Challenged by moral nihilism we have three options: some sort of “Protagorean” conventionalism, a transcendentally rooted version of “naturalism” originally identified by Plato and fleshed out by Augustine, and a “virtual” morality cynically marketed as objective. Conventionalism, however, fails to ground obligation, which could thus be justified only by “Augustine's” alternative, which he developed from its original in three ways: by proposing a personal first principle, thus emphasising respect for every individual; by deepening our awareness of evil in reinforcing the (...) notion of “crime” by that of “sin” against the nature and consequent commands of a personal God; and by locating us in no timeless sphere of pure rationality but in our particular historical space. Religion (so understood) and moral obligation stand or fall together. (shrink)

Modernity has imposed on many of us, and perhaps especially on academics, a habit of silence with regard to what John Rawls called deeply held ‘comprehensive’ moral beliefs. According to Rawls and his many disciples, the survival of liberalism depends upon the bracketing of comprehensive beliefs whenever we step into the public sphere. And in the field of higher education, that would have to include the classroom, the lab, the library carrel, the hotel conference suites where we confer and exchange (...) ideas, as well as the vast academic publishing apparatus. I would like to call attention to the way that the supposed requirement of the Rawlsian silence is being challenged, not just by conservative critics but even by such a staunch defender of conventional liberalism as Jürgen Habermas. Second, if Habermas and the other critics are right, then a fortiori, the public university—perhaps the most representative and exemplary of all the institutions of civil society—ought to welcome the infusion of relevant but closely held beliefs, including religious ones, in carrying out its research and teaching responsibilities. (shrink)

The domain of ethics deals with the antagonisms between “good and evil, right or wrong, correct or unjust, virtuoso or vicious” etc. However, ethics is not the only area where these terms can be used, but as a norm, most ethical systems have been grounded in negotiating and consolidating these debates. Ethics has been transposed into many areas of activity, social and / or professional, so over time, according to Harry Redner, ethics have been born on account of the relationship (...) of feelings: love vs blame (religious or moral ethics), patriotism and glory vs. disgrace and disapproval (civic ethics), respect and veneration vs. rejection and humility (ethics of responsibility). These types of ethics over time have mixed up and can be “distinguished according to the external guarantees that they rely on to ensure social conformities.” These external guarantees, according to Harry Redner, are conventions, norms and laws. Even though they seem to be identical, there are some details of difference that are worth mentioning to understand the analytical assembly. (shrink)