We argue that a formal semantics for music can be developed, although it will be based on very different principles from linguistic semantics and will yield less precise inferences. Our framework has the following tenets: Music cognition is continuous with normal auditory cognition. In both cases, the semantic content derived from an auditory percept can be identified with the set of inferences it licenses on its causal sources, analyzed in appropriately abstract ways. What is special about music semantics is that (...) it aggregates inferences based on normal auditory cognition with further inferences drawn on the basis of the behavior of voices in tonal pitch space. This makes it possible to define an inferential semantics but also a truth-conditional semantics for music. In particular, a voice undergoing a musical movement m is true of an object undergoing a series of events e just in case there is a certain structure-preserving map between m and e. Aspects of musical syntax might be derivable on semantic grounds from an event mereology, which also explains some cases in which tree structures are inadequate for music. Intentions and emotions may be attributed at several levels, and we speculate on possible explanations of the special relation between music and emotions. (shrink)

Newton characterizes the reasoning of Principia Mathematica as geometrical. He emulates classical geometry by displaying, in diagrams, the objects of his reasoning and comparisons between them. Examination of Newton’s unpublished texts shows that Newton conceives geometry as the science of measurement. On this view, all measurement ultimately involves the literal juxtaposition—the putting-together in space—of the item to be measured with a measure, whose dimensions serve as the standard of reference, so that all quantity is ultimately related to spatial extension. I (...) use this conception of Newton’s project to explain the organization and proofs of the first theorems of mechanics to appear in the Principia. The placementof Kepler’s rule of areas as the first proposition, and the manner in which Newton proves it, appear natural on the supposition that Newton seeks a measure, in the sense of a moveable spatial quantity, of time. I argue that Newton proceeds in this way so that his reasoning can have the ostensive certainty of geometry. (shrink)

Approaches to animal communication have for the most part been quite different in semiotics and evolutionary biology. In this context the writings of a leading evolutionary biologist who has also been attracted to semiotics — John Maynard Smith — are an interesting exception and object of study. The present article focuses on the use and adaptation of semiotic terminology in Maynard Smith’s works with reference to general theoretical premises both in semiotics and evolutionary biology. In developing a typology of animal (...) signals, Maynard Smith employs the concepts of icon, index and symbol to denote distinct signal classes.He uses “indices” or “indexes” to express a signal type where the relation between signal properties and meaning is restricted because of physical characteristics. Such approach also points out the issue of the motivatedness of signs, which has had a long history in semiotics. In the final part of the article the usage and content of the concepts of signal form and meaning in Maynard Smith’s writings are analysed. It appears that in evolutionary biology, the “signal” is a vague concept that may denote a variety of things from an animal’s specific physiological status to artificial theoretical constructs. It also becomes evident that in actual usage the concept of signal often includes references to the receiver’s activity and interpretation, which belong rather to the characteristics of sign process. The positive influence of Maynard Smith’s works on semiotics could lie in paying attention to the role of physical necessities in animal communication. Physicalconstraints and relations also seem to have a significant role in semiotic processes although this is not always sufficiently studied or understood in semiotics. (shrink)

This paper considers a now familiar argument that the ubiquity of context -dependence threatens the project of natural language semantics, at least as that project has usually been conceived: as concerning itself with `what is said' by an utterance of a given sentence. I argue in response that the `anti-semantic' argument equivocates at a crucial point and, therefore, that we need not choose between semantic minimalism, truth-conditional pragmatism, and the like. Rather, we must abandon the idea, familiar from Kaplan and (...) others, that utterances express propositions `relative to contexts' and replace it with the Strawonian idea that speakers express propositions by making utterances in contexts. The argument for this claim consists in a detailed investigation of the particular case of demonstratives, which I argue demand such a Strawsonian treatment. I then respond to several objections, the most important of which allege that the Strawsonian account somehow undermines the project of natural language semantics, or threatens the semantics -pragmatics distinction. Please note that the paper posted here is an extended version of what was published. (shrink)

In early 1927, Pascual Jordan published his version of what came to be known as the Dirac-Jordan statistical transformation theory. Later that year and partly in response to Jordan, John von Neumann published the modern Hilbert space formalism of quantum mechanics. Central to both formalisms are expressions for conditional probabilities of finding some value for one quantity given the value of another. Beyond that Jordan and von Neumann had very different views about the appropriate formulation of problems in the new (...) theory. For Jordan, unable to let go of the analogy to classical mechanics, the solution of such problems required the identification of sets of canonically conjugate variables, i.e., p’s and q’s. Jordan ran into serious difficulties when he tried to extend his approach from quantities with fully continuous spectra to those with wholly or partly discrete spectra. For von Neumann, not constrained by the analogy to classical physics and aware of the daunting mathematical difficulties facing the approach of Jordan ), the solution of a problem in the new quantum mechanics required only the identification of a maximal set of commuting operators with simultaneous eigenstates. He had no need for p’s and q’s. Related to their disagreement about the appropriate general formalism for the new theory, Jordan and von Neumann stated the characteristic new rules for probabilities in quantum mechanics somewhat differently. Jordan was the first to state those rules in full generality, von Neumann rephrased them and then sought to derive them from more basic considerations. In this paper we reconstruct the central arguments of these 1927 papers by Jordan and von Neumann and of a paper on Jordan’s approach by Hilbert, von Neumann, and Nordheim. We highlight those elements in these papers that bring out the gradual loosening of the ties between the new quantum formalism and classical mechanics. (shrink)

In the Groundwork Kant refers to the analogy between the moral law and the law of nature when clarifying the concept of the categorical imperative. However, in the Groundwork itself, he does not give any further explanation as to why he introduces the analogy. Therefore, I take the Groundwork as a starting point of my article, but then I explicate on the analogy from a broader perspective, focusing especially on his lecture courses Moral Mrongovius II and Naturrecht Feyerabend as well (...) as on his Typic chapter of the second Critique. (shrink)

Dans le § 8 de la 1ère recherche logique Husserl explique qu'est-ce que c'est l'expression, par opposition à un autre type de signe: l'indice. Ce qu'est en jeu, c'est la spécificité de l'expression, entendue par Husserl comme une sorte de signe qui présente un caractère clair. Mais afin de determiner l'expression Husserl effectue une opération interpretée par Derrida comme un premier type de réduction: réduction du langage a une forme du soliloque. En d'autres termes, au moment où Husserl doit expliquer (...) ce qu'est un signe linguistique, met entre parenthèses précisément la fonction symbolique des expressions.Je tiens à souligner dans cet article les raisons qui conduisent Husserl à ce surprenant geste de mettre entre parenthèses l'une des fonctions les plus essentielles des actes significatifs, la fonction comunicative de contenus intentionnels au moyen de signes dans un contexte intersubjectif. Je montrerai après ce que conduit Husserl à examiner à nouveau cette décision et à la critiquer dans les textes de 1913-1914 lors de la préparation de la deuxième édition des Recherches logiques et publiés aujourd'hui dans le volume XX/2 de Husserliana.En el § 8 de la 1ª Investigación lógica Husserl explica qué es la expresión por oposición a otro tipo de signo: el índice. Lo que se halla en juego es la especificidad de la expresión, entendida por Husserl como un tipo de signo que presenta un carácter intencional. Pero, con el fin de perfilar la expresión, Husserl realiza una operación interpretada por Derrida como un primer tipo de reducción: la reducción del lenguaje a la forma del soliloquio. En otras palabras, en el momento en el que Husserl debe explicar lo que es un signo lingüístico, pone entre paréntesis precisamente la función simbólica de las expresiones.Me gustaría poner de relieve en este artículo las razones que llevan a Husserl a este sorprendente gesto de poner entre paréntesis una de las más esenciales funciones de los actos significativos, la función de comunicar contenidos intencionales a través de signos en un context intersubjetivo. Mostraré más tarde qué lleva a Husserl revisar esta decisión y criticarla en los textos de 1913-1914 cuando preparaba la segunda edición de las Investigaciones lógi-cas y hoy publicados en el volumen XX/2 de Husserliana. (shrink)

This paper examines the relationship between a family of concepts involving reliable correlation, and a family of concepts involving adaptation and biological function, as these concepts are used in the naturalistic semantic theory of Dretske's "Explaining Behavior." I argue that Dretske's attempt to marry correlation and function to produce representation fails, though aspects of his failure point the way forward to a better theory.

semantic minimalism and moderte contextualism.

These are the slides of the five lectures in the series "Topics in Philosophy of Language", offered as a course at the 23rd ESSLLI in Ljubljana, in August 2011.