Formulating a metaphysical definition of human play faces three main difficulties. First, for many years the very possibility, or need, for such a definition has been questioned. Second, very often...

Formulating a metaphysical definition of human play faces three main difficulties. First, for many years the very possibility, or need, for such a definition has been questioned. Second, very often...

ABSTRACTIn the first notebook published in Überlegungen II-VI, which covers the years 1931 and 1932, Martin Heidegger uses a conception of power that is different to that found in his later work. Rather than power being the expression of the will to will and source of ruin for humanity, he says that humanity can only be saved from ruin if it can pave the way for an “empowerment of being”. This article will show that this early understanding of power is (...) related to Heidegger’s conception of freedom as the essence of truth, developing his thinking on this topic from the period of 1927–1930. It will show that the terms “empowerment of being” and “letting be” are akin, and that Heidegger uses the former to distance his thinking from potential misinterpretations of the essay “On the Essence of Truth”. (shrink)

La libertad es el concepto fundamental de la “metafísica del Dasein”, que Heidegger desarrolló a finales de los años 20 en continuidad con la ontología fundamental de Ser y tiempo, y que se articula junto a otros dos conceptos: trascendencia y fundamento de la existencia. En ese periodo Heidegger realizó sobre el tratado de la libertad (Freiheitsschrift) de Schelling una temprana y positiva interpretación, diluida en sus relecturas posteriores y más críticas de la obra. Según la tesis de este trabajo, (...) gracias a esta temprana lectura de la concepción de la libertad en Schelling, al hilo de la idea de libertad en la filosofía práctica kantiana, superando el poso idealista-trascendental del Freiheitsschrift, y descubriendo en él la prefiguración de la “diferencia ontológica” y de la “temporalidad” del Dasein, Heidegger formula el sentido metafísico y último de la esencia de la existencia, cuya posibilidad de ser es la libertad. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta uma análise da abordagem de Heidegger à dialética transcendental no contexto de sua interpretação da Crítica da Razão Pura de Kant. Inicialmente, reconstruo a interpretação fenomenológica da Crítica da Razão Pura como sendo uma fundamentação da metafísica. A seguir, apresento a compreensão de Heidegger sobre o que ele chamou de significado positivo da dialética transcendental. O foco principal de sua interpretação é a noção de ilusão transcendental. Concluo este artigo examinando a noção de uma ilusão original, que (...) Heidegger concebe como mais básica do que a ilusão transcendental examinada por Kant. Enfatizo que as subreções transcendentais que Kant explicou na dialética transcendental são interpretadas por Heidegger como casos particulares de uma confusão mais geral, cuja origem pertence à própria estrutura da compreensão do ser. (shrink)

The Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom is the most coherent form of Schelling’s attempt to describe the absolute system or the system of freedom. For the first time in the twentieth century, with Heidegger’s careful reference to his treatise on freedom and his repeated commentary in 1936 and 1941, the importance of this treatise in the history of Western thought became apparent. Heidegger focuses on Schilling’s thinking, especially with Schilling’s treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, research (...) into the formation of the system, and the question of the possibility of a system of freedom as a question of the essence of being. Schilling bases his research on the system of freedom on a correct ontological basis in order to transcend formal freedom as an independent determinant of mechanical causation and to achieve the true definition of freedom as the ability to do good and evil. And after proposing the inadequacy of formal freedom in the idealist systems before it, it introduces the real and living concept of freedom as the ability to do good and evil. Heidegger demonstrates the independence of the Schelling system in comparison with the Fichte and Hegel systems, and his innovations in response to issues such as evil, freedom, identity, and the relation of being and “is” are most evident in the metaphysical realm of the will; however, remaining within the metaphorical framework also prevents Schilling from approaching the question of the truth of existence. Schilling’s important issue is the elimination of the opposition between freedom and necessity, which, in his view, is the focus of philosophy. For this reason, the discussion of freedom is at the heart of the system in its true sense, and in his opinion, his dissertation is for the first time the design of a system based on the idea of human freedom. The possibility of a system of freedom must be created in accordance with the principle of identity, which does not ignore the meaning of the relation of theology. In Schelling’s Heideggerian interpretation of the principle of identity, the priority of ontological issues in matters of theological nature such as all theism is given more importance and the question of all theism as a question of the system to the question of “is” and how to connect the structure of beings as a whole. The purpose of this paper is to analyze Heidegger’s interpretation of the concept of the system of freedom according to Schelling with emphasis on the ontological distinction between ground and existence. This study seeks to answer these two questions: how does the design of the real concept of freedom open the way to explain the ontological foundation of the possibility of evil and the possibility of freedom in the system? Also, how does the distinction between ground and existence lead to Schelling’s main goal in resolving the conflict between system and freedom? Moreover, according to Heidegger, to what extent does this distinction arise from Schilling’s metaphysical and subject-centered thinking? (shrink)