This essay examines whether and to what extent the “other” in communicative interactions may be otherwise than another human subject and the moral opportunities and challenges this alteration would make available to us. Toward this end, the analysis proceeds in five steps or movements. The first reviews the way the discipline of communication has typically perceived and theorized the role and function of technology. The second and third parts investigate the critical challenges that emerging technology, such as artificial intelligence applications (...) and robots, poses to this standard instrumentalist way of thinking. The fourth part introduces an alternative called “relational ethics,” which effectively flips the script on the usual way of proceeding. And the fifth part presents and responds to one important and notable objection to this alternative. The goal in all of this is not to complicate things but to introduce and formulate a techno-ethics that is more agile in its response to the opportunities and challenges of the 21st century and beyond. (shrink)

This paper sheds light on the shift that is taking place from the practice of ‘coding’, namely developing programs as conventional in the software community, to the practice of ‘curing’, an activity that has emerged in the last few years in Deep Learning (DL) and that amounts to curing the data regime to which a DL model is exposed during training. Initially, the curing paradigm is illustrated by means of a study-case on autonomous vehicles. Subsequently, the shift from coding to (...) curing is analysed taking into consideration the epistemological notions, central in the philosophy of computer science, of function, implementation, and correctness. First, it is illustrated how, in the curing paradigm, the functions performed by the trained model depend much more on dataset curation rather than on the model algorithms which, in contrast with the coding paradigm, do not comply with requested specifications. Second, it is highlighted how DL models cannot be considered implementations according to any of the available definitions of implementation that follow an intentional theory of functions. Finally, it is argued that DL models cannot be evaluated in terms of their correctness but rather in their experimental computational validity. (shrink)

More organizations use AI in the hiring process than ever before, yet the perceived ethicality of such processes seems to be mixed. With such variation in our views of AI in hiring, we need to understand how these perceptions impact the organizations that use it. In two studies, we investigate how ethical perceptions of using AI in hiring are related to perceptions of organizational attractiveness and innovativeness. Our findings indicate that ethical perceptions of using AI in hiring are positively related (...) to perceptions of organizational attractiveness, both directly and indirectly via perceptions of organizational innovativeness, with variations depending on the type of hiring method used. For instance, we find that individuals who consider it ethical for organizations to use AI in ways often considered to be intrusive to privacy, such as analyzing social media content for traits and characteristics, view such organizations as both more innovative and attractive. Our findings trigger a timely discussion about the critical role of ethical perceptions of AI in hiring on organizational attractiveness and innovativeness. (shrink)