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Ii.—the perception of space

Mind 12 (48):516-548 (1887)

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  1. The rise of empiricism: William James, Thomas hill green, and the struggle over psychology.Alexander Klein - 2007 - Dissertation, Indiana University, Bloomington
    The concept of empiricism evokes both a historical tradition and a set of philosophical theses. The theses are usually understood to have been developed by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. But these figures did not use the term “empiricism,” and they did not see themselves as united by a shared epistemology into one school of thought. My dissertation analyzes the debate that elevated the concept of empiricism (and of an empiricist tradition) to prominence in English-language philosophy. -/- In the 1870s and (...)
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  • Peirce’s Post-Jamesian Pragmatism.Nathan Houser - 2011 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 3 (1):39-60.
    It is commonly supposed that the pragmatisms of Peirce and James are fundamentally opposed; this view is supported by the fact that in 1905 Peirce deliberately chose a new name for his original doctrine. Yet Peirce and James were not only life-long friends but to a surprising extent were life-long collaborators. It is true that their approaches to philosophy were very different, reflecting their distinct personalities, with James exhibiting a pluralistic and humanistic style as opposed to Peirce the analyst and (...)
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  • Darkness Visible?Briggs Wright - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):39 - 55.
    In the philosophy of perception, typically, everything is illuminated. Discussions of perceptual experience primarily focus on subjects situated in illuminated environs. Rarely do we see treatment of putative perceptual experience involving darkness. In this paper, I will carefully canvas and characterize the nature of experiences of darkness, marking a substantive distinction between two such kinds of experiences. Crucially, I give an account of the distinctive phenomenology of experiences of darkness, and show that neither of the two broad kinds of experiences (...)
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