Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. On Mathematical and Religious Belief, and on Epistemic Snobbery.Silvia Jonas - 2016 - Philosophy 91 (1):69-92.
    In this paper, I argue that religious belief is epistemically equivalent to mathematical belief. Abstract beliefs don't fall under ‘naive’, evidence-based analyses of rationality. Rather, their epistemic permissibility depends, I suggest, on four criteria: predictability, applicability, consistency, and immediate acceptability of the fundamental axioms. The paper examines to what extent mathematics meets these criteria, juxtaposing the results with the case of religion. My argument is directed against a widespread view according to which belief in mathematics is clearly rationally acceptable whereas (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Reasons, Rationalization, and Rationality.Erhan Demircioglu - 2021 - Philosophia 51 (1):113-137.
    In this paper, I provide an answer to the question “what is it for a reason to be the reason for which a belief is held?” After arguing against the causal account of the reason-for-which connection, I present what I call the rationalization account, according to which a reason R a subject S has for a belief P is the reason for which S holds P just in case R is the premise in S’s rationalization for P, where the argument (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Causal-Doxastic Theory of the Basing Relation.Keith Allen Korcz - 2000 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):525-550.
    The epistemic basing relation is the relation which must hold between a person's belief and the adequate reasons for holding that belief if the belief is to be epistemically justified by those reasons. Although the basing relation is a fundamental component of any adequate theory of epistemic justification, it has received scant attention in the literature. In this paper, I propose a novel causal analysis of the basing relation, one which helps to characterize an intemalist element which, I shall argue, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   74 citations  
  • (1 other version)Empathy, Primitive Reactions and the Modularity of Emotion.Anne J. Jacobson - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (sup1):95-113.
    Are emotion-producing processes modular? Jerry Fodor, in his classic introduction of the notion of modularity, holds that its most important feature is cognitive impenetrability or information encapsulation. If a process possesses this feature, then, as standardly understood, “what we want or believe makes no difference to how [it] works”.In this paper, we will start with the issue of the cognitive impenetrability of emotion-producing processes. It turns out that, while there is abundant evidence of emotion-producing processes that are not cognitively impenetrable, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Is the brain a memory box?Anne Jaap Jacobson - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):271-278.
    Bickle argues for both a narrow causal reductionism, and a broader ontological-explanatory reductionism. The former is more successful than the latter. I argue that the central and unsolved problem in Bickle's approach to reductionism involves the nature of psychological terms. Investigating why the broader reductionism fails indicates ways in which phenomenology remains more than a handmaiden of neuroscience.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations