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  1. On Socrates' Project of Philosophical Conversion.Jacob Stump - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (32):1-19.
    There is a wide consensus among scholars that Plato’s Socrates is wrong to trust in reason and argument as capable of converting people to the life of philosophy. In this paper, I argue for the opposite. I show that Socrates employs a more sophisticated strategy than is typically supposed. Its key component is the use of philosophical argument not to lead an interlocutor to rationally conclude that he must change his way of life but rather to cause a certain affective (...)
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  • Self-Knowledge in the Eye-Soul Analogy of the Alcibiades.Daniel Ferguson - 2019 - Phronesis 64 (4):369-391.
    The kind of self-knowledge at issue in the eye-soul analogy of the Alcibiades is knowledge of one’s epistemic state, i.e. what one knows and does not know, rather than knowledge of what one is. My evidence for this is the connection between knowledge of one’s epistemic state and self-improvement, the equivalence of self-knowledge to moderation, and the fact that ‘looking’ into the soul of another is a metaphor for elenctic discussion. The final lines of the analogy clarify that the part (...)
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  • Self-Knowledge, Elenchus and Authority in Early Plato.Fiona Leigh - 2020 - Phronesis 65 (3):247-280.
    In some of Plato’s early dialogues we find a concern with correctly ascertaining the contents of a particular kind of one’s own psychological states, cognitive states. Indeed, one of the achievements of the elenctic method is to facilitate cognitive self-knowledge. In the Alcibiades, moreover, Plato interprets the Delphic injunction, ‘know yourself’, as crucially requiring cognitive self-knowledge, and ending in knowing oneself as subject to particular epistemic norms. Epistemic authority for self-knowledge is, for Plato, conferred on the basis of correct application (...)
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  • Dialectic and Who We Are in the Alcibiades.Albert Joosse - 2014 - Phronesis 59 (1):1-21.
    In the Platonic Alcibiades, Socrates raises two central philosophical questions: Who are we? and: How ought we to take care of ourselves? He answers these questions, I argue, in his famous comparison between eyes and souls. Both answers hinge upon dialectic: self-care functions through dialectic because we are communicating beings. I adduce arguments for this from the set-up and language of the comparison passage. Another important indication is that Socrates expressly refers back to an earlier, aborted attempt to describe who (...)
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