Park and Davies (2024) discuss the allocation of scarce resources during a pandemic—primarily ventilators and healthcare staff—and assess the ethical concepts that are used in arguments for and aga...

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is increasingly recognised as a threat to human, animal and environmental health. In an effort to counter this threat, several intervention plans have been proposed and implemented by states and organisations such as the WHO. A One Health policy approach, which targets multiple domains (healthcare, animal husbandry and the environment), has been identified as useful for curbing AMR. Johnson and Matlock have recently argued that One Health policies in the AMR context require special ethical justification because of (...) the so-called least restrictive alternative principle. This article analyses and rejects two assumptions that this argument relies on. The first assumption is that One Health policies are generally more restrictive than their alternatives because they target more domains and impact more people. The second assumption is that the least restrictive alternative principle has a special normative importance in that it establishes a systematic presumption in favour of the least restrictive policy options. Once these assumptions are rejected, the use of One Health policies on AMR can be justified more easily than Johnson and Matlock argue. (shrink)

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) has been declared one of the top ten global public health threats facing humanity. To address AMR, coercive antimicrobial stewardship policies are being enacted in some settings. These policies, like all in public health, require ethical justification. Here, I introduce a framework for ethically evaluating coercive antimicrobial stewardship policies on the basis of ethical justifications (and their limitations). I consider arguments from effectiveness; duty of easy rescue; tragedy of the commons; responsibility-tracking; the harm principle; paternalism; justice and (...) development; a precautionary approach; and professional duties. I consider how these justifications might form the basis for developing a comprehensive ethical framework, and the need for this to be context-specific and aligned with the priorities, evidence and needs of the particular jurisdictions in which a policy is to be enacted. I demonstrate how the ethical justifications might be used by reference to an example policy of the EU ban on the use of certain human-critical antibiotics for livestock, before concluding with challenges for further development of the framework. (shrink)

Residential aged care facilities (RACF) are sites of high antibiotic use in Australia. Misuse of antimicrobial drugs in RACF contributes to antimicrobial resistance (AMR) burdens that accrue to individuals and the wider public, now and in the future. Antimicrobial stewardship (AMS) practices in RACF, e.g. requiring conformation of infection, are designed to minimise inappropriate use of antibiotics. We conducted dialogue groups with 46 participants with a parent receiving aged care to better understand families’ perspectives on antibiotics and care in RACF. (...) Participants grappled with value trade offs in thinking about their own parents’ care, juggling imagined population and future harms with known short term comfort of individuals and prioritising the latter. Distributive justice in AMR relies on collective moral responsibility and action for the benefit of future generations and unknown others. In RACF, AMS requires value trade-offs and compromise on antimicrobial use in an environment that is heavily reliant on antimicrobial drugs to perform caring functions. In the context of aged care, AMS is a technical solution to a deeply relational and socio-structural problem and there is a risk that carers (workers, families) are morally burdened by system failures that are not addressed in AMS solutions. (shrink)

In his feature article, Tyler Paetkau1 argues that the Nuffield Council on Bioethics’ (NCOB) infamous intervention ladder2 fails to acknowledge systemic influences towards poor health outcomes and instead places the blame on individuals. The ladder of interventions to change individual health behaviours runs from less intrusive to more intrusive and pays less attention to possible regulatory mechanisms for big businesses that would often avoid such intrusion on individuals and the punitive implications of that intrusion. Paetkau cites smoking bans and food (...) labelling as examples of various levels of public health measures intruding on individual freedoms. According to him, instead of preventing people from smoking in public spaces or trying to influence their food purchase decisions, we should instead address the social determinants of health through systemic interventions, by which he means ‘interventions that operate on the level of systems rather than individuals and do not target or require individual behaviour change’1 (p. 2). The argument, however, might be questioned. At points in the article, Paetkau proposes that his new, broadened ‘stairway’ set of public health interventions ‘highlights the intimate connection between systemic interventions and individual outcomes’1 (p. 5). However, in some places, …. (shrink)