study concludes that at least some consciousnesses survive in ethereal or idealistic states, but broader generalization is dangerous without further empirical studies. (shrink)

The “Cambridge pragmatists”, Charles S. Peirce, William James and Josiah Royce, are at least in two respects significantly indebted to Kant: first, as von Kempski, Apel and Murphey have shown, with regard to the epistemological issues investigated in pragmatism; secondly, with regard to the various pragmatic approaches to religion, something which has been long overlooked. These approaches are best understood as innovative re-readings of Kant’s postulates of freedom, immortality, and God. Since Hilary Putnam pointed out — in his 1992 book (...) Renewing Philosophy — that James’s essay, “The Will to Believe”, in spite of having received a great deal of hostile criticism, is in “its logic, in fact, precise and impeccable”, James’s thoughts are considered by many contemporary philosophers as particularly inspiring. James’s approach is based on the modern experience of secularism and interprets Kant’s “postulate” as the “option” to believe. A deepening of the debate on the relevance of Kant’s analysis of the horizon of religious hope with regard to human praxis for a pragmatism-inspired philosophy of religion can be expected from a detailed discussion of the thoughts of Peirce and Royce, of thoughts, which, in complex ways, relate to, as well as criticise, James’s individuum-focused interpretation of religious faith. (shrink)

According to the 'axiom of existence', Adopted in this article, Terms which do not denote existent entities do not denote at all. 'past entities', 'future entities', 'possible entities', 'fictional entities', Etc. Do not exist. The class of denoting terms has, Therefore, A changing membership. 'nixon' denotes now, But will fail to denote one hundred years from now. The same is true for terms indicating properties (e.G., '... Is a missile'). A theory of meaning and truth is developed on the basis (...) of this axiom. A denotationless term may still be meaningful. 'x' means, In english, 'the entity which ...' where the dots stand for a certain conjunction of open sentences known to speakers of english in various degrees, Found in reference books of authority, Etc. A statement can be true through either correspondence or analyticity. Thus 'nixon is the u.S. President' is (now) true in both ways. 'socrates was a philosopher', '2+2=4', And 'hamlet killed polonius' are only analytically true. 'polonius killed hamlet' is false. (shrink)

Kierkegaard presents two radically different conceptions of love in his writings, in three different ways. Kierkegaard’s prime literary model for eros is Plato’s Symposium, which culminates in Diotima’s argument for a continuum between immediate, sensate, erotic love and the divine. Kierkegaard repeatedly parodies the notion of eros as a scala paradisi in his pseudonymous “first authorship,” in order to show its inadequacy from the point of view of Christian faith. In his “second authorship” Kierkegaard presents a very different notion of (...) love from this pagan, aesthetic notion — the Christian notion of agape, the selfless love of one’s neighbor. Eros and agape are characterized in mutually exclusive terms. But the conceptual presentation of agape, as a divine gift and as a self-effacing duty to others, results in aporia. It suffers from irresolvable conceptual puzzles and is emotively counter-intuitive. As long as we try to grasp agape conceptually or intuitively via Kierkegaard’s writings, the latter will themselves constitute a scala paradisi — and must be thrown away. The only proper presentation of agape is as edification, using God’s own words of love. Kierkegaard’s “Edifying Discourses” presuppose that “the single individual” to whom they are addressed has already received agape as a divine gift. The proper work of Christian love, then, is to build up this love that already exists in the reader. This paper traces these two notions of love in Kierkegaard’s writings, and their three modes of presentation, though it focuses in particular on the parodies of eros in the “aesthetic authorship” and the aporias of agape in the “second authorship.” It leaves the “Edifying Discourses” to build up the reader on their own terms. The paper also shows how Kierkegaard superimposes Hegel’s dialectic of selfhood on his parodies of the Symposium, with particular attention to Hegel’s discussion of mutual recognition in the constitution of selfhood, and the relations between self-recognition and work in the master/slave dialectic. These Hegelian inflections are in turn explored in the aporetic treatment of love and self in the “second authorship.”. (shrink)