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  1. Alternative mathematics and the strong programme: Reply to Triplett.Richard C. Jennings - 1988 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):93 – 101.
    Timm Triplett argues (Inquiry 29 [1986], no. 4) that David Bloor does not succeed in justifying a relativistic interpretation of mathematics. It is objected that Triplett has focused his attention on the wrong chapter of Bloor's Knowledge and Social Imagery, and that the examples which Triplett demands Bloor provide to make the case do appear in the subsequent chapter. Moreover, Bloor has anticipated and refuted Triplett's brief criticism of the examples that make Bloor's case for the relativism of mathematics. Finally, (...)
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  • (1 other version)On the art of being wrong: An essay on the dialectic of errors.Sverre Wide - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 43 (4):573-588.
    This essay attempts to distinguish and discuss the importance and limitations of different ways of being wrong. At first it is argued that strictly falsifiable knowledge is concerned with simple (instrumental) mistakes only, and thus is incapable of understanding more complex errors (and truths). In order to gain a deeper understanding of mistakes (and to understand a deeper kind of mistake), it is argued that communicative aspects have to be taken into account. This is done in the theory of communicative (...)
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  • (1 other version)On the Art of Being Wrong: An Essay on the Dialectic of Errors.Sverre Wide - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 43 (4):573-588.
    This essay attempts to distinguish and discuss the importance and limitations of different ways of being wrong. At first it is argued that strictly falsifiable knowledge is concerned with simple (instrumental) mistakes only, and thus is incapable of understanding more complex errors (and truths). In order to gain a deeper understanding of mistakes (and to understand a deeper kind of mistake), it is argued that communicative aspects have to be taken into account. This is done in the theory of communicative (...)
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  • Philosophical skepticism not relativism is the problem with the Strong Programme in Science Studies and with Educational Constructivism.Dimitris P. Papayannakos - 2008 - Science & Education 17 (6):573-611.
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