Past research on people's moral judgments about moral dilemmas has revealed a connection between utilitarian judgment and reflective cognitive style. This has traditionally been interpreted as reflection is conducive to utilitarianism. However, recent research shows that the connection between reflective cognitive style and utilitarian judgments holds only when participants are asked whether the utilitarian option is permissible, and disappears when they are asked whether it is recommended. To explain this phenomenon, we propose that reflective cognitive style is associated with a (...) greater moral leniency—that is, a greater tendency to be tolerant of moral violations, and that moral leniency predicts utilitarian judgment when utilitarian judgment is measured through permissibility. In Study 1 (N = 192), we design a set of vignettes to assess moral leniency. In Studies 2 and 3 (N = 455, 428), we show that reflective cognitive style is indeed associated with greater moral leniency, and that moral leniency mediates the connection between cognitive style and utilitarian judgment. We discuss the implication of our results for the interpretation of the relationship between utilitarianism and reflective cognitive style. (shrink)

The primary purpose of this study was to examine the association of foreign language use and religiosity to moral decision-making in the context of a realistic set of scenarios about the COVID-19 pandemic. We used the CNI model in which four variants of a single dilemma manipulated norms and consequences, which are the defining characteristics of deontology and utilitarianism, respectively. A secondary purpose of the study was to investigate the role of in-group versus out-group membership in shaping moral judgment. 461 (...) participants responded to COVID-19 scenarios either in their native language (Persian) or foreign language (English). Contrary to findings of prior research on moral judgment, the results of the current study indicated that those using their native language showed more sensitivity to consequences compared to those using a foreign language and that less religious individuals were more likely to endorse norms compared to more religious participants. These unexpected findings may be attributed either to the use of more realistic scenarios or to some problems associated with the use of the CNI model. Further, participants’ responses did not significantly differ as a result of group membership, but in line with prior research, exploratory analyses revealed that men showed greater sensitivity to consequences. (shrink)

Greene uses evidence from psychology and neuroscience to argue that manual mode is conducive to utilitarian judgments. He further argues that these data, in conjunction with philosophical premises, lend normative support to utilitarianism. After defending Greene’s philosophical premises against critics, I contend that the current state of the evidence suggests that manual mode does not drive utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas involving self-sacrifice. I performed an experiment which replicated the positive association between cognitive reflection test scores and utilitarian responses to (...) dilemmas that involved sacrificing the interests of others. However, I did not find a positive association between CRT scores and self-sacrificial utilitarian responses. The lack of a connection between manual mode and self-sacrifice presents a problem for Greene’s argument that manual mode drives utilitarianism in general. Prima facie, my results indicate that reflection only drives other-sacrificial utilitarian judgments, not self-sacrificial ones. Greene is left without a basis to say that cognitive science lends support to the normative conclusion that we ought to engage in utilitarian self-sacrifice by, for example, giving more to charity. I conclude by discussing other implications of my data for Greene’s argument, and outlining directions for future research. (shrink)