Statements containing epistemic modals (e.g., “by spring 2023 most European countries may have the Covid-19 pandemic under control”) are common expressions of epistemic uncertainty. In this paper, previous published findings (Knobe & Yalcin, 2014; Khoo & Phillips, 2018) on the opposition between Contextualism and Relativism for epistemic modals are re-examined. It is found that these findings contain a substantial degree of individual variation. To investigate whether participants differ in their interpretation of epistemic modals, an experiment with multiple phases and sessions (...) is used to classify participants according to the three semantic theories of Relativism, Contextualism, and Objectivism. Through this study, some of the first empirical evidence for the kind of truth-value shifts postulated by semantic Relativism is presented. It is furthermore found that participants’ disagreement judgments match their truth evaluations and that participants are capable of distinguishing between truth and justification. In a second experimental session, it is investigated whether participants thus classified follow the norm of retraction which Relativism uses to account for argumentation with epistemic modals. Here the results are less favorable for Relativism. In a second experiment, these results are replicated and the normative beliefs of participants concerning the norm of retraction are investigated following work on measuring norms by Bicchieri (2017). Again, it is found that on average participants show no strong preferences concerning the norm of retraction for epistemic modals. Yet, it was found that participants who had committed to Objectivism and had training in logics applied the norm of retraction to might-statements. These results present a substantial challenge to the account of argumentation with epistemic modals presented in MacFarlane (2014), as discussed. Keywords: Epistemic Modals, Relativism, Norm Conflicts, Retraction, Semantics, Truth Conditions, Argumentation. (shrink)

We argue that formal linguistic theory, properly extended, can provide a unifying framework for diverse phenomena beyond traditional linguistic objects. We display applications to pictorial meanings, visual narratives, music, dance, animal communication, and, more abstractly, to logical and non-logical concepts in the ‘language of thought’ and reasoning. In many of these cases, a careful analysis reveals that classic linguistic notions are pervasive across these domains, such as for instance the constituency (or grouping) core principle of syntax, the use of logical (...) variables (for object tracking), or the variety of inference types investigated in semantics/pragmatics. The aim of this overview is to show how the application of formal linguistic concepts and methodology to non-linguistic objects yields non-trivial insights, thus opening the possibility of a general, precise theory of signs. (An appendix, found in the online supplements to this article, surveys applications of Super Linguistics to animal communication.). (shrink)

We argue that formal linguistic theory, properly extended, can provide a unifying framework for diverse phenomena beyond traditional linguistic objects. We display applications to pictorial meanings, visual narratives, music, dance, animal communication, and, more abstractly, to logical and non-logical concepts in the ‘language of thought’ and reasoning. In many of these cases, a careful analysis reveals that classic linguistic notions are pervasive across these domains, such as for instance the constituency (or grouping) core principle of syntax, the use of logical (...) variables (for object tracking), or the variety of inference types investigated in semantics/pragmatics. The aim of this overview is to show how the application of formal linguistic concepts and methodology to non-linguistic objects yields non-trivial insights, thus opening the possibility of a general, precise theory of signs. (An appendix, found in the online supplements to this article, surveys applications of Super Linguistics to animal communication.). (shrink)

In this paper, a novel experimental task is developed for testing the highly influential, but experimentally underexplored, possible worlds account of conditionals (Stalnaker, 1968; Lewis, 1973). In Experiment 1, this new task is used to test both indicative and subjunctive conditionals. For indicative conditionals, five competing truth tables are compared, including the previously untested, multi-dimensional possible worlds semantics of Bradley (2012). In Experiment 2, these results are replicated and it is shown that they cannot be accounted for by an alternative (...) hypothesis proposed by our reviewers. In Experiment 3, individual variation in truth assignments of indicative conditionals is investigated via Bayesian mixture models that classify participants as following one of several competing models. As a novelty of this study, it is found that a possible worlds semantics of Lewis and Stalnaker is capable of accounting for participants’ aggregate truth value assignments in this task. Applied to indicative conditionals, we show across three experiments, that the theory both captures participants’ truth values at the aggregate level (Experiments 1 and 2) and that it makes up the largest subgroup in the analysis of individual variation in our experimental paradigm (Experiment 3). (shrink)

Habilitation thesis in psychology. The book consists of a collection of reasoning studies. The experimental investigations will take us from people’s reasoning about probabilities, entailments, pragmatic factors, argumentation, and causality to morality. An overarching theme of the book is norm pluralism and individual differences in rationality research.

The theory of mental models is a current cognitive approach trying to describe the way people make inferences. According to this theory, people reason from possibilities or models linked to sentences. Sometimes, such possibilities or models are transformed by the action of a semantic modulation. The point this paper is intended to make is that Stoic logic also has the machinery to explain semantic processes such as that of modulation. This is shown by means of the criterion Chrysippus of Soli (...) provided for conditional sentences and the theory of sign related to that criterion. (shrink)

Peter Wason provided his four-card selection task over five decades ago. It keeps causing difficulties from both the linguistic, the psychological, and the cognitive point of view. Many psychology theories have been proposed in order to remove its problems. This paper tries to offer one more possible account. That account is based on the method of extension and intension presented by Rudolf Carnap. Hence, it resorts to the concept of state-description. The basic ideas of the argumentation are two: 1) people (...) might tend to consider state-descriptions when processing information, and 2) if conditionals are not expressed with a clear contextual framework, they might be interpreted as biconditionals. (shrink)

Reflectivists consider reflective reasoning crucial for good judgment and action. Anti-reflectivists deny that reflection delivers what reflectivists seek. Alas, the evidence is mixed. So, does reflection confer normative value or not? This paper argues for a middle way: reflection can confer normative value, but its ability to do this is bound by such factors as what we might call epistemic identity: an identity that involves particular beliefs—for example, religious and political identities. We may reflectively defend our identities’ beliefs rather than (...) reflect open-mindedly to adopt whatever beliefs cohere with the best arguments and evidence. This bounded reflectivism is explicated with an algorithmic model of reflection synthesized from philosophy and science that yields testable predictions, psychometric implications, and realistic metaphilosophical suggestions—for example, overcoming motivated reflection may require embracing epistemic identity rather than veiling it (à la Rawls 1971). So bounded reflectivism should be preferred to views offering anything less. (shrink)

The suppression task challenges classical logic. Classical logic is monotonic. However, in the suppression task, an inference with the form of modus ponendo ponens is inhibited by adding a new premise. Several explanations have been given to account for this fact. The present paper indicates three of them as examples: that of the theory of mental models, that based on logic programming and closed world assumption, and that referring to Carnap's concept of state‐descriptions. Besides, the paper offers one more explanation (...) linked to Carnap's idea of reduction. It proposes sentences akin to a reduction sentence, a pair reduction, and a bilateral reduction sentence. Those sentences are related to the initial conditional in the suppression task. This proposal tries to stay within first‐order predicate logic. (shrink)

For most of its history, the psychology of reasoning was dominated by binary extensional logic. The so-called “new paradigm” instead puts subjective degrees of belief center stage, often represented as probabilities. We argue that the “new paradigm” is too vaguely defined and therefore does not allow a clear decision about what falls within its scope and what does not. We also show that there was not one settled theoretical “old” paradigm, before the new developments emerged, and that the alleged new (...) paradigm is less revolutionary as the term suggests. A more veridical view is that current progress is developing in continuities where rival research programs can thrive or fail in the face of new experimental findings. The article closes with some topics where more connections between competing research programs are likely to promote progress in our understanding of human reasoning. (shrink)

Knauff and Gazzo Castañeda (this issue) critique the "new paradigm" – a framework that replaces logic with probabilities – on the grounds that there existed no "old” paradigm for it to supplant. Their position is supported by the large numbers of theories that theorists developed to explain the Wason selection task, syllogisms, and other tasks. We propose some measures to inhibit such facile theorizing, which threatens the viability of cognitive science. We show that robust results exist contrary to the new (...) paradigm, and that it is unable to account for other results. (shrink)

We provide a new link between deductive and probabilistic reasoning fallacies. Illusory inferences from disjunction are a broad class of deductive fallacies traditionally explained by recourse to a matching procedure that looks for content overlap between premises. In two behavioral experiments, we show that this phenomenon is instead sensitive to real-world causal dependencies and not to exact content overlap. A group of participants rated the strength of the causal dependence between pairs of sentences. This measure is a near perfect predictor (...) of fallacious reasoning by an independent group of participants in illusory inference tasks with the same materials. In light of these results, we argue that all extant accounts of these deductive fallacies require non-trivial adjustments. Crucially, these novel _indirect_ illusory inferences from disjunction bear a structural similarity to seemingly unrelated _probabilistic reasoning_ problems, in particular the conjunction fallacy from the heuristics and biases literature. This structural connection was entirely obscure in previous work on these deductive problems, due to the theoretical and empirical focus on content overlap. We argue that this structural parallelism provides arguments against the need for rich descriptions and individuating information in the conjunction fallacy, and we outline a unified theory of deductive illusory inferences from disjunction and the conjunction fallacy, in terms of Bayesian confirmation theory. (shrink)

La teoría de los modelos mentales ofrece una explicación de cómo los seres humanos infieren conclusiones. Tal explicación no es coherente con la lógica clásica. Admite inferencias que son incorrectas en dicha lógica. Dos de esas inferencias son consideradas aquí. Una de ellas permite derivar que las cláusulas de un condicional son posibles si ese condicional es verdadero. La otra autoriza a deducir que las cláusulas de una disyunción son posibles si esa disyunción es verdadera. Recurriendo al modo que en (...) Crisipo de Solos entiende las relaciones condicionales, este trabajo propone dos axiomas que describen las estructuras de esas dos inferencias. La idea es que tales axiomas podrían ser incluidos en un hipotético sistema axiomático que intentara reproducir cómo son los procesos inferenciales humanos. (shrink)

No present theory explains the inferences people draw about the real world when reasoning about “bouletic” relations, that is, predicates that express desires, such aswantin “Lee wants to be in love”. Linguistic accounts ofwantdefine it in terms of a relation to a desirer's beliefs, and how its complement is deemed desirable. In contrast, we describe a new model‐based theory that posits that by default, desire predicates such aswantcontrast desires against facts. In particular,A wants Pimplies by default thatPis not the case, (...) because you cannot want what is already true. On further deliberation, reasoners may infer thatA believes, but does not know for certain, thatPis not the case. The theory makes several empirical predictions about how people interpret, assess the consistency of, and draw conclusions from desire predicates likewant. Seven experiments tested and validated the theory's central predictions. We assess the theory in light of recent proposals of desire predicates. (shrink)

Kai kurios šiuolaikinio kognityvinio mokslo teorijos teigia, kad žmogaus prote veikia dvi sistemos: sistema, vykdanti greitą intuityvų mąstymą, bei sistema, vadovaujanti lėtam logiškam mąstymui. Būtų galima manyti, kad šių sistemų egzistavimą patikrinti sudėtinga. Šiame straipsnyje pateikiamas būdas palaipsniui patvirtinti šių dviejų sistemų egzistavimą. Pasitelkiamas dviejų sistemų, pasireiškiančių per mentalinių modelių teoriją, principas. Be to, laikantis Carnapo redukcijos idėjos, straipsnyje aprašomos dvi procedūros, kuriomis hipotezė patvirtinama palaipsniui. Viena iš jų tyrinėja, kaip žmogaus protas nagrinėja žmogaus proto veiklą darant išvedimus pagal modus (...) tollendo tollens. Kita hipotezė tyrinėja išvedimus iš griežtosios disjunkcijos su trimis disjunktais. (shrink)

This paper is intended to address the work “Against logical form”, authored by Johnson-Laird in 2010. In it, based on the theory of mental models, Johnson-Laird claims that the way people interpret sentences in natural language has nothing to do with logic. This is because that action is not related to logical forms. According to him, the mental activity is mainly linked to semantics and pragmatics. However, here, following arguments provided by López-Astorga, I try to show that the theory of (...) mental models can be linked to syntactic structures. My main point is made by dealing with an argument given in the mentioned Johnson-Laird’s paper. In principle, that argument seems to undermine proposals such as that of López-Astorga. However, the present work proposes otherwise. (shrink)