In this paper I evaluate the soundness of the prototype paradigm, in particular its basic assumption that there are pan-human psychological essences or core meanings that refer to basic-level natural kinds, explaining why, on the whole, human communication and learning are successful. Instead I argue that there are no particular pan-human basic elements for thought, meaning and cognition, neither prototypes, nor otherwise. To illuminate my view I draw on examples from anthropology. More generally I argue that the prototype paradigm exemplifies (...) two assumptions that dominate cognitive science: (1) If human beings use words they mean something particular and what they mean can be discovered by scientific methods. (2) There is a fixed number of domains of categorization, each made up of a fixed number of basic categories. I suggest that these two assumptions lead to Brave New World. (shrink)

The transition from Middle English to Modern English in the second half of the 14th century is a turning point in the syntax of the language. It is at once the point when several constraints on nominal arguments that had been gaining ground since Old English become categorical, and the point when a reorganization of the functional category Infl is initiated, whose completion over the next several centuries yields essentially the syntactic system of the present day. From this time on, (...) subjects are obligatory, and they must be placed in Spec-IP position. In the VP, the last traces of OV order disappear, the order of direct and indirect object becomes fixed, the first “recipient passives” enter the language, and objects cease to be separable from the verb by adverbs or adjuncts. The V2 constraint of Old and Middle English is lost, as topicalized constituents cease to trigger verb-fronting. Concurrently, in the Infl system, the first instances of periphrastic do-support begin to replace fronting of the finite main verb, and, with the appearance of split infinitives and pro-infinitives, to starts to pattern as a non-finite Aux rather than, as in earlier stages, as a prefix marking the infinitive. All these changes have been dated to the second half of the 14th century, most of them specifically to the period between 1360 and 1380. (shrink)

Wilkins & Wakefield (1995) provide a thoughtful contribution to our understanding of language origins. In this commentary I attempt to define the relationship between object-manipulation and primate brain function further by reviewing research on aimed throwing and the production and use of stone tools by tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebtis apella). I propose that examining the relation between brain function and object-manipulation inCebuswill provide insight into the preconditions of language in our hominid ancestors.

The present paper analyzes how the semantic and pragmatic functions of closed class categories, or grammatical morphemes (i.e., inflections and function words), organize discourse processing. Grammatical morphemes tend to express a small set of conceptual distinctions that organize a wide range of objects and relations, usually expressed by content or open class words (i.e., nouns and verbs), into situations anchored to a discourse context. Therefore, grammatical morphemes and content words cooperate in guiding the construction of a situation model during discourse (...) comprehension by specifying complementary aspects of described situations. The paper reviews and extends analytical and empirical evidence for this grammatical‐conceptual correspondence, and suggests that the correspondence developed in response to the cognitive demands of discourse processing. Thus the distinction between open and closed linguistic categories is interpreted in terms of a fundamental correspondence between conceptual and linguistic structure that helps organize discourse processing. (shrink)