This paper examines the metaphysical question of 'ensoulment' in relation to the theory, put forward in an earlier paper, that human life begins when the newly formed body organs and systems of the embryo begin to function as an organised whole, at which stage there is evidence of a change of nature. Although Roman Catholic theology teaches that a human being is a union of physical body and spiritual soul, it is incorrect to interpret this in a dualistic sense. The (...) meaning of 'soul' is considered and the conclusion reached that although both in the religious context and apart from it abortion is difficult to justify at any stage after conception, it does not follow that the use of 'spare' In Vitro Fertilisation (IVF) embryos should be rejected. If 'ensoulment' does not occur until the new organism functions as a whole then a decision not to make use of IVF embryos for medical purposes would be a heavy responsibility and not a 'safe' way out. (shrink)

There is an emerging consensus within Natural Law that explains transgender identity as an “embodied misunderstanding.” The basic line of argument is that our sexual identity as male or female refers to our possible reproductive roles of begetting or conceiving. Since these two possibilities are determined early on by the presence or absence of a Y chromosome, our sexual identity cannot be changed or reassigned. I develop an argument from analogy, comparing gender and language, to show that this consensus is (...) premature. Language and gender imbue our body with further social meaning and so, I conclude, that just as we can learn multiple languages, so too can we learn multiple genders. Since language and gender each constitutively contribute to our wellbeing as a “second nature,” I argue against this consensus to show that the reason people who are transgender struggle to flourish is not because of a “troubled trans psyche,” but because there are conceptual, interpersonal, and institutional obstacles stacked against them. (shrink)

The main purpose of this article is an analysis of the Continuity Argument, one of the most influential arguments upon which the moral condemnation of scientific and medical practices such as embryo research and experimentation, assisted reproduction, abortion, therapeutic cloning, etc. are based. I have firstly given a very brief account of the approach that attributes the status of marker event to fertilization, identifying the Continuity Argument between other argumentation. Further, I have tried to distinguish the three possible interpretations of (...) the notion of continuity assumed in the Continuity Argument, and to isolate the most persuasive formulation of Continuity Argument. Finally, I argue that even from the most convincing philosophical and scientific interpretation of the post-fertilization continuity, it does not follow: that fertilization is a necessary determinant of moral status; that fertilization is the most reasonable determinant of moral status. In short, this article has two goals: to show that this very argument does not entail the stance that the above mentioned practices are morally impermissible; to suggest that some pragmatic strategies which treat sorites-infected paradoxes could insure a philosophically and scientifically appropriate framework for an alternative approach. (shrink)

Glavna je svrha ovoga članka analizati Argument kontinuiteta, jedan od najutjecajnijih argumenata na kojemu su utemeljeni moralna osuda znanstvenih i medicinskih praksi poput istraživanja i eksperimenata s embrijem, potpomognuta reprodukcije, pobačaja, terapeutskog kloniranja, itd. Prvo se daje vrlo kratko objašnjenje pristupa koji pripisuje status markirajućeg događaja fertilizaciji, identificirajući Argument kontinuiteta među drugim argumentacijama. Nadalje, pokušava se razdvojiti tri moguće interpretacije pojma kontinuiteta pretpostavljenog u Argumentu kontinuiteta, te izdvojiti najuvjerljiviju filozofsku i znanstvenu interpretaciju postfertilizacijskog kontinuiteta. Naposljetku, tvrdim da iz filozofski i (...) znanstveno najprihvatljivije interpretacije ne slijedi: 1) da je fertilizacija nužna odrednica moralnog statusa; 2) da je fertilizacija najrazboritija odrednica moralnog statusa. Ukratko, ovaj članak ima dva cilja: I) pokazati da upravo taj argument ne povlači za sobom stajalište da su gore spomenute prakse moralno nedopustive; II) sugerirati da bi neke pragmatičke strategije koje se bave soritom-prouzročenim paradoksima mogle osigurati filozofijski i znanstveno primjeren okvir za alternativni pristup. (shrink)

In an article in an earlier edition of the Journal of Medical Ethics (1) Dr Iglesias bases her analysis upon the mediaeval interpretation of Platonic metaphysics and Aristotelian logic as given by Aquinas. Propositional forms are applied to the analysis of experience. This results in a very abstract analysis. The essential connection of events and their changing temporal relationships are ignored. The dichotomy between body and soul is a central concept. The unchanging elements in experience are assumed to be more (...) real than the actual world of experienced process. Such a view makes the analysis of the temporal factors in experience impossible. Its abstractness is quite unsuitable for the analysis of the ontological structure and development of the neonate from fertilisation to birth. A N Whitehead made the notion of organism central to his philosophy. He refused to place human experience outside nature, or admit dualism. His philosophy of organism is an attempt to uncover the essential elements connecting human experience with the physical and biological sciences. Time, change and process are, in his view, more real than the static abstractions obtainable by the use of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Use of the latter negates the essential connectedness of events and the importance of temporarily and change (2). In this paper I argue that the embryo, being an organism, is not analysable in terms of thinghood. It is a process. To apply Aristotelian logical concepts to it is to distort the real nature of the datum. (shrink)

(2000). The Potentiality Argument in the Debate relating to the Beginning of Personhood. Human Reproduction & Genetic Ethics: Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 19-26.