In order to make sense of Scotus’s claim that rationality is perfected only by the will, a Scotistic doctrine of truth is developed in a speculative way. It is claimed that synthetic a priori truths are truths of the will, which are existential truths. This insight holds profound theological implications and is used on the one hand to criticize Kant's conception of existence, and on the other hand, to offer another explanation of the sense according to which the existence of (...) things is grasped. (shrink)

This article addresses the issue of the two-level nature of acts of the will, i.e. its ability to voluntarily refer to its own acts. First, we will examine the ancient sources of the concept of the two-level will (Plato and Augustine). Then, we will focus on the views of John Duns Scotus on the types of acts of will, with particular emphasis on the concept of non velle and its application in philosophical and theological issues. Against the backdrop of Scotus’s (...) concept, we will examine the ways in which 14th-century thinkers engaged with his position and developed his account of the two-level acts of will and types of acts of will. Finally, the article discusses a significant change in the function of non velle and the use of this type of volitional act in 14th-century ethics by exploring the views of Buridan and Kilvington. -------------------------- Received: 29/01/2023. Reviewed: 30/03/2023. Accepted: 18/04/2023. (shrink)

For theological reasons, medieval thinkers maintained that sacraments “effect what they figure”—that is, they are more than mere signs of grace; and yet, they also maintained that they are not proper causes of grace in the way fire is the proper cause of heat. One way to reconcile these requirements is to explicate sacramental causation in terms of sine qua non causes, which were distinguished from accidental causes on the one hand, and from proper efficient causes on the other hand. (...) This article traces the development of this concept, as discussed in the context of the sacraments, from Scotus and Auriol, via Ockham and Peter of Ailly, to Gabriel Biel. It shows how the discussion, in its later stages, opened up concerns about occasionalism, offering thereby a case study of how particular theological issues led to metaphysical ones in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. (shrink)

Escoto es uno de los pensadores medievales que con más fuerza afirmó la especificidad de lo libre en las potencias del alma, distinguiéndolo netamente de lo natural. Llevó su postura hasta ciertas conclusiones que parecieron demasiado atrevidas, incluso para autores intelectualmente muy cercanos. Por eso, se le ha presentado a veces como un precedente de la visión moderna de la libertad como autonomía absoluta. Este artículo se acerca a su pensamiento, repasando tres aspectos de su propuesta que permiten ofrecer una (...) visión más completa de su idea de libertad: la relación entre objeto conocido y acto de la voluntad, la doctrina de las _affectiones _de la voluntad y la consideración de la plenitud de la voluntad en la _beatitudo_. Se repasan varios debates actuales sobre el pensamiento de Escoto, con el objetivo de extraer algunos elementos que puedan servir para una exposición sistemática de la cuestión. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to explore John Duns Scotus’s thought on Freedom, in order to achieve some elements that might be useful for a systematic study. Starting from the distinction between “natural” and “free” active potencies, it shows what is more specific of Freedom. Being a pure perfection, for Scotus, it can be applied to God and creatures as well. After exposing the content and origin of the distinction, the article provides an account of Duns Scotus’s thought on (...) Divine Freedom. Insofar as freedom is infinite, it is compatible with necessity. At the same time, as God is creator of the contingent and finite world, his Freedom is capable of contingent actions. Finally, human Freedom is studied as an important part of the image of God in human beings. The Franciscan’s conception of Freedom makes it possible to overcome the idea that it depends either on the imperfection of the contingent world or on the imperfection of our knowledge about it. Moreover, it shows that Freedom has an act of its own and thus it is more than a mere “corollary” of knowledge. (shrink)