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  1. Transparent quantification into hyperintensional objectual attitudes.Bjørn Jespersen & Marie Duží - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):635-677.
    We demonstrate how to validly quantify into hyperintensional contexts involving non-propositional attitudes like seeking, solving, calculating, worshipping, and wanting to become. We describe and apply a typed extensional logic of hyperintensions that preserves compositionality of meaning, referential transparency and substitutivity of identicals also in hyperintensional attitude contexts. We specify and prove rules for quantifying into hyperintensional contexts. These rules presuppose a rigorous method for substituting variables into hyperintensional contexts, and the method will be described. We prove the following. First, it (...)
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  • Nontrivial Existence in Transparent Intensional Logic.Miloš Kosterec - 2024 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 20 (1):113-130.
    The paper analyses the validity of arguments supporting the assumption of a constant universe of individuals over all possible worlds within Transparent Intensional Logic. These arguments, proposed by Tichý, enjoy widespread acceptance among researchers working within the system. However, upon closer examination, this paper demonstrates several weaknesses in the argumentation, suggesting that there is an open possibility to incorporate a variable universe of individuals even in models within this system.
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  • Left Subsectivity: How to Infer that a Round Peg is Round.Bjørn Jespersen - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (4):531-547.
    A property modifier is a function that takes a property to a property. For instance, the modifier short takes the property being a Dutchman to the property being a short Dutchman. Assume that being a round peg is a property obtained by means of modification, round being the modifier and being a peg the input property. Then how are we to infer that a round peg is a peg? By means of a rule of right subsectivity. How are we to (...)
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  • Anatomy of a proposition.Bjørn Jespersen - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1285-1324.
    This paper addresses the mereological problem of the unity of structured propositions. The problem is how to make multiple parts interact such that they form a whole that is ultimately related to truth and falsity. The solution I propose is based on a Platonist variant of procedural semantics. I think of procedures as abstract entities that detail a logical path from input to output. Procedures are modeled on a function/argument logic, but are not functions. Instead they are higher-order, fine-grained structures. (...)
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  • If structured propositions are logical procedures then how are procedures individuated?Marie Duží - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1249-1283.
    This paper deals with two issues. First, it identifies structured propositions with logical procedures. Second, it considers various rigorous definitions of the granularity of procedures, hence also of structured propositions, and comes out in favour of one of them. As for the first point, structured propositions are explicated as algorithmically structured procedures. I show that these procedures are structured wholes that are assigned to expressions as their meanings, and their constituents are sub-procedures occurring in executed mode. Moreover, procedures are not (...)
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