Primary textual evidence confirms that Schopenhauer was aware of the widespread adoption of solitary confinement in the American penitentiary system, and some of its harmful effects. He understands its harmfulness in terms of boredom, a phenomenon which he is known to have given extensive thought and analysis. In this paper I interpret Schopenhauer’s account of boredom and its relation to solitary confinement. I defend Schopenhauer against the objection that cases of confinement only serve to illustrate the general inadequacy of his (...) explanation of boredom in terms of a lack of things to will. This defence arrives at the conclusion that, on the contrary, someone might well suffer from a lack of things to will as a direct result of being confined; and that boredom understood as the deprivation of willing, a phenomenon I suggest may be called conative deprivation, makes an illuminating contribution to our theoretical understanding of the harmfulness of solitary confinement. (shrink)

This paper examines the roles that self-knowledge and reflection play in Schopenhauer’s view of agency. Focusing in particular on the discussion of the acquired character, his cognitive theory of motivation, and the idea of intellectual freedom, I argue that we find two conceptions of rational agency in Schopenhauer. The ‘minimal’ conception sees rational agency primarily as a kind of reflective motivation, whereas the ‘maximal’ or ‘robust’ conception sees rational agency as involving a kind of reflective self-organization. Furthermore, I argue that (...) rational self-organization and acquired character go hand-in-hand: it is only in virtue of achieving the latter that one achieves the former. Although some worry that the discussion of acquired character does not sit well with Schopenhauer’s broader determinist theory of action, the reading offered here aims to demonstrate that the two are reconcilable. (shrink)