Switch to: References

Citations of:

Of Brains in Vats, Whatever Brains in Vats May Be

Bredo C. Johnsen

Philosophical Studies 112 (3):225-249 (2003)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.

Semantic self-knowledge and the vat argument.Joshua Rowan Thorpe - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2289-2306.details Putnam’s vat argument is intended to show that I am not a permanently envatted brain. The argument holds promise as a response to vat scepticism, which depends on the claim that I do not know that I am not a permanently envatted brain. However, there is a widespread idea that the vat argument cannot fulfil this promise, because to employ the argument as a response to vat scepticism I would have to make assumptions about the content of the premises and/or (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Closure Scepticism and The Vat Argument.Joshua Rowan Thorpe - 2017 - Mind 127 (507):667-690.details If it works, I can use Putnam’s vat argument to show that I have not always been a brain-in-a-vat. It is widely thought that the vat argument is of no use against closure scepticism – that is, scepticism motivated by arguments that appeal to a closure principle. This is because, even if I can use the vat argument to show that I have not always been a BIV, I cannot use it to show that I was not recently envatted, and (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations

1