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Indefinite probability statements

Frank Jackson & Robert Pargetter

Synthese 26 (2):205 - 217 (1973)

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An analysis of indefinite probability statements.John Bigelow & Robert Pargetter - 1987 - Synthese 73 (2):361 - 370.details An analysis of indefinite probability statements has been offered by Jackson and Pargetter (1973). We accept that this analysis will assign the correct probability values for indefinite probability claims. But it does so in a way which fails to reflect the epistemic state of a person who makes such a claim. We offer two alternative analyses: one employing de re (epistemic) probabilities, and the other employing de dicto (epistemic) probabilities. These two analyses appeal only to probabilities which are accessible to (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Reliability and Justified Belief.John L. Pollock - 1984 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):103 - 114.details Reliabilist theories propose to analyse epistemic justification in terms of reliability. This paper argues that if we pay attention to the details of probability theory we find that there is no concept of reliability that can possibly play the role required by reliabilist theories. A distinction is drawn between the general reliability of a process and the single case reliability of an individual belief, And it is argued that neither notion can serve the reliabilist adequately. Download Export citation Bookmark 55 citations
Fitness.Robert Pargetter - 1987 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 68 (1):44-56.details Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
The Simple View again: a brief rejoinder.H. J. McCann - 2011 - Analysis 71 (2):293-295.details In a recent issue of Analysis I gave a critique of some arguments made by Di Nucci concerning the so-called Simple View – the view that an agent performs an action intentionally only if he intends so to act. In turn Di Nucci offers a reply that concentrates on two points. The first has to do with a group of examples, one having to do with waking a flatmate, and the others with routine actions such as shifting gears while driving. (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 9 citations
Sleeping Beauty and direct inference.Joel Pust - 2011 - Analysis 71 (2):290-293.details One argument for the thirder position on the Sleeping Beauty problem rests on direct inference from objective probabilities. In this paper, I consider a particularly clear version of this argument by John Pollock and his colleagues (The Oscar Seminar 2008). I argue that such a direct inference is defeated by the fact that Beauty has an equally good reason to conclude on the basis of direct inference that the probability of heads is 1/2. Hence, neither thirders nor halfers can find (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 12 citations

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