El objetivo de este artículo es analizar dos confusiones o puntos ciegos asociados a la teoría de la secularización, fundamentalmente en lo que respecta a la relación que establece entre lo secular y lo religioso. Para ello tomamos como punto de partida el trabajo de José Casanova titulado Genealogías de la secularización, en el que estudia las tres sub-tesis a partir de las que se articula dicha teoría: diferenciación entre esferas seculares y religiosas, declive generalizado de la creencia y de (...) la práctica religiosa y privatización de lo religioso. Una vez señalado lo anterior, el primero de los «blindspots» que analizaremos parte de abordar la secularización desde la perspectiva de la primera sub-tesis y se manifiesta en forma de euro-centrismo o de cristiano-centrismo. Desde esta perspectiva, la particularidad cristiano-europea se utiliza como patrón general de secularización; el segundo «blindspot» se centra en la segunda sub-tesis (aunque en menor medida también en la tercera) y parte de una identificación absoluta entre lo religioso y la religión. Desde este punto de vista, la teoría de la secularización reduce el fenómeno religioso a la religión, dejando fuera de esta ecuación una importante cantidad de formas religiosas que no consiguen (o no buscan) sistematizarse (tal y como la religión exige). (shrink)

Inspired by american pragmatism and Hans Joas' proposal of an affirmative genealogy, I argue in this paper that a genealogical inquiry (both on the biografical and on the historical level) can explain what motivates individuals to moral agency better than Kantian moral philosophy, without renouncing an historically-informed conception of universal moral values.

Recent analyses have critically evaluated the connection of abstract rights with territorial nation-states. This article extends those findings by analyzing the way discourses of rights (human, political, national) are interconnected. It is argued that the system of relations that rights establish between their norms and concrete sociopolitical practices allows rights to function as overall machinery, one that both produces and governs subjects. From this perspective, this article establishes that: (a) since rights depend for their legal guarantee on the power of (...) nation-states, they are a normative standard which coincides with the political power of a nation-state; (b) since rights require a certain ethic from subjects in order that their exercise of rights be legally protectable, they govern subjects through inclusion, that is, by structuring fields of action in order that a certain “proper” conduct may take place; (c) since the nation-state framework with which rights are connected operates in a postcolonial order, the functioning of rights is also connected with the discursive dynamics of postcoloniality. The empirical focus of the discussion is on Pakistan. The first section focuses on the use of human rights’ discourse in order to counter drone attacks in Pakistan’s tribal belt. The conundrums that human rights in this context generate are then filled in by acknowledging “rights” of a state (i.e. political sovereignty and territorial integrity), which is the focus of second section. The third section comments on the way national and political rights correspond to the notions of “citizenship” and “belongingness,” which in turn shapes the conduct of subjects in a contextually apt manner. (shrink)