Critical thinking is considered an essential educational goal. As a result, many philosophers dreamed their departments would offer multiple sections of CT, hence justifying hiring additional staff. Unfortunately, this dream did not materialize. So, similar to a current theory about teaching writing, “critical thinking across the curriculum” has become a popular idea. While the idea has appeal and unquestionable merit, I will argue that the likelihood the skills necessary for effective CT will actually be taught is minimal.

From a dialectical point of view, the evaluation of argumentation includes consideration of how well it deals with counter-arguments. This corresponds with one of the requirements developed in Dutch jurisprudence: if the justification of a ju dicial decision does not reflect on essential counter-arguments, the decision may be quashed in appeal. I will first examine what textual clues identify counter-arguments and objections, and then discuss the criteria that are used in legal practice to ev aluate how well the justification responds (...) to counter-arguments and objections. Finally, I compare these with proposals for dialectical criteria. (shrink)

In this paper, I re-examine the connection Hans-Georg Gadamer made between hermeneutics and the rhetorical tradition in light of recent developments in informal logic. Originally, Gadamer made this connection between hermeneutics and rhetoric because both use the theoretical tools of persuasion and acceptance in contrast to scientific objective methodology. Since this association, another possibility has arisen; informal logic. Using the writings of Ralph Johnson, I outline the difference between in formal logic and rhetoric, and suggest that after an analyses of (...) these differences, informal logic appears to be closer to hermeneutics in its overall structure and telos than rhetoric. (shrink)

This essay presents a three-dimensional analysis of definition with application to making and evaluating definitions; teaching how to define; avoiding equivocation with "argument" and "bias"; and, using the concept-conception distinction, avoiding being deterred by the many definitions of "critical thinking", and seeing the usefulness of objectivity in everyday arguments in spite of existing conflict and confusion about aspects of objectivity.