In recent years, there has been increasing discussion of whether philosophy actually makes progress. This discussion has been prompted, in no small part, by the depth and persistence of disagreement among philosophers on virtually every major theoretical issue in the field. In this paper, I examine the role that the Method of Cases – the widespread philosophical method of testing and revising theories by comparing their verdicts against our intuitions in particular cases – plays in creating and sustaining theoretical disagreements (...) in philosophy. Drawing on work from cognitive psychology, I argue that there is a fundamental incompatibility between the structure of the theories that philosophers seek to construct using the MoC and the structure of the concepts on which our case-specific intuitions are based. This incompatibility renders MoC-based philosophical theorizing unable ever to succeed by the very standards of adequacy that it sets for itself. And this, in turn, helps to explain the depth and persistence of theoretical disagreements – and, in certain ways, the lack of progress – in the many areas of philosophy where the MoC plays an important role. (shrink)

Peter Draper has offered a critique of concept analysis in nursing, suggesting that many concept analysis studies can be regarded as low‐grade literature reviews. Although I will argue en passant that he was right, defending Draper is not my main concern in this paper. Instead, I undertake a close reading of a single study, and identify a series of puzzles about what it says. The puzzles pertain to the distinction between concept and phenomenon; the function of definition; discriminating between the (...) concept of interest and other concepts; how defining attributes are derived; in what sense concept analysis clarifies the concept; whether concept analysis can adjudicate current debates; the role of model cases. The point is to show how a precise and detailed interrogation of this kind sets an agenda of questions which can be asked about other examples of the same genre. The approach gives rise to concerns about the politics of reading in the current academic environment, and I refer to these concerns briefly at the end. (shrink)

The philosophical “method of cases” has been the subject of intense discussion. In a recent paper, Frank Jackson attempts to vindicate the method by proposing that it is underwritten by the “representational view of language.” Jackson's proposal is potentially very significant. For if it is true, then the method of cases stands, but quite possibly also falls, with the representational view of language as characterized by Jackson. The aim of this paper is to question the philosophical method of cases by (...) showing that it does in fact presuppose a particular view of language that is at the very least questionable, both philosophically and empirically. (shrink)