Nothing seems more possible to me than that people some day will come to the definite opinion that there is no copy in the… nervous system which corresponds to a particular thought, or a particular idea, or, memory.WittgensteinIn a recent essay it was emphasized that brain and mind appear to the mind as complementary and reciprocally recursive domains of a hermeneutic circle (Fischer, 1987). An outstanding and not yet recognized feature of this hermeneutic circle is that interpretation within this circle (...) is not rule-governed and hence appears self-organized: individual features of the world (or the brain) become intelligible in terms of the whole context (of the mind)… while the entire context becomes intelligible through individual features (or brain functions). How, or from where then is significance arising? (shrink)

We prove that the general scheme for physical theories that we have called semantic realism(SR) in some previous papers copes successfully with a number of EPR-like paradoxes when applied to quantum physics (QP). In particular, we consider the old arguments by Furry and Bohm- Aharonov and show that they are not valid within a SR framework. Moreover, we consider the Bell-Kochen-Specker und the Bell theorems that should prove that QP is inherently contextual and nonlocal, respectively, and show that they can (...) be invalidated in the SR approach. This removes the seeming contradiction between the basic assumptions of SR and QP, and proves that some problematic features that are usually attributed to QP, us contextuality and nonlocality, occur because of the adoption of a verificationist position, from one side, and from an insufficient adherence to the operational principles that have inspired QP itself, from the other side. (shrink)

The status and justification of quantum logic are reviewed. On the basis of several independent arguments it is concluded that it cannot be a logic in the philosophical sense of a general theory concerning the structure of valid inferences. Taken as a calculus for combining quantum mechanical propositions, it leaves a number of significant aspects of quantum physics unaccounted for. It is shown, moreover, that quantum logic, far from being more general than Boolean logic, forms a subset of a slight (...) and natural extension of Boolean logic, a subset which corresponds to incomplete statements. The philosophical background of this unsatisfactory state of affairs is briefly explored. (shrink)

Do the partial order and ortholattice operations of a quantum logic correspond to the logical implication and connectives of classical logic? Rephrased, How far might a classical understanding of quantum mechanics be, in principle, possible? A celebrated result of Kochen and Specker answers the above question in the negative. However, this answer is just one among various possible ones, not all negative. It is our aim to discuss the above question in terms of mappings of quantum worlds into classical ones, (...) more specifically, in terms of embeddings of quantum logics into classical logics; depending upon the type of restrictions imposed on embeddings, the question may get negative or positive answers. (shrink)