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  1. No Such Thing as Too Many Minds.Luke Roelofs - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):131-146.
    Many philosophical views have the surprising implication that, within the boundaries of each human being, there is not just one mind, but many: anywhere from two (the person and their brain, or the person and their body) to trillions (each of the nearly-entirely-overlapping precise entities generated by the Problem of the Many). This is often treated as absurd, a problem of ‘Too Many Minds’, which we must find ways to avoid. It is often thought specifically absurd to allow such a (...)
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  • How to Explain the Importance of Persons.Christopher Register - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    We commonly explain the distinctive prudential and moral status of persons in terms of our mental capacities. I draw from recent work to argue that the common explanation is incomplete. I then develop a new explanation: We are ethically important because we are the object of a pattern of self-concern. I argue that the view solves moral problems posed by permissive ontologies, such as the recent personite problem.
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  • The Personite Problem: Should Practical Reason Be Tabled?1.Mark Johnston - 2016 - Noûs 51 (3):617-644.
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  • The Personite Problem: Should Practical Reason Be Tabled?Mark Johnston - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4):617-644.
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  • How to Explain the Importance of Persons.Christopher Register - 2023 - The Philosophical Quarterly.
    We commonly explain the distinctive prudential and moral status of persons in terms of our mental capacities. I draw from recent work to argue that the common explanation is incomplete. I then develop a new explanation: We are ethically important because we are the object of a pattern of self-concern. I argue that the view solves moral problems posed by permissive ontologies, such as the recent personite problem.
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